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  As cohabitation among unmarried couples becomes more common in the United States, [FN1] a most 
pressing challenge *256 facing inheritance law scholars, practitioners, and others who concern 
themselves with the development of inheritance law is to craft reforms that would, if implemented, 
better serve non-marital families while at the same time maintaining a reasonable ease of administration 
of estates. [FN2]  One area in urgent need of such reform is intestacy law. [FN3]  Current intestacy law 
generally does not *257 reflect as well as it could the way Americans today structure their family lives. 
[FN4]  For example, the intestacy statutes of forty-seven states make no provision for the survivor of a 
non-marital committed partnership. [FN5] 
 
  Committed partners can ameliorate the harshness of existing law and protect each other from 
disinheritance with effective estate planning. [FN6]  But many non-marital couples do not seek to do so, 
either because they procrastinate or because they mistakenly believe that the surviving partner will 
succeed to the decedent partner’s property under their state’s intestacy statute. [FN7]  Moreover, even 
where the partners have attempted to execute an estate plan that provides for the survivor of them, such 
a plan is subject to possible challenge by a partner’s intestate heirs, such as siblings*258 or even more 
distant relations, whom the law deems to be “natural” objects of an unmarried person’s bounty. [FN8] 
 
  I have argued elsewhere in favor of revising Article II of the Uniform Probate Code to grant intestate 
inheritance rights to the intestate decedent’s surviving committed but non-marital partner. [FN9]  
Reform of the Uniform Probate Code to provide such intestate inheritance rights would further Article 
II’s principal goal of promoting the donative freedom of the decedent. [FN10]  Further, such reform 
could be undertaken without unreasonably undermining Article II’s expressed subsidiary goals including 
a desire for simplicity and certainty in the administration of estates. [FN11] 
 
  Moreover, reform of Article II to include recognition of non-marital partnerships, and in particular gay 
and lesbian couples, would serve an expressive function. [FN12]  By including intestate inheritance 
rights for a surviving non-marital committed partner, *259 an amended Article II would demonstrate 
that non-marital committed partnerships merit positive attention under succession law. [FN13]  Thus, 
reform might alter how society views these partnerships and, indeed, how the committed partners view 
their own relationship. [FN14] 
 
  The manner of identifying committed partners, as well as the fact of recognition itself, has the potential 
to shape behavior, to express societal support for the relationship, and to impact the ease of 
administration of estates.  The different approaches to identification reflect different weighing of values 
in this process.  Reform of intestacy law to include non-marital partners might take one of several 
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 approaches: a registration scheme, a multi- factor approach, or a combination registration/multi-factor 
approach. 
 
  Pursuant to a registration scheme, the intestacy statute would provide intestate inheritance rights to a 
surviving non-marital partner only if the partners had registered their partnership as prescribed by the 
statute prior to the intestate’s death.  For example, Hawaii provides an intestate share to a surviving non-
marital partner where the partners had registered prior to the intestate’s death as reciprocal beneficiaries. 
[FN15] 
 
  The registration approach has the virtue of certainty.  Under the registration approach, a determination 
of who is entitled to take an intestate share as a surviving non-marital partner requires only an 
examination of the state’s register for non-marital partners.  This approach avoids a subjective inquiry 
by the fact-finder into the quality of the survivor’s relationship with the intestate *260 so as to determine 
whether the survivor merits recognition under the intestacy scheme. [FN16]  A principal drawback of 
this approach to reform, however, is its underinclusiveness.  The registration approach fails to recognize 
the surviving non-marital partner where the partners chose not to register or simply neglected to do so. 
[FN17] 
 
  A second approach to reform, that addresses the underinclusiveness concern, is the multi-factor 
approach. [FN18]  Pursuant to a multi-factor approach, the non-marital partners need not have registered 
their relationship in order that the survivor of them might be entitled to a share of the intestate estate of 
the first of them to die.  Rather, the survivor may assert her entitlement to an intestate share based upon 
the nature and quality of her relationship with the intestate.  The court must then evaluate that claim by 
considering whether the nature and quality of the claimant’s relationship with the intestate was such that 
it is appropriate that she be awarded an intestate share.  The intestacy statute guides the court in making 
this subjective inquiry by setting out factors that the court might find relevant and helpful in evaluating 
the quality of the partners’ relationship. 
 
  The principal concern with the multi-factor approach is the extent to which a subjective inquiry might 
undermine certainty in *261 administering the intestacy scheme.  In a jurisdiction that allows for a 
multi-factor inquiry, the property owner and her presumptive heirs might be less certain during the 
property owner’s life as to how her intestate estate will be distributed at her death.  Moreover, a court’s 
multi-factor inquiry might require a large expenditure of judicial resources as well as the expenditure by 
the claimant and those who oppose her claim of a great deal of time and financial resources. 
 
  To reduce the uncertainty of the multi-factor approach while still avoiding underinclusiveness, a third 
approach to reform combines a registration system with a multi-factor approach. [FN19]  In allowing the 
partners to register their relationship, the combination or hybrid approach allows those who take 
advantage of the registration process to ensure that the surviving partner will be an intestate heir in the 
case of intestacy.  Thus, the partners are able to avoid the uncertainty and the delay and expense of a 
multi-factor inquiry. 
 
  The combination approach seeks to maintain inclusiveness by allowing for a multi-factor inquiry in 
cases in which an intestate is survived by a putative non-marital partner but the partners did not register 
the partnership during the intestate’s life.  In allowing for such a multi-factor inquiry, the combination 
approach introduces uncertainty in a reduced number of cases (as contrasted with a pure multi-factor 
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 approach) into administration of the intestacy scheme.  In cases in which the intestate had died while 
unregistered but also in a relationship that arguably meets the standard for a committed partnership set 
out in the intestacy statute, the combination approach allows for the survivor to assert a claim for an 
intestate share and, thus, to subject the administration of the intestate estate to whatever uncertainty and 
expense arises with a claim under a pure multi-factor approach. [FN20] 
 
  *262 In this present Article, I now consider how one might best structure a multi-factor approach (or 
the multi-factor component of a combination approach) intestacy scheme granting intestate inheritance 
rights to the surviving committed partner of an intestate decedent.  Two issues appear paramount.  First, 
how should the intestacy scheme qualify an individual as a surviving committed partner entitled to take 
an intestate share under the scheme? [FN21]  Second, to what portion of the decedent’s intestate estate 
should the qualifying surviving committed partner be entitled?  With respect to this second issue--the 
size of the surviving committed partner’s intestate share--the broad principles of the proposal I offer in 
this Article, employing an accrual approach to determining the size of the intestate share, and much of 
its supporting analysis, would apply with equal force to determining the size of an intestate share 
afforded to a committed partner pursuant to an intestacy scheme that employs a registration approach.  
Indeed, these broad principles and rationales underlying my proposed accrual approach would apply also 
to the determination of the size of an intestate share accorded to a surviving legal spouse. 
 
  My proposal derives from an emphasis on four values: For both consequentialist and non-
consequentialist reasons, which are set out below, [FN22] I seek to promote the donative intent of the 
intestate property owner, to reward the surviving partner who contributed to the financial, physical, or 
emotional well-being of the intestate, to protect the reliance interests of the surviving partner, and to 
safeguard the ease of administration of estates. [FN23]  These values inform my proposal with respect to 
both the qualification of a committed partner and the portion of the decedent’s intestate estate to which 
she is entitled. 
 
  With respect to the portion of the intestate estate to which a surviving committed partner shall be 
entitled, I propose the use of an accrual method.  Pursuant to this approach, the size of the intestate share 
awarded to a surviving committed partner is proportional *263 to the duration of the committed 
partnership cohabitation period. [FN24]  In addition, my intestacy scheme would allow for the “ex-
partner” of a decedent from a relationship that fractured shortly before the decedent’s death to claim an 
intestate share.  The ex-partner would be entitled to a portion of the intestate estate proportional to the 
duration of the partnership cohabitation period discounted in proportion to the time elapsed between the 
fracture and the intestate’s death. [FN25] Moreover, I would apply the accrual/multi-factor approach to 
govern the passing of intestate property even in cases in which the decedent committed partner died 
partially testate. [FN26]  To promote certainty and ease of administration, however, my proposal would, 
in certain circumstances, deny standing to a claimed committed partner to challenge a decedent’s will 
when the surviving committed partner cannot demonstrate that she and the decedent cohabited in a 
committed partnership for nine years or greater duration. [FN27] 
 
  With respect to the qualification of a committed partner, my proposal asks the court to focus its inquiry 
on twenty-three enumerated factors that directly implicate the values that my proposed intestacy scheme 
seeks to promote. [FN28]  The presence of these factors tends to indicate that the claimant and the 
decedent lived life together as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership, that the 
decedent would want the survivor to take an intestate share, that the survivor contributed to the 
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 decedent’s financial, physical or emotional well-being, or that the survivor had come to rely upon the 
decedent for her financial security.  I group these factors accordingly to focus the court’s inquiry on the 
underlying values.  My proposal limits the ability of a court to consider one arguably relevant factor--the 
sexual exclusivity of the parties’ relationship--because I have serious concerns about the use of such a 
factor.  My proposal requires that “[i]f the court finds that the parties lived together in a sexually 
exclusive relationship during their cohabiting partnership, the court shall weigh this factor in favor of 
finding that the parties lived life together in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership” but the 
court may not otherwise consider evidence *264 relating to the sexual exclusivity of the parties’ 
relationship. [FN29] 
 
  Finally, my proposal also includes the objective requirement of a three-year minimum duration for the 
cohabiting committed partnership before a surviving partner may assert a claim for a share of the 
intestate decedent’s estate. This requirement greatly promotes certainty by narrowing the pool of 
potential claimants and eliminating those potential claimants most likely to have a weak or borderline 
claim.  The minimum duration also is well grounded in the intent, reliance, and reciprocity rationales of 
my scheme. [FN30] 
 
  In the remainder of this Article, I set out the details of and the rationale for my proposed accrual/multi-
factor approach to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners.  Part I of the Article 
sets out, as a starting point for discussion, Professor Lawrence Waggoner’s leading multi-factor proposal 
for inclusion of unmarried committed partners within the intestacy scheme. [FN31]  In Part II of the 
Article, I discuss my choice of values to ground my proposed reform. [FN32]  In Part III, I set out an 
accrual method for calculating the portion of the intestate estate to which the surviving committed 
partner is entitled and explain how this accrual method promotes the values of donative intent, reliance, 
reciprocity, and ease of administration. [FN33]  Finally, in Part IV of the Article, I discuss how these 
values relate to the factors I have chosen to be used for the qualification of a surviving committed 
partner. [FN34] 
 
I 
 
A Starting Point for Discussion: Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft 
 
  In thinking through these issues--who shall qualify as a committed partner and what portion of the 
decedent’s intestate estate shall they take--I need not work from scratch.  Indeed, Professor Lawrence 
Waggoner has set forth as a “Working Draft” [FN35] an influential and leading American proposal to 
reform *265 intestacy law to include intestate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners by 
means of a multi-factor approach. [FN36] 
 
  An interesting feature of the Waggoner Working Draft is that it does not apply at all in cases of partial 
intestacy.  The Working Draft provides an intestate share for a surviving committed partner only where 
an “adult decedent dies without a valid will.” [FN37]  Thus, if the decedent dies with a valid will that 
fails to dispose of all of her probate property, the decedent’s property that passes by intestacy is not 
governed by the Working Draft. [FN38] 
 
  The Working Draft divides surviving committed partners into two groups for the purposes of 
determining the portion of the intestate estate to which the surviving committed partner is entitled.  In 
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 cases in which the decedent is not survived by either a descendant or a parent, and in cases in which the 
decedent is survived by one or more descendants, all of whom are also descendants of the surviving 
committed partner, the survivor is entitled to the first $50,000 of the intestate estate and, in addition, to 
one half of the remainder of the intestate estate. [FN39]  In all other cases, the Working Draft provides 
to a surviving committed partner one half of the decedent’s intestate estate. [FN40] 
 
  As is generally the rule with extant intestacy statutes, the Working Draft does not take into account the 
duration of the relationship between the intestate and the heir in determining *266 the portion of the 
intestate share to which the heir is entitled. [FN41]  Under the Working Draft, the duration of the 
committed partnership is irrelevant to the size of the intestate share that the surviving partner takes.  For 
example, all else being equal, the surviving partner of a thirty-year committed partnership takes a share 
equal to that taken by the surviving partner of a three-year committed partnership. 
 
  Moreover, under the Working Draft, the surviving partner of a long-term committed partnership takes 
less than a surviving legal spouse of a short-term marriage would take pursuant to the Uniform Probate 
Code under otherwise similar circumstances. [FN42]  For example, as noted above, under the Working 
Draft, when the decedent is survived by a committed partner but is not survived by a parent or a 
descendant, or is survived by one or more descendants all of whom are also descendants of the surviving 
committed partner, the survivor is entitled to the first $50,000 of the intestate estate plus one half of the 
remainder of the intestate estate. [FN43]  The Uniform Probate Code would give to a legal spouse in 
these circumstances the entire intestate estate. [FN44] 
 
  Indeed, for an intestate estate of any given size greater than $50,000, under the Working Draft no 
surviving committed partner would ever take a share of her partner’s intestate estate as large as that 
given to a surviving spouse pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code’s intestacy provisions.  The best that 
a surviving committed partner might do under the Working Draft is to take the first $50,000 of the 
decedent’s intestate property plus one-half the balance of the intestate estate.  In contrast, the worst that 
a surviving spouse might do under the Uniform Probate Code’s intestacy provisions is to take the first 
$100,000 of the decedent’s intestate property plus one-half the balance of the intestate estate. [FN45] 
 
  *267 Professor Waggoner intended for his Working Draft to be less rewarding to a surviving 
committed partner than is parallel intestacy law with respect to a legal spouse “to maintain the incentive 
to enter into a formal marriage.” [FN46]  Professor Waggoner acknowledges that this disparate 
treatment of committed partners and legal spouses might be inappropriate with respect to those 
committed partners who are unable to marry each other on account of their sex. [FN47]  He suggests, 
therefore, that it may be appropriate for an intestacy statute to provide for a larger share to the survivor 
of a same-sex committed partnership as contrasted with the share provided to the survivor of a mixed-
sex committed partnership. [FN48] 
 
  In determining who shall qualify as a surviving committed partner, the Working Draft first sets out 
several objective requirements intended to narrow the pool of potential claimants, thus, lessening the 
burden on the probate system and limiting the amount of uncertainty introduced by this reform of the 
intestacy scheme. [FN49]  First, no claim for a committed partner’s share may be filed against the 
intestate estate of a decedent who was a minor or who was married at her death. [FN50]  In addition, the 
claimant herself must have been an adult unmarried to anyone at the decedent’s death but must not have 
been prohibited by law from marrying the decedent by reason of consanguinity. [FN51]  Finally, the 
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 *268 claimant must have been “sharing a common household” with the decedent at the decedent’s death. 
[FN52] 
 
  Having thus narrowed the pool of potential claimants, the Working Draft next calls for a subjective 
inquiry into whether the claimant was living in a “marriage-like relationship” with the decedent at the 
decedent’s death. [FN53]  The Working Draft sets out six factors that a court should consider, among 
others that the court might find relevant, in deciding whether the decedent and the claimant enjoyed a 
“marriage-like relationship.” [FN54] Finally, the Working Draft provides for a rebuttable presumption 
that the relationship at issue was “marriage-like” if the claimant and the decedent engaged in one or 
more of four specified behaviors: sharing a common household for a prescribed minimum period, 
registering as domestic partners, participating in a commitment ceremony certified in writing by an 
organization, and co-parenting a child together. [FN55] 
 
  Professor Waggoner offered his proposal “as a starting point for discussion” with the hope that it would 
spark dialogue about the need for reform of intestacy statutes and the best approach to such reform. 
[FN56]  In that spirit, in this Article, I use the Waggoner Working Draft as my “starting point for 
discussion” of how a jurisdiction might best structure an intestacy statute that utilizes a multi-factor 
approach to provide inheritance rights to a surviving non-marital committed partner.  My proposal for 
reform, which is set forth in Appendix B, borrows much from Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft.  As 
set out below, however, my proposal departs from the Working Draft in numerous important respects. 
 
*269 II 
 
The Values That Should Be Reflected in the Intestacy Provisions Recognizing 
Committed Partners 
 
  In designing any intestacy scheme, one might do well to start by considering the values that the 
intestacy scheme will seek to further. [FN57]  I begin, therefore, by asking what values should be served 
by an intestacy scheme’s provisions that recognize the decedent’s surviving committed partner.  As 
noted above, I seek to design an intestacy scheme that would serve four principal values: donative 
freedom, reciprocity, reliance, and ease of administration. [FN58] 
 
A. Donative Intent 
 
  There is widespread acceptance among succession law scholars that it is and should be an important 
goal of any intestacy scheme to further the donative intent of the intestate property owner. [FN59]  *270 
The first goal of my proposed intestacy statute reform, therefore, is to promote better the donative intent 
of the intestate who has died survived by a non-marital committed partner. [FN60]  The intestate 
distribution scheme should seek, to some great degree, to distribute intestate property to the committed 
partner as the property owner would have provided had she thought about the matter and set forth her 
wishes. [FN61] 
 
  Recent empirical work by Professor Mary Louise Fellows and her colleagues at the University of 
Minnesota strongly supports the proposition that reform of intestacy law to recognize the inheritance 
rights of surviving committed partners would better promote the intent of the intestate who has died 
while in a non-marital committed partnership. [FN62]  Professor Fellows and her colleagues surveyed 
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 and reported on the attitudes of several groups with respect to the provision of intestate inheritance 
rights for unmarried committed partners. [FN63]  In general, the Fellows survey found that a substantial 
majority of the respondents in each respondent group--those living in a committed non-marital 
partnership, as well as a substantial majority of the general public--would prefer that a surviving 
committed partner take as an heir a portion of the decedent partner’s intestate estate. [FN64] 
 
B. Reciprocity 
 
  A second goal of my proposed intestacy scheme reform is to promote the norm of reciprocity as it 
relates to the actions of the committed partners during the course of their partnership.  That is, the 
intestacy scheme should seek to reward or compensate those committed partners who assisted the 
intestate in the accumulation *271 of her wealth or who provided for the intestate’s physical, emotional 
or financial needs. [FN65]  One justification for incorporating the value of reciprocity into intestacy 
provisions recognizing unmarried committed partners is the notion that the surviving committed partner 
earned a portion of the intestate property through her contributions to the decedent partner, and their 
partnership, even though the property was acquired by the decedent partner and titled in the decedent’s 
name. [FN66]  A second justification for incorporating reciprocity is the aspiration that the intestacy 
statute will promote a better society to the extent that it recognizes, rewards and, thus, promotes care-
taking behaviors.  And it makes sense that the contributor/caretaker be rewarded from the estate of the 
person who received her contribution or care-taking. 
 
  American succession law incorporates this value of reciprocity to only a slight degree.  One important 
example of modern succession law’s concern with reciprocity is found in the 1990 Uniform Probate 
Code’s elective share. [FN67]  In general, an elective share, also known as a forced share, allows a 
surviving spouse to assert a claim for a portion of the decedent spouse’s estate even where the decedent 
spouse intentionally disinherited the surviving spouse. [FN68]  The traditional rationale for such 
protection *272 against disinheritance was to ensure some means of support for the surviving spouse 
and to guard against the surviving spouse becoming a public charge. [FN69] 
 
  The primacy of the support rationale for the elective share has given way to some degree in recent 
years, however, to a reciprocity rationale. [FN70]  The modern notion, sometimes labeled the 
“partnership theory of marriage,” is that the surviving spouse who contributed to the accumulation of the 
decedent’s property is entitled, in light of that contribution, to a share of that property at the decedent’s 
death regardless of how the property was titled. [FN71]  The general comment to the 1990 Uniform 
Probate Code’s elective share explains that, pursuant to this rationale, “the law grants each spouse an 
entitlement to compensation for non-monetary contributions to the marital enterprise, as ‘a recognition 
of the activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate not only for this activity but for 
opportunities lost.”‘ [FN72] 
 
  The structure of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s elective share reflects the ascension of this 
reciprocity rationale. [FN73]  Prior to the 1990 revisions, the Uniform Probate Code’s elective share 
allowed the surviving spouse to claim a one-third share of the decedent spouse’s estate, regardless of the 
duration of the marriage.  *273 This flat percentage approach failed to implement well the partnership 
principle.  The spouse of a very short-term marriage, who had contributed very little to the accumulation 
of the decedent’s wealth, and the spouse of a very long-term marriage, who had contributed greatly to 
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 the accumulation of most or all of the decedent’s wealth, were entitled to the same portion of their 
respective decedent spouse’s estate. [FN74] 
 
  In contrast, the 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s elective share better implements the partnership theory 
by using an elective share-percentage that increases as the duration of the marriage increases. [FN75]  
This elective-share percentage is then multiplied by the value of the “augmented estate.” [FN76]  Credits 
are then subtracted from the product to give the amount from the decedent’s estate to which the survivor 
is entitled. [FN77]  Thus, all else being equal, the surviving spouse of a long-term marriage will be 
entitled to assert a claim for a greater share of the decedent spouse’s estate as compared to the claim of 
the surviving spouse of a short-term marriage. [FN78] 
 
  *274 The reciprocity norm also may well be playing a role in many will contests. [FN79]  Professor 
Melanie Leslie theorizes that judges and juries adjudicating will contests seek to vindicate a social norm 
of reciprocity--that family members who care for and support a close relative or otherwise are actively 
involved in the close family member’s life can expect to receive an inheritance from the relative and can 
rely upon that expectation. [FN80] This reciprocity norm supports the expectation that a testator will 
disinherit her closest relatives in favor of a non-relative only where those relatives have failed to provide 
care for the testator and, instead, one or more non- relatives have performed the nurturing “family” roles 
that society expects family members to play. [FN81]  This reciprocity norm has the virtue of 
encouraging family members to support each other, albeit out of an expectation that the supporting 
family member herself will enjoy reciprocal support in the future. [FN82] 
 
  Professor Leslie argues that the fact-finder in a will contest is likely to believe that a testator who has 
disinherited a close relative has broken an implied promise to the family member where the family 
member had acted in accordance with the reciprocity norm. [FN83]  The fact-finder, therefore, will set 
aside the will that violates the reciprocity norm, thus allowing the family member to take a share of the 
decedent’s intestate estate. [FN84]  On the contrary, *275 in the case of a close relative who had failed 
to meet the testator’s physical or emotional needs, the fact-finder will not find the testator guilty of a 
breach of any implied promise in disinheriting the relative in favor of a non-family member.  In such a 
case, the fact-finder will uphold the will against the disappointed family member’s challenge. [FN85] 
 
  For the most part, however, American intestacy law does not recognize the value of reciprocity.  As 
Professor Frances Foster has written, “[t]he U.S. inheritance system at best regards virtue as its own 
reward.  Under inflexible status-based intestacy rules, contributions to the decedent’s welfare are 
irrelevant for inheritance purposes.” [FN86] 
 
  Most American states, however, do recognize a principle of reverse reciprocity by which the intestacy 
scheme penalizes some persons who acted in a reprehensible manner toward the intestate such that the 
bad actor is deemed an “unworthy heir.” [FN87]  The most significant manifestation of this principle is 
the “slayer statute” which generally bars one who intentionally kills the intestate from taking her 
intestate property. [FN88]  Indeed, such statutes *276 generally apply not only to intestate property but 
also to property passing by will, revocable inter vivos trusts, life insurance policies, and joint tenancies. 
[FN89]  Section 2-803 of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, for example, provides that one who 
intentionally and feloniously kills the decedent forfeits any right to succeed to property passing by 
intestacy, will, or by a will substitute, such as a payable-on-death account or a joint tenancy. [FN90]  
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 The comment to section 2-803 explains that this slayer statute is meant to implement a principle of 
reverse reciprocity--the principle that “a wrongdoer may not profit by his or her own wrong.” [FN91] 
 
  Moreover, in a large number of American states, the law of intestacy recognizes this principle of 
reverse reciprocity with respect to behavior less severe than intentional homicide.  In such states, 
unworthy heirs might include those who abandoned the intestate or who had a duty to support the 
intestate but failed to do so. [FN92]  In these states, the intestacy scheme bars such persons *277 from 
taking an intestate share. [FN93] 
 
  Professor Foster has reported on the Chinese inheritance system and how it incorporates the value of 
reciprocity to a much greater extent than does the American system.  Chinese law makes relevant a wide 
range of behaviors by the potential heir toward the decedent. [FN94]  A Chinese court, like some 
American courts, might punish an unworthy heir for abandoning, mistreating, or failing to support the 
decedent. [FN95]  Unlike American courts, however, a Chinese court might also explicitly reward one 
who had cared for the decedent’s needs by awarding such a person a larger share of the intestate estate 
than she might otherwise have gotten. [FN96]  Indeed, the court might so reward a person who is not 
legally related to the decedent and who otherwise would not have taken any of the decedent’s intestate 
estate. [FN97] 
 
  Chinese courts enjoy great flexibility with respect to the extent to which they may decrease the share of 
an unworthy heir or increase the share of one whose behavior toward the decedent merits reward. 
[FN98]  The court might order total forfeiture of the *278 person’s share of the estate or merely a partial 
reduction to the extent that the court judges appropriate. [FN99] In contrast, those American courts that 
are authorized to punish unworthy heirs may do so only by ordering a total forfeiture.  American courts 
do not have the authority to reduce an heir’s share only in part as the court thinks is proportional to the 
severity of the heir’s wrong-doing. [FN100] 
 
C. Reliance 
 
  A third goal of my proposed intestacy scheme reform is to protect the financial well-being of the 
committed partner who has arranged her life so that she has become dependent on the intestate for the 
maintenance of her standard of living. [FN101]  The reliance I seek to protect contains an element of 
sacrifice.  I seek to protect the expectations of the surviving partner who has foregone opportunities or 
reallocated her resources in order to maintain the partnership or promote the common good of both 
partners. [FN102] 
 
  My intestacy scheme’s protection of this reliance interest recognizes that non-marital relationships are 
stronger when the partners take responsibility for one another, and when the partners are comfortable 
pooling their financial and human resources within the relationship should they find it beneficial to do 
so. [FN103]  *279 Where one partner has sacrificed opportunities for the good of the partnership, 
therefore, the intestacy scheme will acknowledge her sacrifice.  This is so regardless of whether the 
decedent made any explicit promise to compensate the other partner for her sacrifice.  Moreover, from a 
scarce resources perspective, it makes sense that the intestate partner’s estate rather than the 
government’s purse satisfy the survivor’s reliance interest as it was the decedent partner who benefitted 
most directly from the surviving partner’s sacrifice. 
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   Protection of this type of reliance interest does not seem to be a central concern of succession law.  The 
nearest examples of such concern arguably are found in the putative spouse doctrine and the equitable 
adoption doctrine.  Even these doctrines, however, do not very nearly implement the principle of 
protection of reliance interests that I seek to incorporate into intestacy reform. 
 
  The putative spouse doctrine [FN104] allows a court to treat a survivor who was not legally married to 
a decedent as the decedent’s legal spouse for purposes of the intestacy statute. [FN105]  The survivor 
must have cohabited with the decedent in the good-faith belief that she was the decedent’s legal spouse. 
[FN106]  In this sense, the doctrine is concerned with reliance. The doctrine concerns itself with 
dependence also in that, when there is more than one putative spouse asserting a claim to the decedent’s 
estate or where both a putative spouse and a legal spouse are asserting such claims, the court must 
equitably apportion the estate taking into account, among other factors, the comparative needs of the 
claimants. [FN107] 
 
  *280 Pursuant to the equitable adoption doctrine, a court may allow a surviving foster child of the 
decedent to inherit from the decedent’s intestate estate. [FN108]  Most courts require that the foster 
parent have entered into an adoption contract with the person or persons legally able to consent to the 
adoption and that the foster parent have failed to perform the contract even though she raised the foster 
child as her own. [FN109]  Some courts that have applied the equitable adoption doctrine have justified 
its application on the grounds that the foster child detrimentally relied on the foster parent’s promise to 
adopt, which detrimental reliance justifies the court’s providing an equitable remedy for the child. 
[FN110]  For example, the Georgia Supreme Court, when it first recognized the doctrine of equitable 
adoption in Georgia in 1913, emphasized the reliance interests of the foster child:  
    Where one takes an infant into his home upon a promise to adopt such as his own child, and the child 
performs all the duties growing out of the substituted relationship of parent and child, rendering years of 
service, companionship, and obedience to the foster parent, upon the faith that such foster parent stands 
in loco parentis, and that upon his death the child will sustain the legal relationship to his estate of a 
natural child, there is equitable reason that the child may appeal to a court of equity to consummate, so 
far as it may be possible, the foster parent’s omission of duty in the matter of formal adoption. [FN111] 
 
  *281 Protection of dependence without express regard to reliance or sacrifice is more easily found in 
succession law than is the protection of reliance interests on which I wish for my intestacy reform to 
focus. [FN112]  Again, foreign models provide an illustration of how American succession law might 
offer greater protection for those who depended financially upon the decedent. [FN113]  Family 
maintenance schemes, such as those in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, allow 
a court to disregard a decedent’s estate plan and distribute part of the decedent’s estate to an applicant, 
often limited to a spouse or child, who was dependent upon the decedent at her death. [FN114] 
 
  For example, the United Kingdom’s Inheritance Act of 1975 [FN115] allows a court to make an award 
from the decedent’s testate or intestate estate in favor of an applicant when the court determines that the 
decedent’s will or the intestacy scheme, or the combination of the two, “is not such as to make 
reasonable financial provision for the applicant.” [FN116]  Under the statute, the decedent’s surviving 
spouse or child, the decedent’s former spouse who has not remarried, any person who the decedent 
treated as a child of the family in relation to a marriage of the decedent, and “any person . . . who 
immediately before the death of the deceased was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the 
deceased” may apply for provision. [FN117]  In the case of an application *282 by a surviving spouse, 
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 the court is to decide the question of “reasonable financial provision . . . whether or not that provision is 
required for his or her maintenance.” [FN118]  Otherwise, the court is to interpret “reasonable financial 
provision” to mean an amount that “would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the 
applicant to receive for his maintenance.” [FN119]  The act does not expressly mention reliance or 
sacrifice as factors that the court should consider in determining whether to make an award to an 
applicant.  The act does list among factors that the court should consider, however, the decedent’s 
obligations and responsibilities toward the applicant, other applicants, and the beneficiaries of the 
decedent’s estate; the competing financial needs and resources of the applicant, other applicants, and the 
beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate; the physical or mental disabilities of the applicant, other 
applicants, and the beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate; and the conduct of the applicant or any other 
person. [FN120] 
 
  China’s inheritance law makes a priority the protection of the financial interests of the decedent’s 
dependents. [FN121]  The Chinese system promotes this goal through use of forced heirship and 
equitable redistribution. [FN122]  Chinese courts have discretion to distribute an intestate’s estate 
among her dependents as the court thinks best will meet the particular needs of those dependents. 
[FN123]  For example, Chinese courts might provide a disproportionate share of the intestate’s estate to 
a child of the intestate with a disability that affects her ability to earn a living, [FN124] and might 
provide a share of the estate to a person otherwise lacking a legal family relationship with the intestate 
but for whom the intestate had provided financial support. [FN125] 
 
  *283 American succession law provides limited protection for a decedent’s dependents in the form of a 
family allowance, [FN126] an exempt property allowance, [FN127] and a homestead allowance. 
[FN128]  The Uniform Probate Code also provides a surviving spouse with a “supplemental elective- 
share amount” intended to ensure at least a minimum level of support for a surviving spouse with actual 
need who has been disinherited by the decedent spouse. [FN129]  This provision of the Uniform Probate 
Code’s elective share scheme is grounded on the notion “that the spouses’ mutual duties of support 
during their joint lifetimes should be continued in some form after death in favor of the survivor, as a 
claim on the decedent’s estate.” [FN130] 
 
  None of these doctrines has at its heart, however, a concern with dependence or reliance relating to 
sacrifice of opportunities or allocation of resources.  This type of reliance interest, which I seek to 
protect in my intestacy reform, is more nearly found in recent proposed family law reform. The 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ground the recharacterization of 
certain separate property as marital property on just this type of reliance.  I discuss this proposed family 
law reform and its justification below in my justification of the accrual approach to calculation of an 
intestate share. [FN131] 
 
*284 D. Certainty and Ease of Administration 
 
  One can envision various schemes for the distribution of intestate property that focus on honoring the 
donative intent of the decedent while also seeking to reward those individuals who had most 
significantly contributed to the intestate’s financial, physical, or psychological well-being; and while 
also attempting to protect the reliance interests of those persons who had reordered their lives so as to 
have become dependent upon the decedent for their financial comfort.  Under one such system, with 
respect to each person who dies intestate, a probate judge would engage in an open-ended inquiry into 
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 the particular circumstances of the intestate’s life. [FN132]  The court would hear testimony and find 
facts relating to the intestate’s probable donative intent--that is, relating to the issue of which persons 
this intestate most likely would have wanted to inherit her intestate estate. [FN133]  Also, the court 
would seek to determine whether any individuals were particularly instrumental in contributing to the 
intestate’s well-being--whether it be the accumulation of her wealth or the maintenance of her health and 
happiness. Finally, the court would inquire into whether any persons had sacrificed opportunities or 
reallocated their resources in reliance upon their relationship with the decedent and, as a result thereof, 
become dependent upon the intestate for their financial support.  At the conclusion of its investigation 
into these matters, the court would then order distribution of the decedent’s intestate property to such 
persons and in such portions as the court had concluded would best balance the three values grounding 
the intestacy statute. 
 
  Such a scheme has a critical short-coming.  Administration of an intestate estate under an open-ended 
inquiry intestacy scheme would produce great uncertainty, would be more time-consuming, *285 and 
would be greatly more expensive than is administration under extant American intestacy schemes. 
[FN134]  Certainty and ease of administration are prized features of these extant intestacy schemes. 
[FN135]  More generally, certainty and ease of administration are principal concerns of American 
succession law. [FN136] 
 
  *286 Indeed, while Professor Foster lauds the Chinese system for its flexibility and its ability to pay 
attention to the merits of the individual claims of the decedent’s friends and family, she acknowledges 
that such a system might be unworkable in the United States and might even fail in China as that nation 
develops. 
 
  If current trends [in China] continue, increased social mobility, accumulation of private property, and a 
rise in the popular use of courts will bring about an increase in the number and complexity of inheritance 
disputes. In its present form, the behavior-based model appears fundamentally unsuited to this new 
environment.  It is highly time- and labor-intensive, requiring courts to evaluate on a case-by-case basis 
the conduct of all potential claimants and the most appropriate division of each estate.  The flexibility 
that is the hallmark of the behavior-based model today may prove to be its greatest drawback in the 
future. [FN137] 
 
  Therefore, any proposal to reform intestacy law to provide for a decedent’s surviving non-marital 
committed partner that utilizes a multi-factor approach to the qualification of that partner must overcome 
opposition from those who are concerned about reform undermining certainty and ease of administration 
in probate. [FN138]  It is a principal challenge for succession law in this *287 era of the emergence of 
the legal movement to recognize functional family [FN139] to balance a concern with certainty and ease 
of administration with the desire for succession law to better serve the needs of property owners who 
have formed less dominant family structures. [FN140] This balancing must resist the temptation to *288 
focus solely on the potential for succession law reform to undermine certainty and ease of 
administration. [FN141]  Rather, this balancing also must give weight to the benefits of discretion in 
succession law that may be sacrificed to certainty. [FN142]  Chief among these benefits is the ability of 
a discretionary system to recognize the importance of functional families in ways that a fixed-rule 
system cannot. [FN143] 
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   *289 Extant American succession law remains largely fixated on the nuclear family and on fixed rules 
that derive from and serve the nuclear family at the expense of less dominant family structures. [FN144]  
Arguments grounded in certainty continue to block reforms that would recognize and better serve these 
less dominant family structures. [FN145]  One should anticipate that arguments from certainty also will 
be at the forefront of opposition to discretionary inheritance systems that would incorporate the values 
of reciprocity and reliance. [FN146] 
 
  Certainty and ease of administration, therefore, are central concerns of my proposed intestacy reform.  I 
seek to promote the donative intent of the intestate, recognize the contributions of the surviving partner 
to the intestate’s estate and welfare, and protect the reliance interests of the surviving partner--all while 
retaining a great degree of administrative convenience.  I attempt to balance these goals principally by 
means of an accrual and discounting scheme that I set out below. 
 
III 
 
The Portion of the Intestate Estate That Should Be Awarded to a Surviving 
Committed Partner 
 
  Ideally, the surviving committed partner should take from the decedent’s intestate estate in proportion 
to the extent that the intestate would want her to take and in proportion to her reliance *290 and 
reciprocity interests.  A first limitation on this ideal is the need to avoid an open-ended inquiry in each 
case of intestacy in which a claimant seeks recognition as the surviving committed partner.  A second 
limitation on this ideal is the fact that in certain circumstances, most notably when a partnership has 
fractured shortly before the intestate’s death, the intestate’s most likely donative intent will be at odds 
with the survivor’s reciprocity and reliance interests.  A scheme in which the committed partner’s 
entitlement to a share of her partner’s intestate estate accrues as the duration of the cohabiting 
partnership increases and is discounted in relation to the duration of the period between fracture of the 
partnership and the death of the intestate best implements the ideal. 
 
A. The Accrual Approach 
 
  As a general rule, American intestacy schemes ignore the duration of a marriage in calculating the 
portion of a decedent spouse’s intestate estate to be awarded to a surviving spouse. [FN147]  Professor 
Waggoner’s Working Draft similarly employs such an all-or-nothing approach.  Under the Working 
Draft, once a person qualifies as a committed partner, the duration of the partnership will not affect the 
size of the share that the survivor takes. 
 
  In contrast, a central feature of my proposed intestacy scheme reform is an accrual approach to 
calculating the portion of the intestate estate to which the surviving committed partner shall be entitled.  
Pursuant to this accrual approach, the portion of the decedent partner’s intestate estate to which the 
person who qualifies as a surviving committed partner shall be entitled is influenced by the duration of 
the cohabiting partnership.  All else being equal, as the length of the cohabiting partnership increases, 
the size of the intestate share to which the surviving partner shall be entitled increases also. [FN148] 
 
  *291 I propose to give to a surviving committed partner a portion of the decedent partner’s intestate 
estate according to the following schedule: 
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If the decedent and the surviving committed 
partner cohabited in a partnership for a period of: The unreduced intestate share percentage is: 
at least 3 years but less than 4 years 18% of the intestate estate 
at least 4 years but less than 5 years 24% of the intestate estate 
at least 5 years but less than 6 years 30% of the intestate estate 
at least 6 years but less than 7 years 36% of the intestate estate  
at least 7 years but less than 8 years 42% of the intestate estate  
at least 8 years but less than 9 years 48% of the intestate estate  
at least 9 years but less than 10 years 54% of the intestate estate  
at least 10 years but less than 11 years 60% of the intestate estate 
at least 11 years but less than 12 years 68% of the intestate estate  
at least 12 years but less than 13 years 76% of the intestate estate 
at least 13 years but less than 14 years 84% of the intestate estate  
at least 14 years but less than 15 years 92% of the intestate estate 
at least 15 years or more 100% of the intestate estate. [FN149] 
 
  A jurisdiction adopting my proposed intestacy scheme recognizing committed partners would need to 
integrate my proposal into its extant intestacy scheme so that the persons who would have taken the 
decedent’s intestate estate had she died without a surviving committed partner would take that portion of 
the intestate estate that does not go to the surviving committed partner.  For example, where the accrual 
schedule provides that the surviving committed partner shall be entitled to an unreduced intestate share 
percentage of eighteen percent of the intestate estate (because the decedent and the surviving committed 
partner cohabited in a partnership for a period of at least three years but less than four years), the 
decedent’s remaining intestate heirs *292 would take at least the remaining eighty-two percent of the 
intestate estate.  These non-partner heirs will take a greater portion of the intestate estate in cases in 
which the surviving committed partner’s unreduced intestate share percentage is reduced. 
 
  My proposal provides that the “unreduced intestate share percentage” set forth in the accrual schedule 
is to be reduced if one or two of the following three circumstances exists at the decedent’s death: (1) the 
decedent is survived by one or more descendants who are not also descendants of the surviving 
committed partner, (2) the decedent is not survived by any descendant but is survived by at least one 
parent, and (3) the partnership between the decedent and the surviving committed partner fractured prior 
to the decedent’s death and remained fractured at the time of the decedent’s death. [FN150] The amount 
of the reduction varies with the circumstance and is set out in Appendix B. [FN151]  Thus, where the 
decedent is survived by a committed partner entitled to an unreduced intestate share percentage of 
eighteen percent of the intestate estate, and in addition is survived by a child who is not also a child of 
the surviving committed partner, the child would be entitled to the remaining eighty-two percent of the 
intestate estate plus the portion of the unreduced intestate share percentage that is taken away from the 
surviving committed partner because the decedent was survived also by such a child.  The theory of this 
particular discounting provision is that the decedent would want the surviving committed partner to take 
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 less of the intestate estate where the other surviving heir is such a child (as opposed to where, for 
example, the other surviving heir is a sibling of the decedent). 
 
  I derive the intestacy accrual schedule from the elective-share percentage schedule found in the 
Uniform Probate Code’s elective share provisions.  In general, my proposed unreduced intestate share 
percentage is twice the elective share percentage. [FN152]  *293 This doubling of the elective share 
percentage is intended to award to the surviving committed partner a percentage of the intestate estate 
that approximates the percentage of the intestate estate that is partnership property.  This award of all of 
the intestate partnership property to the surviving partner is intended to reflect not only the portion that 
is a return on the survivor’s contribution to the partnership property titled in the decedent’s name, but 
also an additional portion to protect the survivor’s reliance interests and to reflect the decedent’s likely 
intent to provide generously for her surviving partner. 
 
  The Uniform Probate Code’s elective share calculation seeks to entitle the surviving spouse to one-half 
of the marital property from the union.  Thus, the elective share fraction represents the drafter’s estimate 
of the percentage of property that is one-half of the marital property for a relationship of any given 
duration. [FN153]  To calculate the total percentage of property that is marital property, one must double 
the elective-share percentage.  Therefore, to award all of the intestate partnership property to the 
surviving committed partner, my intestacy accrual schedule doubles the elective-share percentage. 
 
  The Uniform Probate Code’s elective share calculation seeks to prevent a surviving spouse from 
asserting a claim to an elective share when the surviving spouse already owns half or more of the marital 
property from the union. [FN154]  To do this, the elective share percentage is first applied against an 
augmented estate, which consists generally of all of the property owned by either *294 spouse at the 
decedent’s death. [FN155]  Next, the product of this calculation is reduced by the survivor’s credits, 
which include an approximation of all marital property already owned by the surviving spouse. 
 
  Consider a simple example: Assume a decedent who died after ten years of marriage.  At her death, the 
decedent owned $200,000 worth of property.  The surviving spouse owned $400,000 worth of property 
titled in his name.  No property passed to the surviving spouse at the decedent spouse’s death by means 
of intestacy, will or non-probate vehicle. 
 
  The Uniform Probate Code’s elective-share percentage for a ten-year marriage is thirty percent of the 
augmented estate.  The augmented estate in this simple example is valued at $600,000.  Thus, the 
elective share amount in this example is $180,000.  This represents an approximation of the amount of 
marital property to which the survivor is entitled. 
 
  The Uniform Probate Code’s elective share calculation subtracts from this  $180,000 an approximation 
of the amount of marital property that the survivor already owns.  To calculate the approximation of the 
amount of marital property that the survivor already owns, one multiples the amount of property that the 
survivor already owns--here, $400,000--times twice the elective share percentage--here, sixty percent. 
[FN156]  Pursuant to this calculation, the survivor in this example is charged with owning $240,000 of 
marital property, which is more marital property than that to which he is entitled.  Therefore, the final 
amount from the decedent spouse’s estate to which the surviving spouse in this example *295 is entitled 
pursuant to the elective share is zero. [FN157] 
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   My intestacy scheme calculation differs from the Uniform Probate Code’s elective share calculation in 
that it is not concerned with the amount of partnership property that the surviving committed partner 
already owns.  This difference derives from the theories underlying my intestacy scheme as contrasted 
with the theory underlying the Uniform Probate Code’s elective share.  The elective share operates even 
in the face of the decedent’s expressed and unequivocal contrary intent.  An elective share award 
represents the amount to which a surviving spouse is entitled in the face of the decedent spouse’s 
express disinheritance of the surviving spouse (by will or will substitute).  Therefore, the Uniform 
Probate Code’s elective share calculation guards against “overcompensating” the survivor in whose 
name a disproportionate share of the marital property already is titled. 
 
  The accrual intestacy calculation, in contrast, operates in the absence of such an express disinheritance 
(at least with respect to the intestate property).  Indeed, one of the goals of my intestacy scheme is to 
promote the donative intent of the intestate.  The intestacy scheme need not be as concerned, therefore, 
with giving the surviving partner a greater portion of the decedent’s intestate estate than that to which 
she is “entitled.” 
 
  This accrual method will tend to further each of the four values that should ground an intestacy 
scheme’s provisions recognizing the surviving committed partner.  First, an accrual approach to 
determining the surviving partner’s portion of the decedent’s intestate estate is designed to promote the 
imputed donative intent of the typical intestate decedent partner.  It seems likely that the intestate 
decedent would want a partner of many years to take more of her intestate property than she would want 
a partner of few years to take. [FN158]  Indeed, Professor Fellows recent empirical research into the 
donative preferences of those Minnesota residents living in a committed partnership provides some 
tentative support for this proposition. [FN159] 
 
  *296 Second, an accrual approach to the intestate inheritance rights of a surviving committed partner 
recognizes the claimant’s financial contributions and acts of care with respect to the decedent partner to 
the extent that the duration of the cohabiting partnership correlates positively with the performance of 
such contributions and acts of care.  Such a correlation seems highly likely in the run of cases.  One 
could reasonably assume a direct relationship between the duration of the cohabiting partnership and the 
extent to which the surviving partner contributed to the intestate partner’s well- being, including her 
financial well-being. 
 
  This assumption is the expressed rationale for the 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s accrual-type elective 
share.  The accrual-type elective share adjusts the surviving spouse’s ultimate entitlement to the length 
of the marriage.  The longer the marriage, the larger the “elective-share percentage.”  The sliding scale 
adjusts for the correspondingly greater contribution to the acquisition of the couple’s marital property in 
a marriage of fifteen years than in a marriage of fifteen days. [FN160] 
 
  *297 Third, the accrual approach protects the surviving committed partner’s reliance interests in the 
partnership.  It seems reasonable as well to assume a direct relationship between the duration of the 
cohabiting partnership and the extent to which the survivor has forgone opportunities in order to 
preserve the partnership or otherwise has reordered her life so as to have become dependent financially 
on the intestate.  As the partnership endures, the partners likely will increasingly come to intermingle 
their finances and their plans for the future.  Moreover, they might increasingly come to see the property 
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 of each as being available to meet the needs of both partners.  In this sense, each partner will come to 
rely upon the financial support of the other partner. 
 
  This assumption that a relationship is more likely to induce financial reliance as the duration of the 
relationship increases is the rationale underlying the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution’s recharacterization of some or all separate property as marital property, where the 
marriage is of sufficient duration, for the purposes of the court’s equitable division of property between 
the spouses at divorce. [FN161]  The Principles provide generally that, at the dissolution of a marriage, 
separate property of a spouse should be assigned to the spouse who owns it. [FN162]  However, the 
Principles also provide in certain circumstances for the recharacterization of separate property as marital 
property, the value of which marital property is then presumptively distributed equally between the 
spouses. [FN163] 
 
  Section 4.12 of the Principles provides that at the dissolution of a marriage that exceeds a minimum 
duration, which minimum duration the adopting jurisdiction must specify, a portion of the separate 
property that a spouse held when she entered into the *298 marriage should be recharacterized as marital 
property. [FN164]  The percentage of separate property that is so recharacterized depends upon the 
length of the marriage.  The longer the marriage, the greater the percentage of separate property that is 
recharacterized as marital property. [FN165]  In a marriage of sufficient duration, all of the separate 
property that a spouse brought to the marriage is recharacterized as marital property. [FN166] 
 
  In addition, this section of the Principles provides for the recharacterization at divorce of a portion of 
separate property acquired during the marriage where the marriage is of a specified minimum duration 
and the spouse who owns the separate property at issue has owned the property for a specified minimum 
duration. [FN167]  The length of the marriage and the length of the property “holding period” determine 
how much of the separate property is recharacterized as marital property. [FN168]  Where there is a 
sufficiently lengthy marriage and a sufficiently lengthy holding period, the full value of the separate 
property acquired during the marriage is recharacterized as marital property. [FN169] 
 
  *299 The Principles’ drafters expressly justified this recharacterization scheme on the principle of 
reliance:  
After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think of their separate-property 
assets as separate, even if they would be so classified under the technical property rules.  
Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that such assets will be available to 
provide for their joint retirement, for a medical crisis of either spouse, or for other 
personal emergencies.  The longer the marriage the more likely it is that the spouses will 
have made decisions about their employment or the use of their marital assets that are 
premised in part on such expectations about the separate property of both spouses. 
[FN170] 
 
  Of course, the accrual method yields an approximation.  It has not been designed to be exactly accurate 
in any given case.  But that should not be a significant concern. [FN171] 
 
  The alternative would be to inquire in each case into the actual donative intent of the decedent, the 
actual extent to which the survivor contributed to the intestate’s well-being, and the actual degree of 
reliance by the survivor on the continuation of the partnership and on the decedent.  Such an open-ended 
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 inquiry, *300 of course, would be costly and administratively burdensome and perhaps impracticable.  
The accrual approach allows for the emphasis on and promotion of the values of donative intent, 
reciprocity and reliance while maintaining an ease of administration. [FN172] 
 
  Indeed, the proposed accrual method also serves the values of certainty and administrative convenience 
in at least two additional ways.  First, the accrual method, which provides a relatively small share of the 
decedent’s intestate estate to the survivor of a short-term cohabiting partnership, greatly reduces the 
incentive of both the claimed surviving partner and the decedent’s other intestate heirs to litigate the 
issue of whether a committed partnership existed when the relationship at issue was, at most, a short-
term relationship.  This disincentive should tend to reduce greatly the amount of litigation over the issue. 
 
  Second, the accrual method reduces the likelihood of a court making a relatively costly “wrong” 
decision as to whether a qualifying committed cohabiting partnership existed.  The determination as to 
whether a claimant was a committed partner such that she should share in the intestate estate will be 
more difficult--a closer call--in relationships of relatively short duration. In such relationships, however, 
even if the claimant qualifies as a surviving committed partner, she will take only a relatively small part 
of the decedent’s intestate estate.  Thus, the accrual method minimizes the consequence of a “wrong” 
decision. [FN173]  With respect to relationships of greater duration, in which a greater share of the 
intestate estate is at stake, the evidence that such a relationship existed should be far more compelling 
and, therefore, the judgment as to whether such a relationship existed should be in most cases a much 
clearer call for the court (and potential litigants) to *301 make. [FN174] 
 
B. The Discounting Approach After a Fracture of the Partnership 
 
  The Working Draft requires that a couple be cohabiting at the death of the intestate decedent in order 
for the surviving partner to qualify for an intestate share.  That the partners had separated at the time of 
the intestate’s death is an absolute bar to the survivor’s taking.  Generally, this is the approach of extant 
intestacy schemes that utilize a multi-factor approach to the identification of a committed partner. 
[FN175] 
 
  A rationale that supports this approach is the view that separation of the couple is most commonly a 
manifestation of the desire of at least one of the parties to terminate the partnership: Separation generally 
signals an end to partnership status so that it is no longer appropriate to engage in a multi- factor inquiry 
into whether a partnership existed at the time of death. [FN176]  A related rationale is that separation 
commonly coincides with a desire of the parties that the surviving partner not take a share of intestate 
property at the death of the first to die. [FN177] 
 
  *302 In pondering reform of Alberta, Canada’s intestate succession act, the Alberta Law Reform 
Institute reasoned instructively as follows with respect to this issue:  
[I]t makes no sense to assume that the deceased cohabitant would want his or her estate to 
go to the separated cohabitant after the relationship has come to an end.  Separation with 
intent to end the relationship is for cohabitants the equivalent of divorce for married 
persons.  Some cohabitants will see this as harsh and others will see it as a benefit, but it 
is a consequence of cohabiting outside marriage.  The definition [of a cohabitant who 
shall qualify for a share of the decedent’s intestate estate] should require that the couple 
be living together at the time of death. [FN178] 
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  The Alberta reformers’ decision that a qualifying cohabitant must not have been separated from her 
partner at the partner’s death follows from the reformers’ antecedent decision that the central goal of the 
intestacy scheme should be to promote the donative wishes of the intestate. [FN179] 
 
  Similarly, the Working Draft’s approach to separation is consistent with an intestacy scheme that has as 
its sole or dominant value promoting the likely intent of the decedent.  Indeed, a scheme so grounded 
might deny an intestate share also to a legal spouse who was living separate and apart from the decedent 
spouse at the intestate’s death.  One might reasonably conclude that the intestate who was living 
separate and apart from her spouse at her death would not have wanted her surviving spouse to take a 
share of her intestate estate, or at least would not have wanted him to take as great a share as had the 
couple been living together as wife and husband at the intestate’s death. [FN180] 
 
  *303 One might suppose an intent-centric intestacy scheme that allowed for the possibility that a 
surviving separated partner might take an intestate share.  An intent-centric scheme might concern itself 
with the occasional partners who did not view their separation as necessarily permanent.  More 
precisely, such a scheme might consider whether the intestate held out the hope for reconciliation with 
the separated partner.  One might reasonably hypothesize that partners who are separated but who 
contemplate reconciliation would want the surviving partner to share in their intestate estate.  An intent-
centric scheme might inquire, therefore, into whether the intestate believed that she and her partner were 
likely to reconcile, and might award the survivor of such a partnership an intestate share. 
 
  The Working Draft does not concern itself with the possibility of reconciliation.  This approach has the 
virtues of simplicity and objectivity. Once the couple separates there is no call for a difficult and 
subjective inquiry into whether the intestate viewed the separation as permanent or rather as a possibly 
temporary interruption of the committed partnership. 
 
  I propose to allow the survivor of a recently-fractured partnership at the death of one of the partners to 
take an intestate share in some cases.  This proposal is not based in any large part, however, on the 
possibility that the partners might have reconciled.  Indeed, my proposal would allow the survivor of a 
recently-fractured partnership to take an intestate share regardless of whether the intestate held out hope 
of reconciliation.  Thus, my approach too avoids any inquiry into the intestate’s state of mind with 
respect to the likelihood of reconciliation. 
 
  I propose that where the partnership between the decedent and the surviving committed partner 
fractured prior to the decedent’s death and remained fractured at the time of the decedent’s death, the 
intestate share percentage to which the survivor otherwise would be entitled shall be discounted in 
proportion to the length of time between the fracture and the intestate’s death. [FN181]  The survivor’s 
share shall be reduced by fifty percent if the partnership fractured in the year prior to the decedent’s 
death, by *304 seventy-five percent if the partnership fractured more than one year prior to the 
decedent’s death but less than two year’s prior to the decedent’s death, and by one hundred percent if the 
partnership fractured more than two years prior to the decedent’s death. [FN182] 
 
  In addition, my proposal would deny a claimant any intestate share where the fracture of her 
relationship with the decedent led to a distribution of the parties’ assets pursuant to contract or statute. 
[FN183]  For example, if the relevant jurisdiction had adopted the American Law Institute’s Principles 
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 of the Law of Family Dissolution with respect to the allocation of domestic partnership property 
between former partners, [FN184] and if a court proceeding so allocating domestic partnership property 
between the former partners followed the fracture of the partnership, the surviving former partner would 
not be entitled to any portion of the decedent’s intestate estate.  This bar follows from the rationale for 
my discounting approach which is discussed immediately below. 
 
  The reciprocity and reliance rationales principally ground this discounting approach.  The surviving 
partner of a recently-fractured relationship is likely to have contributed to a significant portion of the 
wealth that the intestate possessed at her death and is far more likely to have done so as contrasted with 
the surviving former partner of a relatively long-ago fractured relationship.  Moreover, the likelihood 
that the partners have equitably divided up their assets is least where the fracture occurred quite closely 
in time to the decedent’s death.  In addition, the survivor of a recently- fractured partnership in many 
cases is unlikely yet to have had the opportunity to undo her dependence on the intestate for her 
financial well-being.  And, again, she is less likely to have done so as contrasted with the surviving 
former partner of a long-ago fractured partnership. 
 
  The Alberta reformers’ assertion that “[s]eparation with intent to end the relationship is for cohabitants 
the equivalent of divorce for married persons” [FN185] might be generally accurate with respect to the 
donative intent of the partners and spouses.  With respect to the financial consequences of the fracture, 
however, divorce and partnership separation are grossly dissimilar.  The *305 equitable distribution of 
property and, in certain circumstances, the availability of an award of spousal support concomitant with 
divorce generally makes the inclusion of an ex-spouse within the intestacy scheme unnecessary to 
satisfy the reciprocity and reliance interests of the surviving ex-spouse.  Absent an enforceable contract 
with respect to these matters, however, the fracture of a committed partnership generally entails no 
equitable distribution or support payments.  Inclusion within the intestacy scheme of the ex-partner of a 
recently-fractured partnership, therefore, is necessary to protect the ex-partner’s reliance and reciprocity 
interests. 
 
  I concede that, in allowing for an ex-partner to share in the decedent’s intestate estate, my goal of 
promoting the values of reciprocity and reliance comes in conflict, in the run of cases, with my goal of 
promoting the intestate’s likely donative intent.  Such a conflict is not unknown to succession law.  The 
elective share also subjugates testamentary intent in favor of values similar to my reciprocity and 
reliance values--the marital sharing and need/duty of support rationales. [FN186] 
 
  The “marital sharing theory” grounding the elective share is reciprocity based: It asserts that both 
spouses necessarily contributed to the wealth accumulated by either spouse during the marriage and, 
therefore, both spouses are entitled to enjoy a portion of that wealth regardless of how the spouses held 
title to it. [FN187]  The need/duty of support rationale grounding the elective share asserts that the 
decedent spouse owed a duty of support to her spouse during her life and that duty should continue to 
some extent at her death in light of, among other reasons, the surviving spouse’s expectation that he will 
be supported. [FN188]  Similarly, the reliance interest grounding my intestacy reform proposal centers 
*306 on the notion that the partners’ sacrifices for each other and for the good of the relationship give 
rise to an expectation of continued financial support and a corollary financial obligation that to some 
degree survives the death of a partner and survives the fracture of the partnership. 
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   In nearly all of the common law states that provide a surviving spouse with an elective share, the 
circumstance that the spouses were living separate and apart at the death of the first of them to die does 
not impair the survivor’s right to a forced share of the decedent’s estate. [FN189]  This is consistent with 
the two theories that ground the modern elective share. Similarly, allowing the surviving ex-partner of a 
recently-fractured partnership to share in the decedent’s intestate estate promotes the reciprocity and 
reliance rationales. 
 
  Moreover, with respect to the elective share, the donative intent that is being subjugated is express.  In 
contrast, my proposed intestacy scheme reform subjugates an imputed donative intent.  The case for 
subjugating donative intent in favor of reliance and reciprocity interests, therefore, arguably is even 
stronger with respect to the intestate decedent. [FN190] 
 
  Finally, I acknowledge that my proposed discounting approach would increase the amount of 
uncertainty associated with a multi-factor approach.  Under extant multi-factor approach statutes and the 
Working Draft, a court must determine whether the partners separated prior to the decedent’s death.  My 
discounting approach requires in addition that the court determine with some precision when any such 
separation occurred.  One would expect that in cases in which the separation date appears to be roughly 
one year prior or two years prior to the decedent’s death but is not clearly greater than or less than 
respectively either one year *307 or two years prior to the decedent’s death, the termination-date 
determination will be litigated at some length. [FN191] 
 
C. Cases of Partial Intestacy 
 
  An intestacy statute controls the distribution of the decedent’s probate property only to the extent that 
the distribution of that property is not governed by the decedent’s will.  A property owner who dies 
without a valid will dies wholly intestate with respect to her probate property. [FN192]  A property 
owner who dies with a valid will that does not successfully make a complete disposition of her probate 
property dies partially intestate. [FN193]  In this latter case, the intestacy statute will govern the 
distribution of the decedent’s probate property not governed by the decedent’s will. 
 
  The Working Draft, however, applies only “[i]f an unmarried, adult decedent dies without a valid will 
and leaves a surviving committed partner.” [FN194]  Thus, the Working Draft has no application in 
cases of partial intestacy.  Necessarily, in cases in which a committed partner dies partially intestate, 
other provisions of the intestacy scheme would govern the passing of the decedent’s intestate property.  
Presumably, these provisions would pass the committed partner’s intestate property to her close blood 
relations or, if she has no blood relations within the prescribed degree of relationship, to the state. 
 
  In support of the Working Draft’s approach to partial intestacy, one might argue that where the testator 
has executed a will (even one that does not make a complete disposition of the testator’s property) but 
has not seen fit to devise certain property to her partner by that will, this is a strong indication that the 
decedent *308 did not wish to provide that property at her death to her partner.  The argument would 
continue that the presence of such a strong indication of intent would undermine our confidence in any 
multi- factor inquiry into the nature of the decedent’s relationship with the claimed surviving committed 
partner so much so that it makes such an inquiry inappropriate.  This argument assumes that the multi-
factor inquiry ultimately seeks to determine whether the decedent’s relationship with the claimed 
surviving committed partner was of such a quality that we should infer an intent on the part of this 
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 decedent to provide for her.  If so, regardless of what our multi-factor inquiry revealed, our confidence 
in an inferred intent to provide certain property to the claimant would be undermined by our knowledge 
that the decedent partner executed a will and failed to devise that property to her. [FN195] 
 
  If the rationale for not applying a multi-factor approach in cases of partial intestacy relates to a concern 
that the decedent’s expressed testamentary intent suggests that she would not have wanted the surviving 
partner to take a share of her intestate property, then perhaps the multi- factor inquiry should be applied 
in cases of partial intestacy where the decedent executed her will prior to the onset of the committed 
partnership. This is so because the strength of the inference that the decedent intended to disinherit her 
partner depends critically on when the committed partner drafted her will.  A pre-partnership will speaks 
less clearly of the testator’s intent that the surviving partner be excluded from sharing in her intestate 
estate. The protection afforded to a surviving legal spouse who married a testator after the testator 
executed her will, and the rationale for such protection, provides an instructive parallel. 
 
  For example, section 2-301 of the Uniform Probate Code provides that a surviving spouse who married 
his spouse after the decedent spouse executed her will is entitled to the share of the decedent’s probate 
estate that he would have received had the testator died intestate. [FN196]  This entitlement of a spouse 
in the case of a premarital will is meant to effectuate the unexpressed intent *309 of the testator.  The 
surviving spouse is not so entitled, therefore, if the will expresses the testator’s intention that the will be 
effective notwithstanding any subsequent marriage by the testator, or if it is established that the testator 
executed the will in contemplation of her marriage to the surviving spouse, or if it is established that the 
testator provided for her spouse through non-probate means and did so with the intent that such 
provision be in lieu of a testamentary transfer. [FN197] 
 
  The rationale of the statute, and similar statutes, is that the testator who died with a premarital will in 
effect would have executed a new will providing generously for the new spouse had she not overlooked 
that her pre-marital will did not so provide.  The drafters of Uniform Probate Code section 2-301 
explain: “This section reflects the view that the intestate share of the spouse . . . is what the testator 
would want the spouse to have if he or she had thought about the relationship of his or her old will to the 
new situation.” [FN198] 
 
  To be clear, I am not arguing that the surviving committed partner of a decedent with a valid pre-
partnership will should take a portion of any property governed by the will and not devised to her.  But 
where the decedent has died with a valid pre-partnership will and yet partially intestate, the rationale of 
section 2-301 and similar statutes relating to premarital wills suggests that the pre-partnership will 
should not be used to support an inference that the testator wished to exclude the surviving partner from 
sharing in the decedent’s intestate estate. [FN199]  Indeed, the premarital will statutes, and their 
rationale, operate in contravention of an effectively expressed testamentary intent, while application of 
the multi-factor approach in cases of partial intestacy would govern only property not subject to an 
effective testamentary expression. 
 
  In fact, I would apply my proposed accrual/multi-factor approach in all cases of partial intestacy.  In 
cases in which the testator has not effectively expressed an intent to disinherit the *310 surviving 
committed partner or otherwise to distribute her probate property to others than the surviving partner, I 
would not give great weight to any inference that the decedent partner would wish to disinherit the 
surviving committed partner.  I would give much greater weight to the reciprocity and reliance interests 
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 of the surviving committed partner.  This balancing compels application of the accrual/multi-factor 
approach to govern intestate property in cases of partial intestacy. 
 
D. Standing to Challenge the Decedent Partner’s Will 
 
  I would be more supportive of the Working Draft’s restrictive approach in cases of partial intestacy if 
that approach would work to prevent challenges to a will by persons claiming to be a surviving 
committed partner in cases in which the decedent attempted to express testamentary intent and in which 
the claimed partnership was of relatively short duration.  But not applying the multi-factor approach in 
cases of partial intestacy in many such cases will not deny one claiming to be a surviving committed 
partner standing to challenge the decedent partner’s will.  This is so because in many such cases the 
surviving committed partner will have a financial interest in seeing that a court finds the decedent to 
have died intestate. [FN200] 
 
  Generally, one with a direct pecuniary interest in the failure or partial failure of a will enjoys standing 
to bring a challenge against the will.  For this reason, an heir who would take a greater amount from a 
decedent’s intestate estate were the decedent to be found to have died intestate than she would take from 
the decedent’s testate estate has standing to challenge the decedent’s will.  Under the Working Draft, the 
surviving committed partner is an heir if the decedent died wholly intestate.  Thus, the surviving 
committed partner who would take more in intestacy than she was left under the will has a direct 
pecuniary interest in arguing that the decedent died wholly intestate. It would seem, therefore, that such 
a surviving committed partner would have standing to challenge any will that is offered in probate as the 
decedent’s will, provided that the surviving partner’s argument is that the decedent died wholly intestate 
and not merely partially intestate. 
 
  *311 In granting intestate inheritance rights to a surviving committed partner, a multi-factor approach 
statute might not only expand the number of persons who have standing to challenge the decedent’s will 
[FN201] but also might add a layer of litigation to the will contest.  Prerequisite to her challenge to the 
decedent’s will, the claimed surviving committed partner would have to demonstrate to the court that 
she qualifies as a surviving committed partner.  This increased number of potential will claimants and 
added complexity of the will contest litigation would undermine the value of certainty and ease of 
administration even in cases where the decedent died fully testate. 
 
  In the name of certainty and administrative convenience, my proposal would limit the standing of a 
claimed surviving committed partner to challenge a decedent’s will where standing is based on the status 
of committed partner. I would limit standing as follows:  
Unless no other heir, aside from a claimed surviving committed partner, or no other 
group of heirs, not including a claimed surviving committed partner, has a net pecuniary 
interest in challenging respectively the decedent’s will, or any *312 individual provision 
in the will, equal to or greater than the net pecuniary interest of the claimed committed 
partner in challenging respectively the decedent’s will, or any individual provision in the 
will, no person who would take less than fifty percent of the decedent’s intestate estate as 
the surviving committed partner shall have standing to challenge a decedent’s will, or 
individual provision in the will, by virtue of the fact that the person is or claims to be the 
testator’s surviving committed partner.  This provision shall not defeat a person’s 
standing to challenge a decedent’s will where standing is asserted on some basis other 
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 than the challenger’s claimed status as the decedent’s surviving committed partner. 
[FN202] 
 
  Recall that, pursuant to my proposed accrual approach, a surviving committed partner does not take 
fifty percent or more of the decedent partner’s intestate estate unless she and the decedent partner 
cohabited in a partnership of nine years or greater duration. [FN203]  Thus, my proposal would limit 
standing to challenge a decedent’s will in many cases so that a claimed surviving committed partner will 
not have standing to challenge a decedent’s will (where standing is based on committed partner status) 
unless she is able to demonstrate that she and the decedent enjoyed a cohabiting partnership of nine 
years or greater duration.  I think it reasonable to hypothesize that in most cases of claimed relationships 
of such long duration, the evidence of the committed partnership will be compelling.  Thus, in most such 
cases, the claimant’s need to demonstrate to the court that she qualifies as a surviving committed partner 
should not lead in and of itself to prolonged litigation. [FN204] 
 
  Regardless of the claimed duration of the claimed committed partnership, however, my proposal would 
not operate to deny standing to a claimed surviving committed partner to challenge a decedent’s will if 
no other heir or group of heirs collectively has a *313 net pecuniary interest in challenging respectively 
the decedent’s will, or any provision thereof, equal to or greater than that of the claimed committed 
partner.  Assume, for example, that the decedent has died testate survived only by a brother and a 
surviving committed partner from a relationship that was of eight years duration.  Had the decedent died 
intestate, her brother would be entitled under my accrual approach to 52% of the decedent’s intestate 
estate.  The surviving committed partner would be entitled to 48% of the decedent’s intestate estate. 
[FN205]  Whether or not the surviving committed partner would have standing to challenge the 
decedent’s will would depend on the will’s distribution scheme. 
 
  Let’s assume three alternate testamentary schemes.  First, let’s assume that the testator devised all of 
her property to her favorite charity. In this case, the testator’s brother has a pecuniary interest in 
challenging the will greater than that of the surviving committed partner: If the will is held to be invalid, 
he will have a net gain of 52% of the testator’s estate and the surviving committed partner will have a 
net gain of 48% of the testator’s estate.  The surviving committed partner, therefore, would not have 
standing under my proposal to challenge the will.  My approach relies on the unity of interests between 
the brother and the surviving committed partner in seeking to prevent probate of a will that does not 
reflect the testator’s true wishes and, simultaneously in this case, to protect the interests of the surviving 
committed partner. 
 
  Next, let’s assume that the testator devised all of her property to her brother.  In this case, the surviving 
committed partner has a pecuniary interest in challenging the will greater than that of any other heir or 
group of other heirs. [FN206]  If the court finds the testator to have died intestate, the brother suffers a 
net loss of 48% of the decedent’s estate while the surviving committed partner enjoys a net gain of 48% 
of the decedent’s estate.  In such a circumstance, we cannot rely on the brother to protect the surviving 
committed partner’s interest (or to seek to prevent probate of a will that does not reflect the testator’s 
true wishes).  For this reason, my proposal would extend standing to challenge the decedent’s will to the 
surviving committed partner even though she *314 would stand to inherit less than 50% of the 
decedent’s intestate estate as the surviving committed partner. 
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   Finally, let’s assume that the testator devised one-half of the value of her property to her favorite 
charity and one-half of the value of her property to her brother.  Let’s further assume that even if these 
are deemed to be residuary gifts, the relevant law is that there is no residue of a residue, so that should 
either gift fail, the gift would pass by intestacy.  In this case, my proposal would deny standing to the 
surviving committed partner to assert any challenge that goes only to the devise to the charity.  This is 
because the brother has a pecuniary interest in challenging that devise that is not less than the pecuniary 
interest that the surviving committed partner has in challenging the devise. [FN207]  My proposal, 
however, would not deny standing to the surviving committed partner to assert any challenge that goes 
only to the devise to the brother.  The surviving committed partner obviously would gain more from 
such a challenge if successful than would the brother who would keep only fifty-two cents in intestacy 
for every dollar that he lost in the will challenge--a net loss.  Finally, my proposal also would not deny 
standing to the surviving committed partner to assert any challenge that goes to the entire will.  It is true 
that the brother will take 52% of the estate if the challenge is successful while the surviving committed 
partner will take only 48% of the estate.  But the surviving committed partner has a greater pecuniary 
interest in the lawsuit: She will enjoy a net gain of 48% of the estate if the court finds the decedent to 
have died intestate, while the brother would enjoy a net gain of only 2%. [FN208] 
 
*315 IV 
 
The Requirements for Qualification as a Surviving Committed Partner 
 
  My proposed intestacy scheme seeks to focus the inquiry into whether a claimant qualifies as a 
surviving committed partner on several objective factors and various subjective factors that directly 
implicate one or more of the values of donative intent, reciprocity, reliance, and ease of administration. 
 
A. The Objective Requirements 
 
  My proposal borrows from Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft the objective requirements that the 
surviving committed partner have been an unmarried adult at the decedent’s death who would not have 
been prohibited under the law of the relevant jurisdiction from marrying the decedent on account of the 
blood or adoptive relationship between the claimant and the decedent. [FN209]  I concur with Professor 
Waggoner’s judgment that the absence of any of these factors undermines to too great a degree *316 our 
ability to be confident in attributing to the decedent an intention to benefit the claimant. [FN210] 
 
  1. Cohabitation for a Minimum Duration as an Absolute Prerequisite to Taking an Intestate Share 
 
  My proposal also shares in common with the Working Draft the absolute requirement that the decedent 
and the surviving committed partner had cohabited.  My proposal’s requirements with respect to 
cohabitation differ, however, from those of the Working Draft in two important respects.  First, the 
Working Draft requires that the surviving committed partner and the decedent have been cohabiting at 
the decedent’s death in order for the surviving partner to take an intestate share.  My approach, however, 
allows the survivor of a recently-fractured partnership to take a discounted intestate share in certain 
cases, for reasons that I have discussed above. [FN211] 
 
  Second, the Working Draft does not employ any minimum cohabitation period that must be satisfied 
before a surviving committed partner may take an intestate share.  My proposal, however, for reasons 
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 discussed below, employs a minimum cohabiting partnership duration--three years--before the surviving 
committed partner may take any portion of the decedent’s intestate estate. [FN212] 
 
  Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft requires that a surviving committed partner, at the decedent’s 
death, have been sharing a common household with the decedent. [FN213]  The Working Draft defines 
“sharing a common household” to mean “that the decedent and the individual shared the same place to 
live, whether or not one or both had other places to live and whether or not one or both were physically 
residing somewhere else at the decedent’s *317 death.” [FN214]  Defining cohabitation in this manner 
allows for equal inclusion of couples in which the partners were physically residing apart during a 
portion of their cohabiting partnership due to “job-related or involuntary separation, such as where one 
or the other [partner] was on a military mission, was in prison, was hospitalized, or was in a nursing 
home.” [FN215] 
 
  Professor Waggoner chose not to define a “surviving committed partner” so as to require that the 
partner and the decedent had cohabited for a specified minimum duration.  He did not wish to preclude 
in all cases the survivor of a short-term partnership of great commitment from demonstrating that she is 
deserving of an intestate share of the decedent’s estate. [FN216]  Rather, Professor Waggoner chose to 
incorporate into the Working Draft a presumption that arises based on a cohabitation period of a 
specified duration.  The Working Draft presumes that a claimant’s relationship with the decedent was 
sufficiently committed [FN217] such that the claimant who otherwise satisfies the objective elements of 
the Working Draft should qualify for an intestate share of the decedent’s estate if the claimant and the 
decedent cohabited for periods totaling five years during the six years immediately preceding the 
decedent’s death. [FN218]  Thus, under the Working Draft, a claimant need not prove a cohabitation 
period of any specified duration, but she would find it helpful to her claim if she could do so. [FN219] 
 
  *318 My proposal adopts the Working Draft’s definition of “sharing a common household” as its 
definition of cohabitation. [FN220]  My proposal requires as a prerequisite for her taking an intestate 
share that a surviving committed partner had cohabited with the decedent in that the unreduced intestate 
share percentage is determined by the length of time in which the couple “cohabited in a partnership.” 
[FN221]  Recall that, at the high end of the scale, if the decedent and the surviving committed partner 
cohabited in a partnership for a period of at least fifteen years, the unreduced intestate share percentage 
is one hundred percent of the intestate estate.  At the low end of the scale, if the decedent and the 
surviving committed partner cohabited in a partnership for a period of at least three years but less than 
four years, the unreduced intestate share percentage is eighteen percent of the intestate estate.  If the 
claimant did not cohabit in a partnership with the decedent for a period of at least three years, she shall 
not be entitled to any portion of the intestate estate. [FN222] 
 
  Requiring cohabitation in a partnership for a period of at least three years as a prerequisite to the 
claimed surviving committed partner taking any portion of the intestate estate well balances and serves 
all four values that ground my intestacy scheme.  Consider first generally the rationale for distinguishing 
between claimants who cohabited with the decedent and those who did not.  The rationale for such an 
approach is that the absence of cohabitation by the putative partners is an excellent marker for 
insufficient commitment--as the intestacy scheme defines commitment. *319[ FN223]  The principal 
virtue of a cohabitation requirement is that it provides a largely objective means to lock from the 
courthouse an entire group of potential claimants who, on the whole, would be unlikely to succeed even 
absent the absolute bar. 
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  Next, consider the cohabitation requirement in light of the values that ground my proposed intestacy 
scheme.  It seems reasonable to conclude that in cases in which the claimant has not cohabited with the 
decedent, the decedent would not likely have wanted her estate to provide for the claimant after the 
decedent’s death, the claimant is not likely to have engaged in care- taking with respect to the decedent 
and is not likely to have contributed to the decedent’s economic well-being, and the claimant is not 
likely to have relied upon her relationship with the decedent to the claimant’s economic detriment.  It 
seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the vast majority (and too many) of likely claimants who 
have not cohabited with the decedent would be unable to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
they have developed the type of relationship--”life together with the decedent as a couple in an 
emotionally and physically intimate partnership” [FN224]--such that they will succeed in convincing the 
court applying my scheme that they should take a share of the decedent’s intestate estate.  In furtherance 
of administrative convenience, my proposed scheme does not let any of them try. 
 
  I believe the reasoning that grounds my intestacy scheme having any cohabitation requirement supports 
also extending the requirement to bar claims by those who did not cohabit in a partnership with the 
decedent for at least three years.  I have sought to select a minimum cohabiting partnership period of 
such duration that it will serve as an absolute bar only to those persons in a pool of otherwise potential 
claimants the majority of which clearly would be unlikely to succeed, even absent the bar, in 
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence a partnership evidencing the donative intent, reciprocity 
and reliance interests that my proposed intestacy scheme seeks to recognize. [FN225]  The *320 theory 
of my proposal is that even if the decedent of a relationship with less than a three-year cohabiting 
partnership period is likely to have wanted the survivor to share in her estate, such a relationship is 
unlikely to have given rise to reciprocity and reliance interests of the type that my proposal seeks to 
protect. 
 
  Moreover, given that my proposal places the burden on the claimant to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that her relationship with the decedent should qualify her as a surviving committed 
partner, [FN226] the survivor of a relationship of very short duration is likely to be handicapped in 
carrying her burden by the lack of any conduct enduring over a significant period of time that might be 
helpful to the court in evaluating the nature of the relationship.  The Alberta Law Institute has 
commented on the importance of evaluating a relationship over a significant period of time in support of 
its recommendation for reform of the Alberta Intestate Succession Act, which reform would employ a 
minimum three-year cohabitation period before a claimant might assert a claim as a surviving committed 
partner to a share of a decedent’s intestate estate:  
It is just too difficult, if not impossible, to determine if a relationship is marriage-like 
unless one has a significant period of conduct upon which to base this judgment.  The 
reason for this is that the daily life of couples living within marriage or outside marriage 
is similar.  What differs is the commitment to the permanence of the relationship and this 
can only be judged with time. . . . 
  . . . .  
We remain of the view that the three-year period is the appropriate period.  A shorter 
period is likely to catch casual relationships and trial marriages and in such relationships, 
it is unlikely the deceased would want the surviving cohabitant to share in the estate.  The 
relationships we are trying to identify are those which are stable and have a commitment 
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 to permanence.  A minimum period of cohabitation is required to evidence these 
characteristics. [FN227] 
 
  The length of the minimum period need not be set, however, to prevent a windfall for those who pass 
the bar.  This is because my scheme uses an accrual approach to determine the size of the intestate share 
that the surviving committed partner takes.  Thus, *321 once it is determined that one qualifies as a 
committed partner, the size of the intestate share must still be determined.  That determination will be 
made with respect to the duration of the cohabiting partnership period. 
 
  The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and accompanying comments are instructive 
with respect to this dichotomy.  The Principles provide for certain financial consequences upon the 
termination by fracture of a qualifying domestic partnership. [FN228]  First, the Principles call for the 
allocation of “domestic-partnership property” upon the fracture of the qualifying domestic partnership.  
In general, upon dissolution of the partnership, each partner is presumptively entitled to domestic-
partnership property worth one half of the total value of domestic-partnership property that is owned by 
either partner. [FN229]  The Principles define domestic- partnership property as property that would 
have been marital property under the Principles had the domestic partners been married for the duration 
of their domestic-*322 partnership period. [FN230] The Principles further provide that, generally, 
property earned by either spouse during the marriage is marital property. [FN231]  Thus, under the 
Principles, generally, property that is earned by either domestic partner during the domestic partnership 
is domestic-partnership property. 
 
  Second, the Principles call for “compensatory payments” (analogous to alimony) for certain domestic 
partners. [FN232]  In order to qualify for a compensatory payment, the domestic partner first must show 
that she has incurred a compensable loss arising from the fracture of the domestic partnership into 
separate economic units. [FN233]  Examples of compensable losses include (1) a loss in earning 
capacity of one domestic partner that she incurred during the domestic partnership and that continues 
after the domestic partnership and that is related to her performing a disproportionate share of the care of 
the children of either domestic partner, [FN234] and, (2) only when the domestic partnership is *323 of 
a qualifying duration, a loss in living standard experienced by one of the domestic partners upon 
dissolution of the partnership that is attributable to the fact that the claimant domestic partner has 
significantly less wealth or earning capacity than the other domestic partner. [FN235]  In general, the 
amount of the compensatory payment to which a domestic partner is entitled relating to these 
compensable losses is proportional to (a) the disparity in income between the claimant domestic partner 
and her fellow domestic partner and (b) the duration of the domestic partnership or the child care period. 
[FN236] 
 
  Thus, under the Principles, that one qualifies as a domestic partner does not in itself entitle one at 
fracture of the partnership to an allocation of any property owned by the other domestic partner and does 
not, without more, qualify one for compensatory payments.  This has implications for the choice of 
duration of the minimum cohabitation period and minimum cohabitation parenting period, which each 
jurisdiction adopting the Principles must set for itself, that give rise under the Principles to a 
presumption *324 that two cohabitants are domestic partners. [FN237]  A comment to section 6.03 of 
the Principles explains that these minimum periods are meant to promote administrative convenience but 
are not needed as guards against windfall awards:  
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  This section requires that adopting jurisdictions specify a Paragraph (2) cohabitation 
parenting period and a Paragraph (3) cohabitation period. Persons treated as domestic 
partners under this section must also meet the requirements of Chapter 5 in order to 
obtain an award of compensatory payments.  Chapter 5 imposes its own durational 
thresholds for award eligibility.  In addition, for those meeting the threshold requirement, 
the value of any award of compensatory payments is ordinarily proportional to the 
duration of the parties’ cohabitation.  The amount of the parties’ property subject to 
division under section 6.05 will also, in the ordinary case, be proportional to the duration 
of the parties’ cohabitation.  Thus, this section does not require long cohabitation periods 
to screen out inappropriate compensatory-payment awards or property-distribution 
awards. 
 The required durations do need to be long enough to make it likely that the parties 
have established a life together as a couple and that their life together as a couple has had 
some significant impact on the circumstances of one or both parties. [FN238] 
 
  Similarly, my proposed intestacy scheme sets at three years the minimum cohabiting partnership 
duration because, in my theory, this is the period at which there is first a likelihood that the relationship 
between the decedent and the surviving claimant has given rise to the donative intent, reciprocity and 
reliance interests that my intestacy proposal seeks to protect. [FN239] In light of this likelihood, my 
proposal allows the survivors of relationships with *325 such a cohabiting partnership duration into the 
courthouse.  The portion of the decedent’s intestate estate to which the survivor is entitled, if any, is then 
proportional to the duration of the couple’s cohabiting partnership.  Whether the survivor who has gotten 
through the courthouse door is entitled to any such portion, however, is determined by the court using a 
subjective multi-factor analysis. 
 
B. The Subjective Inquiry Weighing Multiple Factors 
 
  Under my proposal, a surviving committed partner is one who satisfies all of the objective elements set 
out above in this Article and, in addition, satisfies at least one of two additional criteria.  The otherwise 
qualified claimant may succeed and take an intestate share by demonstrating that, during the decedent’s 
life, she and the decedent registered as each others’ domestic partner in accordance with the State’s 
requirements and procedures for the registration of domestic partnerships.  In the alternative, the 
claimant may demonstrate:  
[B]y clear and convincing evidence that the claimant lived her or his life together with 
the decedent as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership such that 
the intestacy scheme should protect the decedent’s interest in donative freedom, or the 
surviving committed partner’s reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the 
survivor a portion of the decedent’s intestate estate. [FN240] 
 
1. Factors Evidencing an Emotionally and Physically Intimate Partnership 
 
  My proposed statute lists twenty-three factors, grouped into four categories, that the court shall 
consider and give weight to in making the subjective determination as to whether the claimant has met 
her burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant and the decedent lived life 
together as a couple *326 in such an emotionally and physically intimate partnership.  Many of these 
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 factors derive from and are analogous to factors set out in Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft or the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution that are to be utilized in a 
determination of whether a claimant is, respectively, a surviving committed partner or a domestic 
partner. [FN241]  The Working Draft utilizes a multi- factor inquiry into whether the claimant’s 
relationship with the decedent was “marriage-like”--that is--”a relationship . . . in which two individuals 
have chosen to share one another’s lives in a long-term, intimate, and committed relationship of mutual 
caring.” [FN242]  The Principles *327 of the Law of Family Dissolution utilizes a multi-factor inquiry 
into whether two persons shared “life together as a couple.” [FN243] 
 
  I prefer that an intestacy scheme not evaluate and reward a non-marital partnership based on whether or 
not the relationship was sufficiently “marriage-like” [FN244] because I believe that term is not 
sufficiently precise [FN245] and also raises distracting political issues. [FN246]  I think it preferable to 
focus the court’s inquiry more directly on the values that the intestacy scheme wishes to promote or 
reward.  Even if we derive those values and, therefore, the desired qualities in a relationship from our 
appreciation of an ideal of marriage, it should be possible for us to define the requisite qualities of a 
qualifying committed partnership without making reference to marriage in focusing the court’s inquiry.  
We *328 might consider first the desired qualities of a traditional marriage that we wish to promote or 
reward in including only certain relationships within our definition of a qualifying committed 
partnership.  We might then draft our definition of a qualifying committed partnership with those 
qualities explicitly included. [FN247] 
 
  For example, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution define a 
“domestic partner” as, “two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a 
significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.” [FN248]  The 
definition makes no reference to marriage.  Yet, the comments to the Principles make clear that the 
drafters had as a model an ideal of marital life when they drafted a list of factors that would guide the 
court in deciding whether two partners “shared . . . a life together as a couple.” [FN249] 
 
  I have sought to focus the court’s subjective inquiry into the nature of the claimant’s relationship with 
the decedent directly on the values that ground my intestacy scheme by having the court focus on 
whether the claimant and the decedent lived “as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate 
partnership such that the intestacy scheme should protect the decedent’s interest in donative freedom, or 
the surviving committed partner’s reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a portion 
of the decedent’s intestate estate.” [FN250]  Moreover, in seeking to have the court maintain this focus, I 
have grouped the enumerated factors that the court must consider into four categories, each of which 
relates to one prong of this fundamental and ultimate question. 
 
  First, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors *329 that tend to demonstrate that the 
claimant lived or did not live her or his life together with the decedent as a couple in an emotionally and 
physically intimate partnership, including but not limited to the following factors: evidence that the 
parties were physically intimate with each other; [FN251] whether the couple joined in a marriage 
ceremony or a commitment ceremony; [FN252] whether the couple registered with an employer as 
domestic partners, if such registration was an option and would have been beneficial; whether one or 
both of the parties nominated the other as her or his agent to make health care decisions; [FN253] the 
parties’ reputation in their community or communities as a couple; [FN254] whether the parties made 
joint gifts to charity together; [FN255] whether the parties celebrated holidays, their birthdays, and their 
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 anniversaries together; whether the parties exchanged with each other symbols of their relationship, such 
as rings or engraved jewelry; [FN256] and whether the parties agreed to be buried after their deaths next 
to each other or agreed that the survivor should take possession of the ashes of the first to die. [FN257] 
 
  Second, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors that tend to demonstrate that the 
decedent would or would not have wanted her or his estate to provide for the claimant after the 
decedent’s death, including but not limited to the following factors: whether the decedent devised 
property by will or attempted to do so and, if so, whether the decedent named the claimant as a devisee 
or attempted to do so; [FN258] whether the decedent *330 utilized will substitutes to pass property and, 
if so, whether the decedent designated the claimant as the recipient of property passing by such will 
substitutes; [FN259] and written statements made by the decedent, or oral statements made by the 
decedent in the presence of at least one third-party, in which the decedent expressed the desire that her 
or his estate be used after her or his death to support the claimant. [FN260] 
 
  Third, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant 
did or did not engage in care-taking with respect to the decedent or did or did not contribute to the 
decedent’s economic well-being, including but not limited to the following factors: whether the claimant 
helped the decedent cope with a physical or mental disability; whether the claimant cared for the 
decedent during a period or periods in which the decedent suffered a serious illness or attempted to 
recuperate from an injury; whether the claimant helped finance in some significant part the decedent’s 
education or a business venture of the decedent; whether the claimant performed a disproportionate 
share of the uncompensated domestic services for the couple’s household; and whether the claimant 
contributed a disproportionate share of the financial resources used to maintain the couple’s household. 
 
  And finally, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors that tend to demonstrate that the 
claimant did or did not rely upon her relationship with the decedent to the claimant’s economic 
detriment or in a way that fostered the claimant’s economic dependence on the decedent, including but 
not limited to the following factors: whether the claimant sacrificed career or financial opportunities or 
reallocated her or his financial or personal resources in furtherance of the parties’ relationship or 
common good; [FN261] whether the parties relocated to a new community together; [FN262] written 
statements made by the decedent, or oral statements made by the decedent in the presence of at least one 
third-party, in which the decedent acknowledged a moral or legal *331 responsibility for the claimant’s 
financial well-being or a willingness to assume such responsibility; [FN263] whether the claimant began 
to co-parent a child after the parties had agreed to co-parent the child provided that the claimant was still 
financially responsible for the child at the time of the decedent’s death; [FN264] the extent to which the 
parties intermingled their finances, such as by maintaining a joint checking account, savings account or 
money market account, by making joint investments, or by incurring joint debts; [FN265] and whether 
the claimant’s ability to maintain her or his residence is jeopardized by financial consequences of the 
decedent’s death. 
 
  2. Monogamy and Fidelity as Factors to be Considered 
 
  Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft lists the “degree of exclusivity of the relationship” as a factor 
that the court shall consider in evaluating the relationship between the claimant and the decedent. 
[FN266]  There is a sound reason to consider including such a factor in my proposed intestacy scheme 
also.  The exclusivity of the parties’ relationship is an indication that the parties had committed to the 
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 relationship and is some evidence that they “lived . . . life together . . . as a couple in an emotionally and 
physically intimate partnership.” [FN267] 
 
  Professor Waggoner explains as follows his rationale for including *332 the exclusivity of a 
relationship among the factors that a court applying the Working Draft is to consider in determining 
whether a relationship was “marriage-like”:  
Under most intestacy laws, if one or both spouses are unfaithful, the survivor still takes 
an intestate share.  When the parties are not married, however, the behavior of the parties 
forms the basis of the relationship, and such behavior shows a weakened commitment to 
the relationship.  This is not to say that unfaithfulness during cohabitation precludes a 
finding that the relationship was marriage-like.  The degree to which one or both parties 
were unfaithful, when it occurred, and so on are just factors to be considered in the 
overall balance of factors the court should consider in arriving at its conclusion.  To be 
found marriage-like, a relationship need not be like an ideal or perfect marriage. [FN268] 
 
  Elsewhere, in discussing his Working Draft, Professor Waggoner speaks of the relevance of “whether 
or not a sexual relationship existed and the extent to which the relationship, during cohabitation, was 
monogamous.” [FN269] 
 
  I have several concerns with including the exclusivity of a relationship among the factors that a court 
must consider in evaluating whether a claimant should qualify as a surviving committed partner.  In 
discussing these concerns, and more generally in discussing the exclusivity factor, I think it helpful to 
distinguish between sexual monogamy and infidelity.  Where the parties have agreed that their 
relationship will not preclude either of them from engaging in sexual intimacy outside of the 
relationship, such outside intimacy (if it is within the parameters set by the partners) does not equate 
with infidelity. 
 
  A court might find it helpful in applying my proposed multi-factor approach to consider evidence of 
the exclusivity of the relationship as that term relates to sexual monogamy.  Where the parties have 
committed to the sexual exclusivity of their relationship, that commitment speaks to the broader 
commitment that they have made to each other and favors a finding that the parties were committed 
partners within the meaning of my intestacy scheme. [FN270] 
 
  *333 But I question the extent to which the inverse holds.  That is, I question whether the fact that two 
people who have cohabited for at least three years have agreed to live in a relationship that is not 
sexually exclusive necessarily speaks to any lack of commitment by the parties to the broader 
relationship.  I suspect that a significant proportion of gay male couples who would self-identify as 
committed partners do not desire sexual exclusivity within their relationship. 
 
  I also question the need to evaluate gay relationships against heterosexual norms.  I would prefer that 
an intestacy scheme that recognizes unmarried committed partners respect that many gay couples may 
decide for themselves that the sexual exclusivity norm presumably accepted by the vast majority of 
married couples is something they wish to reject.  I am wary, therefore, of including within a list of 
factors that the court must consider in evaluating the nature of the claimant’s relationship with the 
decedent the exclusivity of the relationship, as one can reasonably predict that this factor will 
disadvantage the survivor of a couple that had rejected the exclusivity norm.  My fear is that the 
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 connection between marital relationships and sexual monogamy is so close in the minds of so many 
people that many judges would give disproportionate weight to the lack of such sexual exclusivity in 
coming to the conclusion that a couple’s relationship was not “marriage-like” and, therefore, was not 
sufficiently committed. 
 
  Where the parties had agreed to live in a relationship that is sexually exclusive and one (or both) of the 
parties was unfaithful, the issue arises--what importance should be given to this infidelity in light of the 
values that ground my proposed intestacy scheme.  Presumably, the answer would depend on the nature 
of the infidelity--its duration and proximity or remoteness in time from the decedent’s death. [FN271]  
The answer also might depend on *334 which of the parties--the claimant or the decedent--was 
unfaithful. 
 
  Where the decedent had been unfaithful, one might conclude that the decedent’s infidelity evidenced 
her lack of commitment to the relationship. [FN272]  Furthermore, from this supposed lack of 
commitment, one might infer a lessened likelihood that the decedent would have wanted the claimant to 
take a portion of the decedent’s intestate estate.  Thus, relying on evidence of the decedent’s infidelity, a 
court might deny the claimant an intestate share of the unfaithful decedent’s estate in order to promote 
the decedent’s presumed donative intent. 
 
  The decedent’s infidelity would not negate the claimant’s contributions to the decedent’s well-being 
during her life or lessen the claimant’s reliance interests where the claimant had sacrificed in furtherance 
of her relationship with the decedent to the claimant’s economic detriment.  The claimant might still 
succeed, therefore, in making out a claim to take a portion of the decedent’s intestate estate (assuming 
that the decedent’s infidelity was not such that it caused the court to conclude that the claimant and the 
decedent did not live life together as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership).  
But in cases in which an award to the claimant otherwise would have been based on the decedent’s 
presumed intent, considering the decedent’s infidelity in an attempt to be faithful to the decedent’s intent 
would come at the high cost of unfairness.  Fairness dictates that the party who has suffered her 
partner’s infidelity should not lose her claim to a portion of the decedent’s intestate estate on the basis of 
that infidelity. 
 
  Where the claimant herself had been unfaithful, the connection between this infidelity and the values 
that ground my proposed intestacy scheme appears to be more remote.  One might make an argument 
that the infidelity is relevant in that it speaks to a reverse reciprocity.  The argument would be that the 
claimant’s infidelity inflicted emotional harm upon the decedent and this behavior should disqualify the 
claimant from taking a portion of the injured decedent’s intestate estate. [FN273] 
 
  *335 In evaluating this argument, we might benefit from comparing how infidelity is taken into 
account by a court that is adjudicating financial issues--property division and spousal support claims--
upon dissolution of a marriage by divorce. [FN274]  The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act rejects 
consideration of marital fault [FN275] in the allocation of property and in the awarding of spousal 
support. [FN276]  Likewise, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
reject consideration of marital fault in both property division and spousal support - which the Principles 
refer to as “compensatory payments.” [FN277] 
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   *336 The ALI’s position on the relevance of marital fault derives from the theories that ground the 
Principles’ division of marital property and awarding of spousal support. [FN278]  With respect to 
property division, sections4.09 and 4.10 of the Principles provide generally that, at dissolution of the 
marriage, each spouse is presumptively entitled to one half of the marital property owned by either 
spouse. [FN279]  This presumption of an equal division of marital property reflects a reciprocity-based 
theory that the amount of property accumulated during the marriage necessarily reflects the 
contributions to the marriage of both spouses whether in the home or in the workplace. [FN280] 
 
  The Principles allow for an award of spousal support to compensate a spouse who has incurred a 
disproportionate financial loss upon dissolution of the marriage. [FN281]  The Principles’ drafters 
reason that it is appropriate for the obligor spouse to compensate the obligee spouse in light of the 
reliance that the marriage has induced and for employment opportunities foregone by the obligee *337 
spouse so that he or she might care for the couple’s children. [FN282] 
 
  The marital misconduct of either spouse is not relevant to these inquiries into the reciprocity and 
reliance interests of the spouses. [FN283]  It is consistent with these theories, therefore, that the 
Principles forbid the court from considering a spouse’s infidelity or other marital fault in the division of 
marital property or the awarding of compensatory payments.  Similarly, it would not be consistent with 
the reciprocity and reliance rationales that ground my proposed intestacy scheme to deny an intestate 
share to an otherwise qualified surviving committed partner on the basis of that partner’s infidelity. 
[FN284] 
 
  I have attempted to balance my concerns with allowing a court *338 to consider the sexual exclusivity 
of the parties’ relationship and my belief that such sexual exclusivity is compelling evidence in favor of 
a finding that the parties enjoyed an emotionally and physically intimate partnership.  My proposal 
provides that:  
If the court finds that the parties lived together in a sexually exclusive relationship during 
their cohabiting partnership, the court shall weigh this factor in favor of finding that the 
parties lived life together in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership.  The 
court shall not otherwise consider evidence relating to the sexual exclusivity of the 
parties’ relationship. [FN285] 
 
  My proposal would allow a claimant to introduce evidence concerning the sexual exclusivity of the 
partners’ relationship.  Only if the claimant chooses to introduce such evidence, would those opposing 
the claimant be entitled to introduce evidence on *339 the point.  If the court finds the opponents’ 
rebuttal evidence convincing, the court will not weigh the exclusivity of the parties’ relationship in the 
claimant’s favor.  The court may not, however, use a finding of non-exclusivity to justify denial of the 
survivor’s claim. 
 
  If my concern that some judges would give undue weight to a lack of sexual exclusivity is justified, 
then it is likely that some judges would find it difficult to ignore evidence of non-exclusivity in 
evaluating the nature of the partners’ relationship, even when the relevant statute directs that a court may 
not consider such evidence.  Some judges may not be able to unring the bell.  My proposal mitigates this 
danger in that it gives to the claimant control over whether any evidence of sexual exclusivity or the lack 
thereof will be heard by the court. 
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 Conclusion 
 
  As an increasing percentage of persons in our society structure family lives outside of the conventional 
nuclear family, family property law is faced with the challenge of evolving to meet better the needs of 
these non-conventional families.  One approach to reform would focus on form and would offer new 
objective statuses for which family members could register and to which inheritance rights would attach.  
This approach possesses the twin virtues of certainty and ease of administration.  The focus on form 
would leave outside inheritance law’s protection, however, those persons who functioned as we would 
hope a family member would function but who failed to register formally for the necessary state 
designation. 
 
  An alternative approach to reform would focus on function.  Inheritance law would acknowledge as 
family members of a decedent those persons who related with the decedent in such a way that we think 
it appropriate to recognize the person as family, perhaps because we wish to encourage and reinforce 
such behavior.  The single most salient objection to application of the functional approach in inheritance 
law has been the perceived difficulty of determining, in the absence of a bright line registration system, 
who counts as a family member.  Yet, the functional approach is consistent with the recent de-emphasis 
of formalism in succession law.  And in principle, if the question is properly framed and a court’s 
discretion is properly constrained, the question of whether the decedent and the claimant functioned as 
parent *340 and child or as committed partners is no more indeterminate than other issues that modern 
probate courts confront and resolve every day--issues such as whether the decedent intended for a 
document that she failed to execute with testamentary formalities to be her will, whether she intended by 
revocation of a will to revive an earlier will, and certainly whether she executed a testamentary 
document with sufficient mental capacity and free of undue influence. 
 
  With respect to the treatment of unmarried committed partners, I propose a hybrid approach to reform 
that both offers a registration option and utilizes a multi-factor test for function.  My proposal’s 
registration option would offer a certain safe harbor for those partners who seek to protect each other 
from disinheritance.  The multi-factor prong of my proposal would allow a court to grant intestate 
inheritance rights to the survivor of an unregistered partnership where the claimant shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that she and the decedent lived together in an emotionally and physically intimate 
partnership and that their relationship profoundly implicated at least one of the three values at the center 
of the court’s inquiry: respect for the decedent’s intent to provide at death for the survivor, or protection 
of the survivor’s reciprocity or reliance interests in the partnership. 
 
  My proposal seeks to constrain the court’s discretion and narrow the question for the court’s analysis 
by setting out twenty-three factors relating to the values grounding my proposal that the court shall 
consider in determining whether a claimant qualifies as a surviving committed partner.  The accrual 
feature of my proposal also promotes these values and reduces the uncertainty that might arise from use 
of a multi-factor analysis in the administration of an estate.  Based on the assumption that there 
generally is a direct relationship between the duration of the cohabiting partnership and the degree to 
which the relationship implicated the donative intent, reciprocity and reliance interests at issue, my 
accrual method increases the intestate share awarded to a surviving committed partner as the duration of 
the cohabiting partnership increases.  The accrual method also serves the value of administrative 
convenience: It provides a disincentive to litigate in the difficult cases of a short-term cohabiting 
partnership because the portion of the intestate estate at issue in such cases will be small.  Similarly, the 
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 accrual method reduces the likelihood of a court making a costly “wrong” decision as to *341 whether 
the claimant should qualify as a committed partner because the close-call short-term cohabiting 
partnership cases will involve only a small portion of the intestate estate. 
 
*342 Appendix A 
 
Working Draft--Intestate Share of Committed Partner, Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
January 20, 1995 
 
  (a) [Amount.] If an unmarried, adult decedent dies without a valid will and leaves a surviving 
committed partner, the decedent’s surviving committed partner is entitled to: 
 
  (1) the first [$50,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, if: 
 
  (A) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or 
 
  (B) all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving committed partner 
and there is no other descendant of the surviving committed partner who survives the decedent; 
 
  (2) one half of the intestate estate, in cases not covered by paragraph (1). 
 
  (b) [Committed Partner; Requirements.] To be the decedent’s committed partner, the individual must, 
at the decedent’s death: (i) have been an unmarried adult; (ii) not have been prohibited from marrying 
the decedent under the law of this state by reason of a blood relationship of the decedent; and (iii) have 
been sharing a common household with the decedent in a marriage-like relationship.  Only one 
individual can qualify as the decedent’s committed partner for purposes of this section. 
 
  (c) [Common Household.] For purposes of subsections (b) and (e), “sharing a common household” or 
“shared a common household” means that the decedent and the individual shared the same place to live, 
whether or not one or both had other places to live and whether or not one or both were physically 
residing somewhere else at the decedent’s death.  The right to occupy the common household need not 
have been in both of their names. 
 
  (d) [Marriage-like Relationship; Factors.] For purposes of subsection  (b), a “marriage-like 
relationship” is a relationship that corresponds to the relationship between marital partners, in which two 
individuals have chosen to share one another’s lives in a long-term, intimate, and committed relationship 
of mutual caring.  Although no single factor or set of factors determines *343 whether a relationship 
qualifies as marriage-like, the following factors are among those to be considered: 
 
  (1) the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of exclusivity of the relationship; 
 
  (2) the degree to which the parties intermingled their finances, such as by maintaining joint checking, 
credit card, or other types of accounts, sharing loan obligations, sharing a mortgage or lease on the 
household in which they lived or on other property, or titling the household in which they lived or other 
property in joint tenancy; 
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   (3) the degree to which the parties formalized their legal obligations, intentions, and responsibilities to 
one another, such as by one or both naming the other as primary beneficiary of life insurance or 
employee benefit plans or as agent to make health care decisions; 
 
  (4) whether the couple shared in co-parenting a child and the degree of joint care and support given the 
child; 
 
  (5) whether the couple joined in a marriage or a commitment ceremony, even if the ceremony was not 
of the type giving rise to a presumption under subsection (e)(3); and 
 
  (6) the degree to which the couple held themselves out to others as married or the degree to which the 
couple held themselves out to others as emotionally and financially committed to one another on a 
permanent basis. 
 
  (e) [Presumption.] An individual’s relationship with the decedent is presumed to have been marriage-
like if: 
 
  (1) during the [six] year period next preceding the decedent’s death, the decedent and the individual 
shared a common household for periods totaling at least [five] years; 
 
  (2) the decedent or the individual registered or designated the other as his  [or her] domestic partner 
with and under procedures established by an organization and neither partner executed a document 
terminating or purporting to terminate the registration or designation; 
 
  (3) the decedent and the individual joined in a marriage or a commitment ceremony conducted and 
contemporaneously certified in writing by an organization; or 
 
  (4) the individual is the parent of a child of the decedent, or is or was a party to a written co-parenting 
agreement with the decedent regarding a child, and if, in either case, the child lived *344 before the age 
of 18 in the common household of the decedent and the individual. 
 
  (f) [Force of the Presumption.] If a presumption arises under subsection (e) because only one of the 
listed factors is established, the presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence.  If more 
than one of the listed factors is established, the presumption can only be rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
 
*345 Appendix B 
 
An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried 
Committed Partners 
 
  (a) [Amount.] The surviving committed partner of an unmarried adult decedent shall be entitled to take 
the following portion of the decedent’s intestate estate: 
 
  (1) Subject to parts (2), (3), and (4) 
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 If the decedent and the surviving committed 
partner cohabited in a partnership for a period of: The unreduced intestate share percentage is: 
at least 3 years but less than 4 years 18% of the intestate estate 
at least 4 years but less than 5 years 24% of the intestate estate 
at least 5 years but less than 6 years 30% of the intestate estate 
at least 6 years but less than 7 years 36% of the intestate estate  
at least 7 years but less than 8 years 42% of the intestate estate  
at least 8 years but less than 9 years 48% of the intestate estate  
at least 9 years but less than 10 years 54% of the intestate estate  
at least 10 years but less than 11 years 60% of the intestate estate 
at least 11 years but less than 12 years 68% of the intestate estate  
at least 12 years but less than 13 years 76% of the intestate estate 
at least 13 years but less than 14 years 84% of the intestate estate  
at least 14 years but less than 15 years 92% of the intestate estate 
at least 15 years or more 100% of the intestate estate. 
   
  (i) The decedent and the claimant cohabited if they shared the same place to live, whether or not one or 
both had other places to live and whether or not one or both were physically residing somewhere else at 
the decedent’s death. 
 
  (ii) The cohabitation period is the appropriate measure for determining the unreduced intestate share 
percentage even in cases in which the decedent qualifies as a surviving committed partner by virtue of 
having registered along with the decedent as each others’ domestic partner in accordance with the 
State’s requirements and procedures for the registration of domestic partnerships.  The duration of the 
registered domestic partnership is not the appropriate measure for determining the unreduced intestate 
share percentage. 
 
  (2) If the decedent left one or more surviving descendants who are not also descendants of the 
surviving committed partner, the intestate share percentage shall be reduced by one-half. 
 
  (3) If the decedent is not survived by any descendant but is *346 survived by at least one parent, the 
intestate percentage shall be reduced by one- quarter. 
 
  (4) If the partnership between the decedent and the surviving committed partner fractured prior to the 
decedent’s death and remained fractured at the time of the decedent’s death, the intestate share 
percentage shall be reduced as follows after and as applied to the product of any reduction under parts 
(a)(2) or (a)(3): 
 
  (i) If the partnership fractured in the year prior to the decedent’s death and remained fractured at the 
decedent’s death, the intestate share percentage shall be reduced by 50%. 
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   (ii) If the partnership fractured more than one year prior to the decedent’s death but less than two year’s 
prior to the decedent’s death and remained fractured at the decedent’s death, the intestate share 
percentage shall be reduced by 75%. 
 
  (iii) If the partnership fractured more than two years prior to the decedent’s death and remained 
fractured at the decedent’s death, the intestate share percentage shall be reduced to zero. 
 
  (iv) If the fracture of the partnership led to a distribution of the parties’ assets pursuant to contract or 
statute, the intestate share percentage shall be reduced to zero. 
 
  (b) [Committed Partner; Requirements.] A surviving committed partner is one who, at the decedent’s 
death, was an unmarried adult, who would not have been prohibited under this State’s law from 
marrying the decedent on account of the blood or adoptive relationship between the claimant and the 
decedent, and who 
 
  (1) during the decedent’s life registered along with the decedent as each others’ domestic partner in 
accordance with the State’s requirements and procedures for the registration of domestic partnerships; or 
 
  (2) demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant lived her or his life together with 
the decedent as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership such that the intestacy 
scheme should protect the decedent’s interest in donative freedom, or the surviving committed partner’s 
reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a portion of the decedent’s intestate estate.  
In determining whether the claimant has met her or his burden of showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that the claimant and the decedent lived life together as a couple in such an emotionally and 
physically *347 intimate partnership, the court shall consider and give weight to the following factors to 
the extent that such factors are not excluded from consideration by part (v): 
 
  (i) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant lived or did not live her or his life together 
with the decedent as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership, including but not 
limited to the following factors: evidence that the parties were physically intimate with each other; 
whether the couple joined in a marriage ceremony or a commitment ceremony; whether the couple 
registered with an employer as domestic partners, if such registration was an option and would have 
been beneficial; whether one or both of the parties nominated the other as her or his agent to make 
health care decisions; the parties’ reputation in their community or communities as a couple; whether the 
parties made joint gifts to charity together; whether the parties celebrated holidays, their birthdays, and 
their anniversaries together; whether the parties exchanged with each other symbols of their relationship, 
such as rings or engraved jewelry; whether the parties agreed to be buried after their deaths next to each 
other or agreed that the survivor should take possession of the ashes of the first to die; 
 
  (ii) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the decedent would or would not have wanted her or his 
estate to provide for the claimant after the decedent’s death, including but not limited to the following 
factors: whether the decedent devised property by will or attempted to do so and, if so, whether the 
decedent named the claimant as a devisee or attempted to do so; whether the decedent utilized will 
substitutes to pass property and, if so, whether the decedent designated the claimant as the recipient of 
property passing by such will substitutes; written statements made by the decedent, or oral statements 
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 made by the decedent in the presence of at least one third party, in which the decedent expressed the 
desire that her or his estate be used after her or his death to support the claimant; 
 
  (iii) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant did or did not engage in care-taking with 
respect to the decedent or did or did not contribute to the decedent’s economic well-being, including but 
not limited to the following factors: whether the claimant helped the decedent cope with a physical or 
mental disability; whether the claimant cared for the decedent during a period or periods in which the 
decedent suffered a serious illness *348 or attempted to recuperate from an injury; whether the claimant 
helped finance in some significant part the decedent’s education or a business venture of the decedent; 
whether the claimant performed a disproportionate share of the uncompensated domestic services for the 
couple’s household; whether the claimant contributed a disproportionate share of the financial resources 
used to maintain the couple’s household; 
 
  (iv) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant did or did not rely upon her relationship with 
the decedent to the claimant’s economic detriment or in a way that fostered the claimant’s economic 
dependence on the decedent, including but not limited to the following factors: whether the claimant 
sacrificed career or financial opportunities or reallocated her or his financial or personal resources in 
furtherance of the parties’ relationship or common good; whether the parties relocated to a new 
community together; written statements made by the decedent, or oral statements made by the decedent 
in the presence of at least one third party, in which the decedent acknowledged a moral or legal 
responsibility for the claimant’s financial well-being or a willingness to assume such responsibility; 
whether the claimant began to co- parent a child after the parties had agreed to co-parent the child 
provided that the claimant was still financially responsible for the child at the time of the decedent’s 
death; the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances, such as by maintaining a joint 
checking account, savings account or money market account, by making joint investments, or by 
incurring joint debts; whether the claimant’s ability to maintain her or his residence is jeopardized by 
financial consequences of the decedent’s death. 
 
  (v) The burden shall be on one opposing the qualification of a claimant as a surviving committed 
partner to demonstrate that the decedent and the claimant did not share physical intimacy at any time 
during their relationship.  If the court finds that the parties lived together in a sexually exclusive 
relationship during their cohabiting partnership, the court shall weigh this factor in favor of finding that 
the parties lived life together in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership.  The court shall not 
otherwise consider evidence relating to the sexual exclusivity of the parties’ relationship. 
 
  (c) [Standing to Challenge the Decedent Partner’s Will.] Unless no other heir, aside from a claimed 
surviving committed partner, *349 or no other group of heirs, not including a claimed surviving 
committed partner, has a net pecuniary interest in challenging respectively the decedent’s will, or any 
individual provision in the will, equal to or greater than the net pecuniary interest of the claimed 
committed partner in challenging respectively the decedent’s will, or any individual provision in the 
will, no person who would take less than 50% of the decedent’s intestate estate as the surviving 
committed partner shall have standing to challenge a decedent’s will, or individual provision in the will, 
by virtue of the fact that the person is or claims to be the testator’s surviving committed partner.  This 
provision shall not defeat a person’s standing to challenge a decedent’s will where standing is asserted 
on some basis other than the challenger’s claimed status as the decedent’s surviving committed partner. 
 
-40- 
 [FNa1]. Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University.  A.B., Cornell University; J.D., Duke 
University.  I thank June Carbone, Dan Cole, Robin Feldman, Tom Gallanis, Susan Gary, Adam Hirsch, 
Brad Joondeph, Ron Krotoszynski, Larry Waggoner, and participants in a Bay Area junior law faculty 
workshop for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
 
[FN1]. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and 
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1265, 1268 n.11 (2001) (citing 
to United States census data indicating that from 1970 to 1998 the number of cohabiting opposite-sex 
couples increased from 523,000 to 4,236,000 and that “[i]n 1998, there were eight unmarried opposite-
sex couples for every 100 married couples, up from one per 100 in 1970); J. Thomas Oldham, Lessons 
from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regulation of Heterosexual Cohabitants Or, Can’t Get 
No Satisfaction, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1409, 1412 (2001) (concluding from studies indicating that 
cohabitation is “particularly popular among the young” that “cohabitation will become an increasingly 
common family type in the United States”); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal 
Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1435, 1435-36 (2001) (commenting 
that “research suggests that cohabitation has become less of an ‘engagement’ that serves as a prelude to 
marriage and more of an intimate arrangement that may serve as an alternative to it” and that “[t]his is 
reflected, for instance, in the declining percentage of cohabitors who eventually marry and in the fact 
that a portion of the declining rate of marriage is due to the increasing rate of cohabitation”); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed Partners: 
Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 417, 418 (1999) 
(reporting that in the past several decades in the United States rates of marriage among unmarried 
women have declined while rates of nonmarital childbearing and nonmarital cohabitation among 
unmarried couples have increased rapidly).  See also Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, 
and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 Fam. L.Q. 1, 16 (2000) [hereinafter 
Ellman, Divorce Rates] (describing a major decline in the U.S. marriage rate from 1969 (149 marriages 
per 1000 unmarried women, fifteen to forty-four years of age) to 1988 (91 marriages per 1000 
unmarried women, fifteen to forty-four years of age). 
 
[FN2]. See Ellman, Divorce Rates, supra note 1, at 42 (remarking that  “declining marriage rates may 
suggest that the law’s treatment of nonmarital families will be increasingly important” and, more 
specifically, “[t]he persistence of gender roles [within non-marital partnerships] may suggest that long-
term relationships between parties who have never formally married should ... be treated similarly to 
marriage, because the parties’ behavior may be little affected by the formalities with which they 
commenced their relationship”); Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional 
Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 93, 94 (1996) (“One of the increasingly notable shortcomings of modern 
probate law is its failure to provide adequate guidelines governing the inheritance rights of children 
outside the traditional nuclear family.”); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 83, 115-16, 155-56, 163 (1994) (in arguing for a posthumous duty to support 
one’s children, pointing out that permitting disinheritance of children disproportionately disadvantages 
children reared outside the traditional family because such children are less likely to benefit from their 
surviving parent taking a forced share of their decedent parent’s estate in that “the disinherited 
cohabitant receives no statutory share which can trickle down for the children’s benefit” and “in our 
multiple marriage society the surviving spouse often is not the parent of the testator’s minor children”); 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform 
Probate Code, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 683, 687 (1992) [hereinafter Waggoner, Spousal Rights in 
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 Our Multiple-Marriage Society] (noting that “[i]nevitably, this transformation of the family will 
increasingly exert new tensions on traditional wealth- succession laws”). 
 
[FN3]. See Mary Louise Fellows, Pride and Prejudice: A Study of Connections, 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 
455, 466 (2000) (asserting that “heirship laws can accomplish their function if they conform to the 
notion of family as it evolves sociologically and not if they are tied exclusively to a definition of family 
determined through legal marriages”). 
 
[FN4]. See generally Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 Law & Ineq. 1 
(2000) [hereinafter Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws]; Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of 
Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917, 918, 928-36 (1989) (arguing that the 
exclusion of step-children from intestate distribution “is unfair and inconsistent with the purpose of the 
intestacy laws” and proposing reform that would bring step-children within intestacy scheme where 
decedent stood in loco parentis with respect to the step-child). 
 
[FN5]. Vermont accords to the surviving partner of a civil union intestate inheritance rights equivalent to 
those it provides a surviving spouse.  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 1204(a), (e)(1) (Supp. 2001).  Hawaii 
provides to a surviving reciprocal beneficiary a spouse’s intestate share.  Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 572C-1, 
560:2-102 (Supp. 2001).  And New Hampshire treats as a surviving spouse the survivor of an opposite-
sex non-marital partnership in which the partners cohabited and held themselves out as husband and 
wife for at least a three-year period immediately preceding the intestate’s death.  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
457:39 (1992). 
 
[FN6]. See Andrew R. Lee, Estate and Disposition Planning Issues for Same-Sex or Other Unmarried 
Couples, Trusts & Estates 51 (Vol. 141, No. 1, Jan. 2002) (discussing need for unmarried couples to 
execute estate planning documents and take advantage of inter vivos gifting techniques to protect the 
surviving partner); Robbennolt & Kirkpatrick Johnson, supra note 1, at 434 (“In the absence of 
legislative or policy reform ... [t]he preventive law emphasis on planning and prevention through the use 
of legal instruments can be used to accurately reflect the goals and circumstances of an unmarried 
committed couple.”). 
 
[FN7]. Robbennolt & Kirkpatrick Johnson, supra note 1, at 442 & n.132  (reporting the results of a 
survey in which “33.3% of respondents with opposite-sex partners (6 respondents) and 45.5% of 
respondents with same-sex partners (45 respondents) mistakenly believed that their partner would be 
among their heirs”); id. at 444 (reporting that of the “respondents [in a non- marital committed 
partnership] who claimed to ‘know’ who would inherit their estate, 34 of 52 persons without wills (65%) 
and 17 of 65 persons with wills (26%) [mistakenly] thought their partner would inherit their estate” if 
they died intestate, and concluding that “many people in unmarried committed partnerships without 
wills may not recognize the need under existing laws to specifically designate their partner as the 
beneficiary of their property if they so desire”). 
 
[FN8]. See generally E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator 
from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority- Culture Arbitration, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 275 
(1999) (arguing that “cultural minorities have cause to fear adjudication of their legal rights and 
responsibilities in a legal system dominated by majority-culture personnel”). 
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 [FN9]. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital 
Inclusion, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 1063 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Expressive Function]. 
 
[FN10]. Id. at 1067-76.  See also T. P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for 
Same-Sex Equality, 60 Ohio St. L. J. 1513, 1523 (1999) (arguing that the current Uniform Probate Code 
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation because it contains default rules that fail to effectuate the 
likely intent of gay, lesbian and bisexual people). 
 
[FN11]. Alta. Law Reform Inst., Reform of the Intestate Succession Act, Final Report No.78 100 (1999) 
(rejecting the concern that adoption of its recommended multi-factor approach to intestate inheritance 
rights for opposite- sex unmarried partners would “unduly” complicate the administration of estates and 
pointing out that “in other areas of the law, such as pension benefits, spousal support claims, and fatal 
accidents, it is possible to determine if a particular person falls into the class of cohabitant who is 
entitled to certain benefits or obligations”); Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1076- 99.  My 
review of Article II of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code concluded that Article II’s six additional 
expressed values (in addition to the goal of promoting the decedent’s donative intent) are (1) a desire for 
simplicity and certainty in succession law, (2) a de-emphasis of formalism, (3) a movement toward the 
unification of the subsidiary law of wills and will substitutes, (4) an endorsement of the “marital-
sharing” theory, (5) a responsiveness to the changing nature of “family” and (6) a desire for multi-state 
uniformity in succession law.  Id. at 1066. 
 
[FN12]. See Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 257, 275 (1994) (“Arguably, statutes governing inheritance should not only provide for 
the orderly distribution of property, but should send messages regarding societal values such as the 
obligation of fathers to support their children.”). 
 
[FN13]. Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1099-106. 
 
[FN14]. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 Law 
& Ineq. 1, 8, 22, 90-91 (1998) [hereinafter Fellows et al., Committed Partners] (supporting the assertion 
that intestacy statutes shape social norms and the definition of family by pointing to the recognition by 
intestacy statutes of the right of adopted children to take as heirs of the adopting parent’s own ancestors 
and collateral relatives and the effect of such recognition in breaking “the stranglehold blood ties had on 
the definition of family”).  See also Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1100-01.  Cf. Gary, 
Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 13 (“With respect to the type of family the intestacy statute 
supports, the definition of family may reflect society’s view both of what a family is and what a family 
should be.”). 
 
[FN15]. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C-1 to -7 (Supp. 2001).  Generally, Hawaii reserves reciprocal beneficiary 
status for same-sex couples and for mixed-sex couples composed of partners who are prohibited from 
marrying one another by reason of consanguinity.  See id. § 572C-4(3).  See also Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 
1204(e)(1) (Supp. 2001) (providing a spouse’s share of the decedent’s intestate estate to a same-sex 
surviving non-marital partner who was the intestate’s civil union partner). 
 
[FN16]. See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the 
Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1652-58 (1991) (arguing that a registration system 
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 for recognition of “nontraditional adult relationships” is preferable to a functional approach in that, 
unlike the latter, it avoids an indeterminate and intrusive inquiry into the claimants’ personal lives and 
avoids requiring that “all alternative families resemble traditionally recognized relationships in function, 
if not in precise form”). 
 
[FN17]. The partners might choose not to register their relationship for fear of discrimination they might 
suffer as a consequence of registration.  To address this fear, the intestacy statute might provide a non-
disclosure option for registrants.  That is, the statute might provide that the state shall not disclose to the 
public the names of registrants who express a preference that the fact of their registration not be 
disclosed to the public.  Of course, this safeguard would not allay the fears of partners who feared state 
discrimination against them based upon the nature of their relationship or their sexual orientation.  As an 
alternative safeguard, the statutory scheme might provide for truly private registration of non-marital 
partnerships for the purposes of the intestacy scheme.  See Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 
1081- 86 (arguing that a registration procedure for committed partners that did not require public 
registration, but rather allowed partners to convey committed partner status upon each other for the 
purposes of the intestacy statute by means of a written unattested document, would be consistent with 
the Uniform Probate Code’s harmless error principle for the execution of wills). 
 
[FN18]. See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 
21 (1994) [hereinafter Waggoner, Marital Property Rights]. 
 
[FN19]. See Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 64  (advocating this type of dual 
registration/multi-factor approach); Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1087 n.125 (citing to 
letters from Professor Lawrence Waggoner to various law reform organizations in which Professor 
Waggoner, the drafter of a leading multi-factor approach proposal, advocates the combination 
approach). 
 
[FN20]. A combination approach jurisdiction might seek to further reduce uncertainty by setting a 
higher burden of proof for a claimant who seeks to demonstrate her surviving partner status pursuant to 
the multi-factor inquiry, in light of the fact that the claimant and the decedent did not take advantage of a 
registration scheme available to them.  The parties’ failure to do so does suggest a greater likelihood that 
the couple was not sufficiently committed such that the survivor should take an intestate share. 
 
[FN21]. See American Law Institute Debates Domestic Partnership Agreements, 26 Fam. L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 28, at 1352-53 (May 23, 2000) (reporting that the issue of when a domestic partnership 
exists proved to be one of the most contentious issues at the American Law Institute’s 77th Annual 
Meeting discussion of the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution with respect to the issue of 
how a court should deal with the break-up of a domestic partnership). 
 
[FN22]. For a discussion of consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches to answering policy 
questions, see Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General and Individual 
Taxation, 21 Va. Tax Rev. 293 (2002). 
 
[FN23]. See infra notes 59-146, and accompanying text. 
 
[FN24]. See infra notes 147-74, and accompanying text. 
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[FN25]. See infra notes 175-91, and accompanying text. 
 
[FN26]. See infra notes 192-99, and accompanying text. 
 
[FN27]. See infra notes 200-08, and accompanying text. 
 
[FN28]. See infra notes 240-65, and accompanying text. 
 
[FN29]. See infra notes 266-85, and accompanying text. 
 
[FN30]. See infra notes 211-39 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN31]. See infra notes 35-56 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN32]. See infra notes 57-146 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN33]. See infra notes 147-208 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN34]. See infra notes 209-85 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN35]. Professor Waggoner has set out the most recent version of his proposal, which he offers as an 
amendment to the Uniform Probate Code, in a “Working Draft” dated January 1995 [hereinafter 
Working Draft].  See Lawrence W. Waggoner et al., Family Property Law: Cases and Materials on 
Wills, Trusts and Future Interests, 108-09 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Waggoner et al., Family Property 
Law].  Professor Waggoner’s revised Working Draft is set forth in Appendix A. 
 
[FN36]. See generally Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18.  See also Alta. Law Reform 
Inst., supra note 11, at 103-06, 116, 118, 123 (discussing the Waggoner Working Draft and 
recommending adoption of several of its features). 
 
[FN37]. Infra Appendix A § (a). 
 
[FN38]. Professor Waggoner designed the Working Draft not to apply in cases of partial intestacy “to 
reduce the risk that an older widow and widower who lived together for convenience or to save expenses 
or for companionship, etc., would ... get caught by the statute.”  His assumption was that each might 
have a will favoring each’s own children from a former marriage, that neither would want any property 
to go to the survivor, and that any partial intestacy would be inadvertent.  E-mail from Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School to Gary Spitko, 
Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law, Dec. 28, 2001 (on file with author). 
 
[FN39]. Infra Appendix A § (a)(1).  The Working Draft brackets the  $50,000 figure, denoting that this 
figure is a recommended amount but a legislature might wish to provide for a lesser or greater amount.  
See id. 
 
[FN40]. Infra Appendix A § (a)(2). 
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[FN41]. But see Cal. Prob. Code § 6454 (West 2002) (requiring that a child/foster parent or child/step-
parent relationship have begun during the child’s minority in order for a parent/child relationship to exist 
with respect to such a parent and child for purposes of intestate succession). 
 
[FN42]. See generally Unif. Probate Code § 2-102 (amended 1997) (providing for the intestate share of 
a decedent’s surviving spouse). 
 
[FN43]. See supra note 39, and accompanying text.  See also infra Appendix A § (a). 
 
[FN44]. See Unif. Probate Code   2-102(1) (amended 1997). 
 
[FN45]. See id. § 2-102(4) (providing to a surviving spouse the first  $100,000 of the intestate estate 
plus one-half the balance of the intestate estate in cases where the decedent spouse is survived by 
descendants who are not descendants of the surviving spouse). 
 
[FN46]. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 80. 
 
[FN47]. Id. at 80 n.143. 
 
[FN48]. Id.  The lesser award to a committed partner under the Working Draft can be justified also on 
the ground that it is easier to be confident concerning the nature of a decedent’s relationship with a 
spouse as contrasted with a decedent’s relationship with a (non-registered) committed partner.  But see 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.12, cmt. b (2002) 
stating that:  
The precise rates chosen by the rulemaker under Paragraphs (1) and (2) [for 
recharacterizing a spouse’s separate property as marital property depending on the 
duration of the marriage] are not compelled by any fundamental principle and are 
therefore not specified in this section.  The rationale for § 4.12 does suggest bounds, 
however.  In the ordinary case of a marriage that has lasted for 30 or 35 years, spouses 
will have made many important and largely irreversible life decisions premised upon a 
shared economic fate, including shared access to assets either brought into their marriage.  
By that time, a complete recharacterization of separate property the parties held at the 
time of their marriage is therefore appropriate as the default rule. 
 
[FN49]. See infra Appendix A § (b); Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 81-82. 
 
[FN50]. Infra Appendix A § (a). 
 
[FN51]. Id. § (b)(i) & (ii). 
 
[FN52]. Id. § (b)(iii). 
 
[FN53]. Id. §§ (b)(iii) & (d). 
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 [FN54]. Id. § (d).  Professor Waggoner’s Working Draft was greatly influenced by case law in the 
factors that it cites as relevant to a court’s determination as to whether a relationship was “marriage-
like.”  In particular, the Working Draft borrows heavily from the courts’ decisions in Braschi v. Stahl 
Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) and in Warden v. Warden, 676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).  
See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 76-80.  Professor Waggoner also relied in 
crafting his proposal upon similar proposals set forth by the Queensland Law Reform Commission and 
upon Sweden’s Law on Cohabitant’s Mutual Home.  See id. at 78 n.141. 
 
[FN55]. Infra Appendix A § (e).  The respondent may rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the 
evidence if the claimant has established only one of the four listed behaviors.  The respondent may rebut 
the presumption only by clear and convincing evidence if the claimant has established more than one of 
the four listed behaviors.  Id. § (f). 
 
[FN56]. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 78. 
 
[FN57]. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 13 (2000) (“At issue in thinking about 
intestacy statutes is not only what a decedent wants, but what society wants.  Should family be 
supported, and if so, should a statute attempt to determine the decedent’s view of who his or her family 
is, or should the statute create a definition of family based on a societal view of family?”). 
 
[FN58]. Additional principles that have been cited as common goals or limitations of intestacy statutes 
include strengthening family, encouraging the accumulation of wealth, maintaining the dominance of the 
private property regime, promoting respect for the legal system, and avoiding excessive complication of 
property titles and excessive subdivision of property.  Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 9; 
id. at 27 (“Intestacy statutes attempt to distribute a decedent’s property to the decedent’s family, either 
because the intestacy statute strives to approximate the decedent’s wishes or because society has decided 
that intestacy statutes should benefit and strengthen families if a decedent does not express a contrary 
wish in a will.”); Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where 
We Need to Go, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 517, 546 (1994) (suggesting that allowing a parent who has abandoned 
her minor child to take an intestate share from the child’s estate undermines the perceived fairness of the 
legal system); Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 8 (commenting that intestacy statutes 
“reflect society’s commitment to: (1) donative freedom; (2) equity, meaning concerns about fairness and 
protection of reliance interests; and (3) family”); id. at 12 (stating that intestacy statutes seek to 
distribute intestate property in a manner that expectant takers believe to be fair, thus, avoiding “disdain 
for the legal system”); id. at 13 n.62 (identifying as additional objectives of intestacy laws avoiding the 
excessive subdivision of property and related complicated property titles, and encouraging the private 
accumulation of wealth). 
 
[FN59]. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 7 (“The most commonly identified goal of 
intestacy statutes is to create a dispositive scheme that will carry out the probable intent of most 
testators.”); Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 8 (commenting that intestacy statutes 
reflect society’s commitment to donative freedom). 
 
[FN60]. See Gallanis, supra note 10, at 1522 (arguing that the Uniform Probate Code’s intestacy 
provisions, as well as the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and the Uniform Guardianship and 
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 Protective Proceedings Act, “cry out for reform” because they fail to fulfill their stated objective “to 
mirror the likely intent of the [gay or lesbian] patient, ward or decedent”). 
 
[FN61]. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 7-8 (“To the extent possible, the statute should 
distribute the property to the persons the decedent would have chosen to receive the property if the 
decedent were making the decision.”). 
 
[FN62]. See generally Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14. 
 
[FN63]. The four groups that Professor Fellows and her colleagues surveyed were (1) the general public, 
(2) persons in a committed non-marital mixed-sex relationship, (3) men in a committed same-sex 
relationship, and (4) women in a committed same-sex relationship.  Fellows et al., Committed Partners, 
supra note 14, at 9. 
 
[FN64]. Id. at 89. 
 
[FN65]. See id. at 14 (describing the view that intestacy law “is part of a state’s statutory scheme to 
support family functions, such as child rearing and mutual financial responsibility” and concluding that 
“[w]ithin this understanding of intestacy, a recognition of inheritance rights for surviving committed 
partners would further the state’s objectives”); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, 
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 551, 588 (1999) (“[A] devise flows naturally as 
the final act of reciprocity in an ongoing relationship--inheritance is viewed as a statement of reward, 
and so long as family members have taken care of each other, they expect the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship to continue to the end”); Francis H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model 
From China, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 1199, 1257 [hereinafter Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance] 
(criticizing American inheritance law for failing to reward those who supported the decedent and 
concluding that “mechanical status-based rules prevail at the expense of individual justice”). 
 
[FN66]. See Monopoli, supra note 12, at 286 (discussing the theories of Locke and John Stuart Mill 
tying rights over private property to the exertion of labor in acquiring that property in support of her 
argument that parental intestate inheritance from a child can be justified when a parent has “invest [ed] 
time, energy and money in raising” the decedent child, but cannot be justified on the basis of expended 
labor where the parent had failed to support or abandoned the child). 
 
[FN67]. See generally Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-201 through 2-212 (amended 1997). 
 
[FN68]. Traditional elective share statutes differed as to whether the surviving spouse could assert a 
claim only against the decedent’s probate estate (property passing by will) or also against the decedent’s 
property passing by will substitutes. 
 
[FN69]. Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The 
Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property 
Alternative, 49 Emory L.J. 487, 493 n.29 (2000). 
 
[FN70]. See Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law 
Provides a Solution, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 567, 577-82 (1995) [hereinafter Gary, Marital Partnership 
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 Theory] (identifying the need and marital partnership rationales as the “two main theories” that serve as 
rationales for the elective share and discussing these rationales). 
 
[FN71]. See Newman, supra note 69, at 493 n.29. 
 
[FN72]. See Unif. Probate Code, Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 
1997), quoting Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 131 (1989). 
 
[FN73]. See id. (stating that the principal goal of the 1990 revisions to the Uniform Probate Code’s 
elective share provisions was “to bring elective- share law into line with the contemporary view of 
marriage as an economic partnership”).  The 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s elective share remains 
concerned also with the spouses’ mutual duty of support.  Section 2-202(b) provides a surviving spouse 
with a “supplemental elective-share amount,” suggested to be $50,000, related to the surviving spouse’s 
actual needs but unrelated to the duration of the marriage--that is, unrelated to the contribution of the 
surviving spouse to the decedent’s accumulation of her property.  Unif. Probate Code § 2-202(b) 
(amended 1997); Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. 
(amended 1997) (“The redesigned elective share system implements the support theory by granting the 
survivor a supplemental elective-share amount related to the survivor’s actual needs.”). 
 
[FN74]. See Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 
1997) (illustrating this point with several fact scenarios under conventional elective share law). 
 
[FN75]. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-202(a) (amended 1997) (setting forth the schedule for the elective-
share percentage). 
 
[FN76]. Id.; see also id. at §§ 2-203 through 2-208 (setting out the composition of the augmented estate). 
 
[FN77]. Id. § 2-209. 
 
[FN78]. For an exploration of how the modern Uniform Probate Code elective share statute falls short in 
implementing the partnership theory of marriage and a proposal to better implement the partnership 
theory into elective share law using a deferred-community property scheme, see generally Newman, 
supra note 69.  See also Gary, Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 70, at 588-89 (acknowledging that 
the Uniform Probate Code’s elective share “facilitates planning and avoids wasting judicial resources on 
tracing problems and support suits” but criticizing that “the arbitrary nature” of the accrual approach 
allows for subjecting separate property to the elective share in certain cases, notably in the case of a late-
in-life marriage that lasts fifteen or more years, and fails to subject marital property to the elective share 
in other cases, notably where the survivor’s “independent wealth is greater than that of the marital 
estate”).  Professor Gary proposes as an alternative that would better implement the marital partnership 
theory beginning by defining the elective share’s augmented estate by reference to the decedent’s gross 
estate for federal estate tax purposes, and then (1) subtracting out from the gross estate the value of the 
decedent’s separate property “to the extent feasible” and using the federal estate tax code to help in 
identifying separate property, and (2) recapturing into the gross estate certain property including certain 
gifts made to others than the surviving spouse by the decedent within three years of the decedent’s 
death, certain insurance proceeds paid as a result of the decedent’s death, tort claims related to the 
decedent’s death and payable to the surviving spouse not otherwise included within the decedent’s gross 
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 estate, and all marital property owned by or controlled by the surviving spouse.  Id. at 589-603.  
Professor Gary seeks to leave the surviving spouse with one-half of the marital property by giving to the 
surviving spouse an elective share equal to fifty percent of the augmented estate minus offsets including 
marital property already owned by the surviving spouse, and property passing to the surviving spouse at 
the decedent’s death.  Id. at 603. 
 
[FN79]. See generally Leslie, supra note 65. 
 
[FN80]. Id. at 558-59. 
 
[FN81]. Id. at 571. 
 
[FN82]. Id. at 583. 
 
[FN83]. Id. at 586 (“Courts intuitively understand that the testator may have obtained benefits by 
implying a promise to reciprocate by leaving relatives a share in her estate.”). 
 
[FN84]. Id. at 558-59, 587, 590.  Professor Leslie bases her conclusions on her examination of more 
than 160 will contest cases decided within a five- year period.  Id. at 592.  She concludes from her 
examination of these cases  
that when a testator’s will appears to fly in the face of the reciprocity norm, courts 
commonly honor that norm by invalidating the will, often by finding that the testator-
beneficiary relationship was “confidential” and created a presumption of undue influence. 
... Conversely, when the court wishes to uphold the will, the court will view an intimate 
interdependent relationship between a testator and a will beneficiary as justifying the 
bequest, rather than giving rise to a presumption of invalidity.  
Id.  Professor Leslie found that courts, including courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the substantial 
compliance or harmless error approaches to wills formalities, enforce compliance with the reciprocity 
norm also by holding wills that do not comport with the norm to have been defectively executed while 
excusing similar defects in wills that comport with the reciprocity norm. Id. at 604-08. 
 
[FN85]. Id. at 559, 587. 
 
[FN86]. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1239.  One can cite as 
counterexamples statutes that reward the decedent’s caregivers, although reciprocity may not be the 
acknowledged value grounding the statute. For example, Illinois law allows for a court to direct the 
guardian of an estate of a mentally or physically disabled person to make a “conditional gift” to a 
spouse, parent or sibling of the disabled person who has lived with and cared for the disabled person for 
at least three years.  755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11a-18.1(a) and (b) (West 1992).  The gift may not be 
distributed until the death of the disabled person.  Id. § 11a-18.1(b).  The theory of the statute is that the 
disabled person would intend to make such a gift.  Id. § 11a-18.1(a).  Illinois also allows a disabled 
person’s caregiver to assert a statutory claim against the estate of the disabled person if the caregiver 
was the decedent’s spouse, parent, sibling or child.  Id. § 18-1.1.  The amount of the allowed claim will 
depend upon the nature and extent of the disabled person’s disability.  Id. § 18-1.1. 
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 [FN87]. But see Monopoli, supra note 12, at 273 (“The idea that wrongdoing of an heir should affect 
whether he takes his share is not common to American inheritance law.”). 
 
[FN88]. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Donative Transfers § 34.8, statutory note (1992) (listing 
statutes).  See also Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 
Law & Ineq. 401, 421 (1995) (arguing that expansion of slayer statutes so that one who abused the 
decedent during the decedent’s life would forfeit her rights in the decedent’s estate would further the 
decedent’s likely donative intent and would “serve as a powerful example of society’s collective resolve 
to condemn family violence”). 
 
[FN89]. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 
505-06 (1986) [hereinafter Fellows, Slayer]. 
 
[FN90]. Unif. Probate Code § 1-201(19) (amended 1997) (definition of “governing instrument”); id. § 2-
803(a)-(c). 
 
[FN91]. Unif. Probate Code § 2-803, cmt. (amended 1997).  See also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing 
and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 803, 805-06 (1993) (“The rule ... is often said to be a self-
evident corollary of the venerable legal principle nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria: 
no one may profit by his own wrongdoing.”); Fellows, Slayer, supra note 89, at 490 (“Relying on the 
equitable maxim that individuals should not profit from their own wrongful acts, courts and legislatures 
bar slayers from taking their victims’ property or in any way benefitting economically from the 
premature death of their victims.”).  But see id. at 490 (arguing that the slayer rule is “an essential 
element of the property transfer law system and does not rest solely on equity principles”).  Slayer 
statutes can be seen also as promoting the likely donative intent of the decedent.  It seems reasonable to 
impute to the slain decedent an intent to disinherit her slayer.  Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance, Legal 
Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 Or. L. Rev. 527, 540 (2000).  See also Sherman, 
supra, at 858-74 (arguing that the slayer rule should not be applied in cases of mercy killing or assisted 
suicide because “the decedent would presumably be grateful to the heir or legatee for his actions”). 
 
[FN92]. See generally Monopoli, supra note 12 (discussing inheritance law’s treatment of parents who 
abandon or fail to support their child with respect to inheritance from the child); id. at 274 (discussing 
the law of a few states that bars intestate inheritance by a surviving spouse who had abandoned the 
decedent spouse); Unif. Probate Code § 2-114 (amended 1997) (providing that “[i]nheritance from or 
through a child by either natural parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has 
openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not refused to support the child”); Waggoner et al., 
Family Property Law, supra note 35, at 82 (noting that “courts may interpret physical and emotional 
abuse as constructive abandonment”).  See also Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing 
Inheritance Rights: California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse But Fails to Build 
an Effective Foundation, 52 Hastings L.J. 537 (2001) (discussing section 259 of the California Probate 
Code which bars an abuser from taking from the decedent’s estate property that was awarded to the 
decedent’s estate as a result of liability arising from the abuse). 
 
[FN93]. Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 
32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 77, 80 (1998) [hereinafter Foster, Behavior-Based Model].  See generally 
Restatement (Third) Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.5(5) (providing that a parent who has 
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 abandoned a child should be barred from inheriting from or through the child); id., at statutory notes 2, 
14 (citing to statutes of twenty-three states that bar a parent, or in some statutes only a father, who has 
abandoned or refused to support his child from inheriting from the child); id. at Reporter’s Note 9 (citing 
cases that have implemented this principle).  See also Unif. Probate Code § 2-114(c) (amended 1997) 
(barring inheritance from or through a child by a natural parent or her kindred if the natural parent has 
failed to openly treat the child as hers or has refused to support the child); Rhodes, supra note 58, at 524-
28, 532-36 (reviewing statutes that provide for forfeiture of an abandoning parent’s share in her child’s 
intestate estate and arguing for a functional interpretation of “parent” in other intestacy statutes that 
would exclude from taking a legal parent who had abandoned her minor child); Eleanor Mixon, Note, 
Deadbeat Dads: Undeserving of the Right to Inherit from their Illegitimate Children and Undeserving of 
Equal Protection, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1773 (2000). 
 
[FN94]. Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93, at 81-86. 
 
[FN95]. Id. 
 
[FN96]. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1239-41. 
 
[FN97]. Id. at 1242 (“Chinese courts routinely provide caregivers, regardless of blood or marital 
relationship to the decedent, preferential treatment in intestate succession.”). 
 
[FN98]. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93, at 94-95 (“China’s behavior-based model of 
inheritance gives courts an arsenal of remedies for penalizing misconduct by heirs.”). 
 
[FN99]. Id. at 84, 94-95. 
 
[FN100]. Id. at 84. 
 
[FN101]. See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 497, 559 
(1977) (“the provisions for passage of intestate property should be broadened to include as possible 
takers those dependent upon the decedent at the time of his death under circumstances which would lead 
to the expectation of continued support”); Gary, Adapting Intestacy Law, supra note 4, at 9 (citing as a 
frequently identified and “paramount” goal of intestacy schemes goals that “derive from a concern with 
support, both economic and otherwise, of the decedent’s family.”).  Id. at 11 (“a goal of providing 
support for a decedent’s dependents is inextricably intertwined with [intestacy] provisions for the 
family”); Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 12 (commenting that the societal 
acceptance that a surviving spouse should be entitled to a large portion of the decedent spouse’s intestate 
estate derives in part from “equity considerations of financial dependence [and] reliance”); id. at 8 
(noting the relationship between intestacy statutes and societal concerns with “equity, meaning concerns 
about fairness and protection of reliance interests”). 
 
[FN102]. This notion of reliance is not completely separable from the reciprocity value.  It may be that a 
significant contribution to the couple’s aggregation of wealth was the assumption of opportunity costs in 
foregone career opportunities. 
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 [FN103]. See Ellman, Divorce Rates, supra note 1, at 40-41 (“Unmarried cohabitants are less likely than 
married couples to pool their financial resources, to have a sense of responsibility for one another, [and] 
to have the confidence in their relationship that allows for them to specialize within it.”). 
 
[FN104]. For an in-depth discussion of the putative spouse doctrine, see generally Christopher L. 
Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
 
[FN105]. Id. at 48. 
 
[FN106]. Restatement (Third) Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.2, cmt. e.  See also Unif. 
Marriage and Divorce Act (1983) § 209; Blakesley, supra note 104, at 18-19 (“Good faith is the central 
element of the putative marriage doctrine and its common-law counterparts”, and “consists of being 
‘ignorant of the cause which prevents the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration 
which caused its nullity.”‘) (citation omitted). 
 
[FN107]. Restatement (Third) Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.2, cmt. e.  A second factor 
that the court might consider in equitably apportioning the estate is the duration of a claimant’s 
cohabitation with the decedent.  Id.  See also Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 209 (1983) 
(providing that “the court shall apportion property, maintenance, and support rights among the claimants 
[including a legal spouse and one or more putative spouses] as appropriate in the circumstances and in 
the interests of justice”). 
 
[FN108]. See generally Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should 
Get What and Why, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 711, 766-806 (1984) (presenting a thorough examination of the 
theoretical bases and application of the equitable adoption doctrine). 
 
[FN109]. William M. McGovern & Sheldon F. Kurtz, Wills, Trusts and Estates 98-99 (2d ed. 2001).  
See also Restatement (Third) Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.5, cmt. k. 
 
[FN110]. Hirsch, supra note 91, at 548 and n.75 (citing cases).  Professor Adam Hirsch has concluded 
from his reading of the equitable adoption cases, however, that it is reasonable to infer that a court will 
apply the equitable adoption doctrine only when its doing so will effectuate the foster parent’s likely 
donative intent.  Id. at 548-49 n.76. 
 
[FN111]. Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 660, [78 S.E. 30, 33 (quote incomplete)] (1913).  See also 
O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ga. 1994) (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the 
child’s reliance interests in equitable adoption cases and proposing that the court in equitable adoption 
cases not concern itself with the “fiction of whether there has been a contract to adopt” but rather focus 
on “the relationship between the adopting parents and the child and in particular whether the adopting 
parents have led the child to believe that he or she is a legally adopted member of their family”). 
 
[FN112]. But see Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 533 (noting that intestacy law generally fails to distinguish 
between heirs of “unequal capacity” so as to provide extra protection to the decedent’s dependents who 
are infirm or disabled). 
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 [FN113]. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 
32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 405 (1997) (arguing for adoption in the United States of a family 
maintenance scheme to protect children along the lines of the scheme utilized in British Columbia). 
 
[FN114]. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1211; Gary, Adapting Intestacy 
Laws, supra note 4, at 11 (“This goal of providing for dependents is a driving concern behind the system 
of testator’s family maintenance in force in Australia, Canada, England and New Zealand.”). See also 
W.D. MacDonald, Fraud on the Widow’s Share (1960) (arguing for replacement of the elective share 
with a “decedent’s family maintenance” scheme which would authorize a court to order an award from 
the decedent’s estate to meet the reasonable support needs of the decedent’s family members).  The 
family maintenance systems apply to testate as well as intestate estates and allow a court to some extent 
to rewrite a decedent’s will.  In this respect, such systems go well beyond the reform of intestacy law 
that I advocate in this Article. 
 
[FN115]. (United Kingdom) Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c.63 (Eng.) 
(as amended by the Family Law Act 1996). 
 
[FN116]. Id. § 2(1). 
 
[FN117]. Id. § 1(1)(e).  The statute provides that a person was being maintained by the decedent when 
the decedent “otherwise than for full valuable consideration, was making a substantial contribution in 
money or money’s worth towards the reasonable needs of that person.”  Id. § 1(3). 
 
[FN118]. Id. § 1(2)(a). 
 
[FN119]. Id. § 1(2)(b). 
 
[FN120]. Id. § 3(1). 
 
[FN121]. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1217  (“China recognizes 
‘dependence as the gravamen of inheritance.’  Support, not entitlement, is the principal basis of Chinese 
inheritance law.”). 
 
[FN122]. Id. 
 
[FN123]. Id. at 1224, 1232. 
 
[FN124]. Id. at 1231. 
 
[FN125]. Id. at 1237-38 (“In practice, Chinese courts have found support relationships in a variety of 
contexts to include rearing and education of children, long-term cohabitation with the decedent, physical 
and emotional care, and even purely financial assistance.”).  Chinese courts will award not only intestate 
property to ensure support of those dependent on the intestate during her life, but also will award 
property that would have passed otherwise pursuant to the decedent’s will to ensure protection of 
dependents.  Id. at 1249.  In contrast, where dependency is not an issue, Chinese courts are reluctant to 
disregard the decedent’s will to reward acts of care toward the decedent by a claimant.  Id. 
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[FN126]. A family allowance generally provides for a reasonable but limited amount of maintenance to 
be paid to a decedent’s surviving spouse or dependent children during the administration of the 
decedent’s estate, but often not to exceed a maximum period of time.  See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code § 2-
404 (amended 1997). 
 
[FN127]. An exempt property allowance protects certain property--commonly household furniture, 
furnishings, automobiles, and appliances--up to a specified maximum total value from the claims of 
creditors.  See, e.g., id. § 2-403. 
 
[FN128]. A homestead allowance typically gives to a decedent’s surviving spouse and minor children 
the right to occupy the decedent’s home for a specified period of time, often of lengthy duration.  Many 
homestead statutes are of limited utility in that they set a low monetary ceiling for protection of 
property.  Restatement (Third) Prop: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 1.1, cmt. j (1999). 
 
[FN129]. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-202(b) (amended 1997). 
 
[FN130]. Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 1997). 
 
[FN131]. See infra notes 147-74 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN132]. See Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 557 (proposing that to better carry out the goal of protecting 
the decedent’s family one might “devise a system through which investigation into each case determines 
the kind and amount of protection that each family needs”).  Gaubatz argues that:  
Such an investigation would permit the law to deal with the exigencies of the particular 
situation; it would avoid the existing practice of arbitrarily setting family members’ 
interests and levels of protection; and it would avoid the risk that the individual family 
will not fit within the arbitrary prototype adopted by the legislature.  
Id. 
 
[FN133]. See id. at 559-60 (proposing that a court be given discretion to adjust intestate shares to 
“provide for the reasonable expectations or probable desires of the decedent”). 
 
[FN134]. See Monopoli, supra note 12, at 261 (noting that increased litigation would be one cost of 
barring intestate taking by fathers who failed to support the decedent child); Jaki K. Samuelson & 
Dennis Thorson, Comment (Contemporary Studies Project), A Comparison of Iowans’ Dispositive 
Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 1041, 
1122 (1978) (“The major objection to an implementation of a flexible intestate succession option is the 
expected increase in costs, including administration time, additional court personnel, and lawyers 
fees.”). 
 
[FN135]. Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 971, 1016 (1999) (“Intestate 
statutes preserve judicial economy by setting forth a predefined hierarchy of persons who qualify for 
distribution. Disregarding the hierarchy to inquire into a decedent’s own definition of family in the 
absence of a will would result in lengthier proceedings.”).  See also Monopoli, supra note 12, at 292-96 
(noting the increase in uncertainty and expense that would arise if probate courts are given discretion to 
-55- 
 deny a parent an intestate share of his child’s estate because of the parent’s abandonment or non-support 
of the child and proposing that such costs could be minimized by requiring the probate judge to give 
deference to a family court’s ruling during the child’s life that the parent had abandoned or failed to 
support the child). 
 
[FN136]. See, e.g., Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 515 (“Simplicity in the administration of estates is an 
important goal both to society and to its members.”); Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-
Marriage Society, supra note 2, at 726-28 (explaining that the drafters of the 1990 Uniform Probate 
Code rejected equitable distribution as the basis of the Code’s revised elective share, in part, because of 
the uncertainty and difficulty in administration that such an approach would introduce into the forced 
share process); Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate Reform: Finding the Way to Your 
Will (A Response to Professor Ascher), 77 Minn. L. Rev. 659, 660 (1993) (noting that the reduction of 
litigation and the facilitation of estate planning are primary goals of probate reform).  
  Arguably, a prime example of the infrequent subordination of certainty in succession law in favor of a 
second value is the “harmless error” principle with respect to the execution of a will.  See Unif. Probate 
Code § 2-503 (amended 1997).  This principle provides that a court may give a document effect as a will 
even though the document is not executed in compliance with the jurisdiction’s requirements for the 
execution of a will, provided that the proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the 
decedent intended for the document to be her will.  Id.  The principle grants this discretion to the court in 
order to avoid “intent-defeating outcomes in cases of harmless error.”  Unif. Probate Code § 2-503 cmt. 
(amended 1997). Professor Foster has commented with respect to the harmless error principle that 
“[i]nterestingly, many of the very scholars who insist on fixed rules in the support context favor 
discretionary schemes in the case of will execution defects.”  Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, 
supra note 65, at 1204 n.25.  But see Restatement (Third) Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 
3.3, Reporter’s Note 2 (setting out an argument that “[t]he harmless error rule does not increase 
litigation”); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and 
Succession Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1165, 1193-94 (1986).  Glendon reconciles her opposition to a 
discretionary family maintenance scheme and her support for a wills’ formalities harmless error 
principle:  
Discretion of the type advocated by [proponents of the harmless error principle] is at the 
margins of a fixed rule and is designed to soften the rule’s effects in individual cases 
where its application could not serve either the purposes of the testator or the overall 
purposes of inheritance law.  A major reason for disquiet about family provision 
legislation-that it is likely to breed litigation-does not appear to be present in the case of 
grants of discretion to dispense with Wills Act compliance.  
Id. 
 
[FN137]. Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93, at 84-85.  See also id. at 126 (pointing out that 
China’s behavior-based inheritance model developed in an environment quite different from the 
environment in the United States, and questioning whether such a model could succeed in the United 
States).  Another criticism that might be made of any system which gives a court open-ended discretion 
to rewrite a decedent’s estate plan is that such a system carries a greater risk to the testamentary freedom 
of those living in non-dominant family structures in that the court is more likely to devalue their family 
relationships. 
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 [FN138]. See generally Glendon, supra note 136, at 1186 (expressing uneasiness about succession law 
reform that would give discretion to a judge to rearrange the decedent’s estate plan “according to a 
judge’s own notion of what is reasonable”).  See also Rhodes, supra note 58, at 528 (anticipating the 
objection based on certainty to her proposed reform of intestacy law to exclude inheritance by parents 
who abandon their minor child and arguing that a concern for certainty should not preclude reform given 
that (1) her reform would apply only to egregious cases and (2) her reform would place the burden of 
demonstrating abandonment by clear and convincing evidence on those asserting abandonment); 
Hernandez, supra note 135, at 1016 (“The resistance to incorporating an expanded definition of family 
into probate codes may stem from a concern with not wanting to overwhelm the probate system with 
open-ended inquiries into who can be considered family.”).  Professor Hernandez has argued that 
recognizing functional families in the context of burial instructions might be a good first reform that 
would give courts experience in the exercise of adjudicating who is family with relatively little cost.  Id. 
at 1018 (“The context of challenges over burial instructions should be a manageable context in which to 
respect a testator’s own definition of family because it can be divorced from probate court concerns over 
a testator recognizing his or her financial support obligations to minor children and spouses.”).  
  In crafting his Working Draft, Professor Waggoner set out to draft a multi- factor intestacy statute that 
would be flexible enough to recognize deserving partners while not excessively undermining certainty.  
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 78 (stating that the author’s goal is to devise an 
approach that will “minimize case-by-case adjudication by opening up more efficient, bright-line tests 
into which most plaintiffs with just claims could fit rather automatically”). 
 
[FN139]. Professor Tanya Hernandez has described the emergence of the legal movement to recognize 
functional family:  
Social custom is developing a concept of family as those “people who love each other 
and want to work to support each other” because they simply choose to, or because the 
need for a caretaker of the elderly, ill, disabled and other dependents has prompted the 
formation of a family.  In response, the legal system has begun to employ a “functional 
approach” to defining family. The functional approach legitimizes non-nuclear 
relationships that share the essential qualities of traditional relationships for a given 
context by inquiring whether a relationship shares the main characteristics of caring, 
commitment, economic cooperation and participation in domestic responsibilities.  The 
paradigm of the functional family seeks to give individuals greater control over the 
structure of their family lives to recognize that biology is not family.  
Hernandez, supra note 135, at 1006-07.  See also Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 
16, at 1646 (“Instead of focusing on the identities and formal attributes of the individuals within a 
relationship, the functional approach inquires whether a relationship shares the essential characteristics 
of a traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs.”). 
 
[FN140]. See Glendon, supra note 136, at 1166 (“In most cases, what is required is not actually a choice 
[between establishing a fixed rule and delegating discretion to a judge], but rather a search for the proper 
mix of discretion and fixed rules under each set of circumstances-the optimum degree of fine-tuning 
without losing coherence and predictability, of reasonable certainty without losing flexibility.”).  See 
also Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 556 (criticizing succession law for “postulat[ing] a mythical ‘normal’ 
family situation and tailor[ing] the law to fit this norm,” which practice, in “many common fact patterns 
where the decedent and his family do not fit the normal family model” results in “law [that] is at best 
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 inadequate and at worst unjust”); Hernandez, supra note 135, at 981, 1004 (calling for courts and the law 
of wills to recognize the expanding definition of family). 
 
[FN141]. See Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 534-35 (questioning “whether ease of administration and 
reduction of conflict provide sufficient justification” for intestacy statutes that fail to foster strong social 
units, fail to protect functional family members and undermine respect for the law). 
 
[FN142]. Repeatedly, advocates of discretion in succession law have urged scholars to focus on the 
costs that accompany certainty.  See generally Gaubatz, supra note 101 (calling for greater flexibility in 
the administration of decedents’ estates to better recognize and serve social bonds, merit and need).  See 
also, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 135, at 1016-17.  
[T]he doctrinal concern with ensuring predictability and judicial economy in the probate 
of estates is one which is being valued at the expense of undermining the stability of a 
testator’s family of choice in contravention of the role of inheritance to make succession 
more meaningful, valuable and responsive to the needs and circumstances of a particular 
family.  
Id. (internal quotes omitted); Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1204-05 (urging 
succession law scholars who evaluate fixed rules v. discretionary inheritance systems “to consider the 
impact of fixed rules on people”); Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 57 (recognizing that 
the desire for certainty in succession law makes it difficult to reform intestacy statutes to take into 
account functional families, and arguing that “[t]he difficulty of creating a scheme of intestate 
distribution in the face of the multitude of family combinations cannot be underestimated, yet neither 
can the need to change an intestate system that increasingly fails to make sense in view of the ways 
families live”); id. at 71 (“Any determination of whether a decedent had a parent-child relationship with 
a survivor will require some degree of discretion [and] likely will lead to increased litigation ... but given 
the state of today’s families, some degree of discretion is necessary.”); Newman, supra note 69, at 549-
50 (conceding that adoption of a deferred-community-property approach to the elective share would 
undermine the succession law goals of predictability and ease of administration but urging such adoption 
in order to better implement the marital partnership theory); Mahoney, supra note 4, at 938 (arguing that 
the “limited amount of uncertainty generated by” her proposed reform that would bring step-children 
within the intestacy scheme where decedent stood in loco parentis with respect to the step-child “would 
be a fair price to pay for the just recognition of stepfamily rights”); Chester, supra note 113, at 416, 425 
(stating that “justice is more important than certainty” in discussing British Columbia’s Wills Variation 
Act, which allows a court to order an “adequate, just and equitable” provision from the decedent’s estate 
for a spouse or child of the decedent). 
 
[FN143]. See generally Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4.  Professor Gary has proposed a 
model intestacy statute which incorporates a functional approach to defining the parent-child 
relationship alongside the existing definitions of parent and child derived from a legal relationship. She 
argues that such reform of the dominant fixed-rule (“blood, marriage or adoption”) approach is needed 
because the objective approach too often fails to carry out the intestate’s intent and too often leaves the 
intestate’s functional and true family without support.  Id. at 71-72. 
 
[FN144]. Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 534-35 (discussing the “insufficient coverage” of intestacy statutes 
that fail to recognize the “family of orientation (non-blood individuals with whom there are very close 
relationships)”). 
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[FN145]. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1255-56 (decrying the 
dominance of “[c]ertainty and administrative convenience arguments” in favor of fixed rules focused on 
the nuclear family and against reforms that would promote equitable inheritance mechanisms, and 
calling the human cost of such dominance “tremendous”); Gary, Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 
70, at 581 (noting the concern that a testator’s family maintenance scheme that would allow a court to 
disregard the testator’s will to the extent the court deems it necessary to provide for the testator’s 
dependents would lead to increased litigation and would introduce greater uncertainty into the estate 
planning process). 
 
[FN146]. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1215, 1255-56 (citing to critics of 
family maintenance systems who rely on certainty and administrative convenience arguments); Gary, 
Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 69 (theorizing that a family maintenance system such as that 
in England has not caught on in the United States “perhaps because of a desire for certainty and perhaps 
due to the structure of the probate court system”). 
 
[FN147]. Cf. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c.63 (as amended by the 
Family Law Act 1996) (Eng.) §§ 3(2) & (4) (listing among factors that a court should consider, in 
determining whether the disposition of a decedent’s estate makes reasonable financial provisions for an 
applicant of court-ordered provision, (1) the duration of the decedent’s marriage to a surviving spouse or 
a former spouse who has not remarried, and (2) the length of time that the decedent assumed financial 
responsibility for the maintenance of an applicant who the decedent was maintaining at her death). 
 
[FN148]. If the decedent and the surviving partner cohabited in a partnership for more than one period 
during the decedent’s life, interrupted by a period of separation, all periods of cohabiting partnership 
should be added together to compute the total cohabiting partnership period.  Periods of separation 
should not be credited in computing the total cohabiting partnership period.  See Unif. Probate Code § 2-
202 cmt. (amended 1997) (stating that in computing the duration of a marriage for purposes of the 
elective share calculation, where spouses were married to each other more than once, all periods of 
marriage should be added together, but the periods of separation should be excluded). 
 
[FN149]. This grant of 100% of the intestate estate to the surviving committed partner in the case of a 
long-term partnership is in stark contrast to the Working Draft’s award to a similarly-situated surviving 
committed partner.  Even in the case of a thirty- or forty-year partnership, and even where the decedent 
is not survived by any descendant or parent, the Working Draft would provide to the surviving 
committed partner no more than $50,000 plus one-half the balance of the intestate estate.  See infra 
Appendix A § (a)(1). 
 
[FN150]. See infra Appendix B § (a)(2)-(4).  My proposal’s treatment of this third circumstance--the 
partnership between the decedent and the surviving committed partner fractured prior to the decedent’s 
death and remained fractured at the time of the decedent’s death--is discussed in detail infra at notes 
175-91 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN151]. See infra Appendix B § (a)(2)-(4). 
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 [FN152]. For cohabiting partnerships of less than three years in duration, my intestacy scheme does not 
give any portion of the intestate estate to the surviving partner.  The Uniform Probate Code’s elective 
share schedule does entitle the surviving spouse from a marriage of less than three years in duration to 
assert a claim for a portion of the decedent spouse’s estate.  See Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-202(a) & (b) 
(amended 1997).  For an explanation as to why my intestacy scheme excludes surviving partners of 
relationships of less than three years in duration, see infra notes 211-39 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN153]. See Unif. Probate Code, part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 
1997) (stating that “[b]y approximation, the redesigned system equates the elective-share percentage of 
the couple’s combined assets with 50% of the couple’s marital assets--assets subject to equalization 
under the partnership/marital-sharing theory”). 
 
[FN154]. See id.  The general comment to part 2 of the Uniform Probate Code states that the intended 
effect of the elective share calculation in the case of a long-term marriage 
is to increase the entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital assets were 
disproportionately titled in the decedent’s name; and to decrease or even eliminate the 
entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital assets were more or less equally 
titled or disproportionately titled in the surviving spouse’s name. 
Id. 
 
[FN155]. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-204 (amended 1997) (including within the augmented estate the 
value of the decedent’s net probate estate); id. § 2-205 (including within the augmented estate the value 
of the decedent’s non-probate transfers to others than the surviving spouse); id. § 2-206 (including 
within the augmented estate the value of the decedent’s non-probate transfers to the surviving spouse); 
id. § 2-207 (including within the augmented estate the value of the surviving spouse’s net assets at the 
decedent’s death and, in addition, property that would have been included within the augmented estate 
under § 2- 205 had the surviving spouse died at the decedent’s death rather than the decedent).  See also 
Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 1997) (stating 
that the elective share percentage is applied to the augmented estate to yield the elective share amount to 
which the surviving spouse is entitled because “[i]f the elective- share percentage were to be applied 
only to the decedent’s assets, a surviving spouse who has already been overcompensated in terms of the 
way the couple’s marital assets have been nominally titled would receive a further windfall under the 
elective-share system”). 
 
[FN156]. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-209(a)(2) (amended 1997). 
 
[FN157]. See Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 
1997) (explaining that when the value of the survivor’s credits exceeds the elective share amount, the 
survivor is not entitled to any additional amount from the decedent’s estate, unless the survivor is 
entitled to a “supplemental elective share-amount” pursuant to § 2-202(b)). 
 
[FN158]. This is not to deny that in some cases intensity of affection will diminish over time. 
 
[FN159]. Professor Fellows and her colleagues asked their survey’s respondents to distribute the 
property of a third-party where the third-party died survived by a partner and parents (“Scenario A”) 
and, alternatively where she died survived by a partner and a child from a prior relationship (“Scenario 
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 C”).  Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 59-60.  The Fellows survey’s findings were as 
follows: With respect to Scenario A, for respondents with same-sex partners, “having been in the 
relationship for at least five years was positively associated with a preference for having the partner 
receive a greater share of the decedent’s estate.  Otherwise, the length of time spent living together had 
only a weak relationship to the distributive preferences.”  Id. at 61.  For respondents with other-sex 
partners, “[b]oth having been in the relationship for at least five years and having cohabited for at least 
five years were each strongly related to a preference for having the partner receive a greater share of the 
decedent’s estate.”  Id.  With respect to Scenario C, for respondents with same-sex partners, “[b]oth the 
duration of the relationship and the time spent cohabiting were positively associated with a preference 
for having the partner inherit a greater share of the estate.”  Id. at 62.  For respondents with other-sex 
partners, “[t]he length of the relationship showed no association to the distributive preferences of the 
respondents, but time spent cohabiting was positively associated with a preference for having the partner 
inherit a greater share of the estate.”  Id.  
  See also Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11, at 81 (reporting that “[t]he Alberta lawyers we have 
spoken to ... indicate that where the spouses both enter the second (or later) marriage with assets, they 
often leave their own assets to their children of an earlier marriage [however,] the longer the marriage, 
the more that is left to the surviving spouse”). 
 
[FN160]. Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 1997).  
See also id. (explaining that “[i]n the short- term, later-in-life marriage ... the effect of implementing [the 
accrual approach] is to decrease or even eliminate the entitlement of the surviving spouse [to an elective 
share] because in such a marriage neither spouse is likely to have contributed much, if anything, to the 
acquisition of the other’s wealth”). 
 
[FN161]. See generally Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 
4.12.  This recharacterization of separate property as marital property does not apply in the case of 
domestic partnerships under the Principles.  Id. § 6.04(3) (providing that “[p]roperty that would be 
recharacterized as marital property under § 4.12 if the parties had been married, is not domestic-
partnership property”). 
 
[FN162]. Id. § 4.11(1). 
 
[FN163]. Id. § 4.12 (providing for the recharacterization of separate property as marital property in 
marriages that exceed a specified minimum duration); id. § 4.11(2) (“Separate property that is 
recharacterized as marital property under § 4.12 is allocated between the spouses under § 4.09 and not 
under ... section [4.11(1)].”); id. § 4.09(1) (stating that generally “marital property and marital debts are 
divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in value, although not necessarily 
identical in kind.”). 
 
[FN164]. Id. § 4.12(1). 
 
[FN165]. Id. § 4.12(1)(a). 
 
[FN166]. Id. § 4.12(1)(b).  The drafters acknowledge that a “premise of this section [4.12], that after 30 
or 35 years of marriage most people will expect that property their spouses brought into the marriage 
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 will be available to them jointly upon retirement or in an emergency, remains untested.”  Id. § 4.12, 
Reporter’s Notes, cmt. a. 
 
[FN167]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.12(2).  In 
general, property acquired during the marriage by either spouse is marital property.  Id. § 4.03(1).  
Examples of property acquired during the marriage that is separate property include property acquired 
by one spouse by gift or inheritance and property acquired by one spouse after the spouses have entered 
into a written separation agreement and have begun living separate and apart.  Id. §§ 4.03(2) & (4). 
 
[FN168]. Id. § 4.12(2)(a). 
 
[FN169]. Id. § 4.12(2)(b).  The Principles’ drafters offer the following illustration of how an adopting 
jurisdiction might choose to implement these rules:  
Jurisdiction A implements the principles set forth in Paragraphs (1) and (2) with the 
following language: ...  
(a) For each year of marriage after the fifth year, four percent of the value of all separate 
property held by the spouses at the time of their marriage is treated at dissolution as the 
spouses’ marital property.  In marriages of 30 or more years’ duration, all separate 
property held by the spouses at the time of the marriage is treated at dissolution as marital 
property.  
(b) In marriages of five or more years’ duration during which a spouse acquires separate 
property, four percent of the value of that separate property is treated at dissolution as 
marital property for each “augmented year” applicable to the property.  
(1) The augmented years applicable to any item of separate property acquired 
during the marriage equal  
(A) the number of years from the fifth year after the property’s acquisition 
to commencement of the dissolution action, plus  
(B) half the number of years between the fifth year of marriage and the 
year of the property’s acquisition.  
(2) This subsection does not apply to property acquired less than three years 
before commencement of the dissolution action.  
Id. § 4.12, cmt. b. 
 
[FN170]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.12, cmt. a.  
The Principles’ drafters analogize their approach to that taken by the Uniform Probate Code’s elective 
share which gradually increases the size of the elective share available to a surviving spouse as the 
duration of the marriage increases.  
If the marriage ends with the death of the wealthier spouse, the common law has 
traditionally provided the remedy of a forced share for survivors not otherwise provided 
for.  The 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code gradually enlarges the spouse’s 
forced share with the duration of the marriage according to a mechanical formula.  
Section 4.12 of these Principles provides an analogous remedy when the marriage ends 
with dissolution rather than death.  
Id. 
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 [FN171]. See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 53 (noting with respect to the 
accrual method incorporated into the 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s elective share provision that:  
The advantage of the UPC system is that it avoids the administrative difficulties of post-
death classification and tracing-to-source that would be endemic to a deferred-community 
elective share.  The trade-off is that it does what its name implies-it approximates.  No 
approximation system will give precisely accurate results in each given case.) 
 
[FN172]. See Unif. Probate Code Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 
1997) (noting that “[b]ecause ease of administration and predictability of result are prized features of the 
probate system,” the 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s elective share implements the marital partnership 
theory by means of an accrual approach which avoids the need to identify which of the spouses’ 
property was marital and which was separate). 
 
[FN173]. Where the partners have registered their relationship, the court can be certain that the survivor 
is a committed partner.  The accrual method is not needed in such instances as a means to reduce the 
cost of an incorrect decision as to whether the decedent and the claimant enjoyed a committed 
partnership.  Even in the case of registered partners, however, the accrual schedule serves the values of 
reciprocity and reliance.  Perhaps the certainty distinction between registered and unregistered partners 
is justification for application of an enhanced accrual schedule for the survivor of a registered 
partnership. 
 
[FN174]. It should be acknowledged that in some cases the determination of a start date for the 
cohabiting partnership period will be difficult and the exercise will result in increased litigation as 
contrasted with an all-or- nothing scheme in which one who qualifies as a surviving committed partner 
takes a specified share regardless of the duration of the cohabitation.  These cases, in which the decedent 
has arguably died around the anniversary of the start of a cohabiting partnership period that is relatively 
uncertain, should be relatively rare.  By way of illustration, in a case in which the start of the cohabiting 
partnership period is unclear but certainly was during the period of June to September of Year zero, a 
precise determination is unnecessary if the decedent died in December of Year eight.  The surviving 
committed partner qualifies for an intestate share derived from an unreduced intestate share percentage 
of forty-eight percent (based on a cohabiting partnership period of at least eight years but less than nine 
years) regardless of whether the cohabiting partnership period began in June or September. 
 
[FN175]. See Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11, at 123 (“New Hampshire, the five Australian states 
and the Waggoner proposal also require that the cohabitant be living with the deceased at the time of 
death in order to share upon intestacy.”). 
 
[FN176]. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 82 n.147  
Under most intestacy laws, if spouses separate prior to the decedent’s death, the survivor 
still takes an intestate share.  The reason is that marriage creates a legal relationship that 
is terminated by divorce, not by separation.  The most public way by which de facto 
partners typically manifest the creation of their relationship is by moving into the same 
household and manifest its termination by moving out.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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 [FN177]. Id. at 81-82 (speaking of decedents who had separated from their partner at the time of their 
deaths and commenting that “the defendants’s leaving the household unmistakably manifested their 
intentions not to make any voluntary transfers to the [putative partners]”). 
 
[FN178]. Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11, at 122. 
 
[FN179]. Id. at 61 (“Unless some compelling social policy requires deviation from how most intestates 
in similar familiar circumstances would want to distribute their estate, intestacy rules should reflect 
those wishes.  We recommend that this be the goal served by the Intestate Succession Act.”).  The sole 
additional goal adopted by the Alberta reformers was to “create a clear and orderly scheme of 
distribution.”  Id. 
 
[FN180]. But see id. at 96 (“We are not convinced that separation [of the spouses] alone is sufficient 
reason to assume that most intestates ... would no longer want their assets to pass to their surviving 
spouse.”).  The Alberta reformers would deny an intestate share to a separated surviving spouse, 
however, when one spouse has filed for divorce or brought an application for division of marital 
property, or where the spouses have divided their marital property with an intent to finalize their affairs.  
Again, the reformers focus here on the intent of the decedent: They conclude that any of these three 
events signifies a point at which it is reasonable to assume that the intestate would not want the 
surviving spouse to be a beneficiary of her estate.  Id. at 95. 
 
[FN181]. The ending date of the partners’ cohabitation would seem the most objective means to mark 
the fracture of the relationship. 
 
[FN182]. See infra Appendix B § (a)(4). 
 
[FN183]. See id. § (a)(4)(iv). 
 
[FN184]. See infra notes 228-38 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN185]. Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11 at 122. 
 
[FN186]. See also Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 c.63 (Eng.) (as amended 
by the Family Law Act 1996) § 1 (allowing a decedent’s former spouse who has not remarried to apply 
for provision from the decedent’s testate or intestate estate on the ground that the estate plan otherwise 
does not “make reasonable financial provision” for her). 
 
[FN187]. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 70, at 572, 577 (discussing the marital 
partnership theory). 
 
[FN188]. Id. at 577.  Professor Gary also lists as reasons why the testator spouse should provide for her 
surviving spouse (1) the moral duty that each spouse owes to the other, and (2) the public policy against 
allowing a surviving spouse to become a public charge when the decedent spouse’s estate might be used 
to support the surviving spouse.  Id.  See also id. at 605 (“An elective share statute should protect a 
spouse who forgoes career opportunities to care for children.”). 
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 [FN189]. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 34 (noting that “in most common law states a 
surviving spouse has the right to an elective share of the estate of the decedent spouse, regardless of 
whether the spouses conducted their lives as married persons”).  But see id. (pointing out that under 
New Jersey law, an elective share is unavailable to a spouse who was living apart from her spouse at his 
death, citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:8-1 (West 1999) and, similarly, under Oregon law, the elective share 
“can be denied or reduced if the spouses were living apart when one of the spouses died”, citing Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 114.135 (1999)). 
 
[FN190]. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 71 (pointing out that “[d]iscretion when a 
person dies intestate ... present[s] different issues from the use of discretion in testamentary estates ... [in 
that a] significant criticism of discretion in connection with testate decedents-- interference with 
testamentary freedom--does not exist where the decedent has not exercised the testamentary freedom”). 
 
[FN191]. An alternative approach that would reduce the incentive to litigate the exact date of fracture 
would adopt a sliding scale that decreases on a daily basis for the period from one to 730 days.  Brad 
Joondeph suggested this approach to me. 
 
[FN192]. Such a property owner might effectively pass much of her property at her death by means of 
“non-probate” will substitutes such as a joint tenancy or a revocable inter vivos trust. 
 
[FN193]. The testator’s failure to include in her will a clause intended to dispose of the residue of her 
estate, or the invalidity or failure of such a residuary clause gift, might lead to the testator’s partial 
intestacy.  A residuary gift might fail, for example, where the gift is made to one who ultimately 
predeceases the testator, and where the lapsed gift is not redirected by an anti-lapse statute and does not 
pass to another residuary beneficiary.  The property that is the subject of such a lapsed gift will pass by 
intestacy. 
 
[FN194]. Infra Appendix A § (a). 
 
[FN195]. A similar argument might be made in cases of partial or even total intestacy where the 
decedent utilized will substitutes to pass all or substantially all of her non-probate property to others than 
the surviving partner. 
 
[FN196]. Unif. Probate Code § 2-301(a) (amended 1997).  This section excludes from the portion of the 
estate in which the surviving spouse is entitled to an intestate share any property devised to a child of the 
testator who was born prior to the testator’s marriage to the surviving spouse but who is not also a child 
of the surviving spouse, or is devised to any descendent of any such child.  Id. 
 
[FN197]. Id. § 2-301(a)(1-3). 
 
[FN198]. Unif. Probate Code § 2-301, cmt. (amended 1997).  See also Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our 
Multiple-Marriage Society, supra note 2, at 748-51. 
 
[FN199]. Such an inference also is undermined in cases of partial intestacy in which the testator made a 
significant non-residuary devise or devises to the surviving partner or a failed residuary gift to the 
surviving partner. 
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[FN200]. Pursuant to the Working Draft, a surviving committed partner is entitled to a minimum of fifty 
percent of the intestate estate even in cases where the duration of the partnership was a year or less.  See 
infra Appendix A § (a). 
 
[FN201]. Depending on how a multi-factor approach statute alters who would take from a decedent as 
an intestate heir, the multi-factor approach might instead decrease the number of persons who have 
standing to challenge a will. For example, my proposed intestacy reform would make the surviving 
committed partner the sole intestate heir when the decedent and the surviving partner cohabited in a 
partnership for a period of fifteen years or more and the decedent is not survived by a parent or a child 
not also the child of the surviving committed partner.  Infra Appendix B § (a) (1)-(3).  Assuming, for 
example, such a decedent who died survived by five siblings as her closest blood relations, my proposal 
would give standing to the surviving committed partner to challenge the decedent’s will on the basis of 
her status as an heir but would also result in the decedent’s five siblings losing standing to challenge the 
decedent’s will on the basis of their status as heirs.  
  The hypothetical above illustrates an issue of unfairness arising from extant intestacy statutes: Assume 
twin brothers Adam and Brian are partnered respectively with a wife of fifteen years and a non-marital 
partner of fifteen years.  Should Adam die survived only by his wife and his brother Brian and leaving a 
will devising his estate to his wife, Brian would not have standing in many states to challenge that will 
because in many states Brian would not be an intestate heir.  See Unif. Probate Code § 2- 102(1) 
(providing that the surviving spouse shall take the entire intestate estate where no descendant or parent 
of the decedent survives the decedent). However, should Brian die survived only by his non-marital 
partner and Adam and leaving a will devising his estate to his non-marital partner, in all states Adam 
would have standing to challenge that will, as in all states (with the possible exceptions of Hawaii and 
Vermont) Adam would be the sole intestate heir.  See Unif. Probate Code § 2-103 (amended 1997) 
(providing that the decedent’s surviving siblings shall take the entire intestate estate where no spouse, 
descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent). 
 
[FN202]. Infra Appendix B § (c). 
 
[FN203]. Id. § (a)(1). 
 
[FN204]. While it might further promote certainty and ease of administration if my approach were to 
deny the surviving committed partner standing to challenge a will in all cases, such an approach would 
be unacceptable in that it would result in cases in which no person had standing to challenge a will. For 
example, where the decedent dies survived by a committed partner of a relationship of more than fifteen 
years duration but is not survived by a descendant not also a descendant of the surviving committed 
partner and is not survived by a parent, the survivor committed partner would be the sole intestate heir.  
See infra Appendix B § (a) (1)-(3).  If one offered into probate a document purporting to be the 
decedent’s only will, and if the surviving committed partner is denied standing to challenge that will, no 
person would have standing to challenge that will. 
 
[FN205]. Infra Appendix B § (a)(1). 
 
[FN206]. Indeed, there is only one other heir--the brother--in my hypothetical. 
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 [FN207]. The brother would gain 52% of the property that the charity loses, while the surviving 
committed partner would gain only 48% of the property that the charity loses. 
 
[FN208]. Similarly, when the issue is whether a group of heirs has a net pecuniary interest in 
challenging the will equal to or greater than the claimed committed partner’s net pecuniary interest in 
challenging the will, it is the net gain of the group as a whole that is the relevant point of comparison. 
Infra Appendix B § (c).  For example, assume that the decedent has died survived only by her committed 
partner of 6 1/2 years and the decedent’s four siblings--Anna, Brian, Chris, and Danny.  Under my 
accrual approach, the partner is entitled to 36% of the intestate estate and each of the siblings is entitled 
to 16% of the intestate estate.  See id. § (a).  Assume further that a will is offered for probate that devises 
property worth 25% of the estate each to Anna and Brian and the residue of the estate to charity.  
  The committed partner will have standing to bring a challenge to the entire will because no “group of 
heirs” would have a pecuniary interest as great as hers in challenging the entire will.  As a group, the 
siblings would enjoy a net gain from a finding of intestacy: They would take 64% of the estate under 
intestacy as contrasted with 50% of the estate under the will.  This net gain of 14% of the estate, 
however, is less than the net gain of 36% of the estate that the surviving committed partner would enjoy 
if the decedent were found to have died intestate.  Moreover no subgroup of siblings would enjoy a net 
pecuniary gain from a successful challenge to the entire will as large as that of the committed partner.  
The subgroup of Chris and Danny would come closest with a net gain of 32% of the estate.  
  The committed partner would not have standing, however, to challenge only the gift to charity.  The 
siblings as a group have a greater pecuniary interest in such a challenge: They would take 64% of the 
property that the charity would lose whereas the committed partner would take only 36% of the property 
that the charity would lose.  This is a net gain of 32% of the estate by the siblings versus a net gain of 
18% of the estate by the committed partner. Therefore, the committed partner may not bring such a 
challenge.  
  Nor would the committed partner have standing to challenge only the gift to Anna or only the gift to 
Brian.  The committed partner would gain 36% of any property lost by, for example, Anna--a net gain of 
9% of the estate.  But the subgroup of siblings consisting of Brian, Chris, and Danny would gain 48% of 
this property--a net gain of 12% of the estate. 
 
[FN209]. See infra Appendix A § (b).  With respect to the qualification that the claimant and the 
decedent must not have been within a familial relationship to each other that would have disqualified 
them from marrying each other, the Working Draft actually provides that the claimant must “not [have 
been] prohibited from marrying the decedent under the law of this state by reason of a blood relationship 
of the decedent.”  Id.  I propose expanding this language to include also adoptive relationships that the 
governing state’s law makes relevant in disqualifying the relatives from marrying each other. See Unif. 
Marriage and Divorce Act § 207, cmt. (“Marriages of brothers and sisters by adoption are prohibited 
because of the social interest in discouraging romantic attachments between such persons even if there is 
no genetic risk.”). 
 
[FN210]. See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 81.  Professor Waggoner points out 
also that the requirement that the decedent have been unmarried at her death precludes the possibility 
that a court would be called on under the Working Draft to allocate property between a spouse and a 
person claiming to be a surviving committed partner.  Id. at 81 n.146. 
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 [FN211]. See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text (discussing the discounting approach after a 
fracture of the partnership). 
 
[FN212]. See Oldham, supra note 1, at 1421 (stating that with respect to the regulation of unmarried 
opposite-sex cohabitants, “[a]lmost all commentators, as well as the drafters of the ALI proposal, accept 
that some ‘trial’ period should be accepted where no rights arise [unless the parties agree to the 
contrary” ]). 
 
[FN213]. Infra Appendix A § (b)(iii). 
 
[FN214]. Id. § (c).  The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution define 
cohabitation for the purpose of qualifying cohabitants as domestic partners as follows: “Persons 
maintain a common household when they share a primary residence only with each other and family 
members; or when, if they share a household with other unrelated persons, they act jointly, rather than as 
individuals, with respect to management of the household.”  Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(4). 
 
[FN215]. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 81 n.145. 
 
[FN216]. Id. at 86 & n.158. 
 
[FN217]. The Working Draft does not use the term “sufficiently committed” but rather inquires into 
whether the relationship at issue was sufficiently “marriage-like.”  Infra Appendix A §§ (b)(iii), (d). 
 
[FN218]. Infra Appendix A § (e)(1).  One opposing the claimant may rebut this presumption by a 
preponderance of the evidence, unless the presumption arises in conjunction with another of several 
other factors also giving rise to such a presumption, in which case the opponent may rebut the 
presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. § (f). 
 
[FN219]. The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution similarly provide 
for a rebuttable presumption that persons not related by blood or adoption are domestic partners when 
the persons have maintained a common household for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a 
“cohabitation period, set in a rule of statewide application.”  This presumption may be rebutted upon a 
showing that the two people “did not share a life together as a couple.”  Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(3).  The Principles further provide a rule that 
persons who have maintained a common household along with their common child for a continuous 
period that equals or exceeds a “cohabitation parenting period, set in a rule of statewide application” are 
domestic partners.  Id. § 6.03(2).  
  Under the Principles, when a claimant has not maintained a common household with the putative 
domestic partner for a specified cohabitation period or maintained a common household with the 
putative domestic partner and their common child for a specified cohabiting parenting period, the 
claimant must not only show that the parties cohabited and shared a life together as a couple, but also 
that they did so “for a significant period of time.”  Id. at § 6.03(6).  Reliance is central to the inquiry into 
whether such a period of time is “significant” under the Principles.  Whether the period of time is 
significant “is determined in light of all the Paragraph (7) circumstances of the parties’ relationship and, 
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 particularly, the extent to which those circumstances have wrought change in the life of one or both 
parties.” Id. 
 
[FN220]. See infra Appendix B § (a)(i). 
 
[FN221]. See id. § (a)(1). 
 
[FN222]. See id. 
 
[FN223]. See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.04, cmt. 
a (“The period during which the parties shared a primary residence can ordinarily be established with 
objective evidence, and in most cases is substantially congruent with the period during which the parties 
shared life together as a couple”). 
 
[FN224]. See infra Appendix B § (b)(2). 
 
[FN225]. Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11, at 121 (law reform commission arguing that “[t]he 
three-year [minimum] period along with the requirement that the relationship be marriage-like will be a 
sufficient marker of the type of relationship in which the deceased would want the surviving cohabitant 
to share in his or her estate”). 
 
[FN226]. See infra Appendix B § (b)(2). 
 
[FN227]. Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11, at 119-21. 
 
[FN228]. The Principles seek to promote two goals through their rules governing the financial 
consequences of the dissolution by fracture of a domestic partnership.  First, the rules seek to fairly 
distribute the financial gains and losses arising from the termination of the domestic partnership.  And 
second, the rules seek to protect society from having to support one of the former domestic partners 
when that support more appropriately should be provided by the other former domestic partner.  See 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.02.  Where a 
jurisdiction has adopted the Principles or similar standards giving rise to financial rights and obligations 
upon the fracture of a committed partnership, consistency and a policy favoring promotion of stability in 
intimate relationships would dictate that the jurisdiction also give inheritance rights to the survivor of a 
partnership that lasted until the death of one of them.  See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers § 2.2, cmt. g:  
To the extent that a domestic partner is treated as having the status of a spouse, 
conferring rights on such a partner on the dissolution of the relationship, the domestic 
partner who remains in that relationship with the decedent until the decedent’s death 
should be treated as a legal spouse for purposes of intestacy. 
 
[FN229]. Section 6.05 of the Principles, in conjunction with Sections 4.09 and 4.10 of the Principles, 
calls for the allocation of “domestic-partnership property” upon the fracture of the qualifying domestic 
partnership.  Section 6.05 provides quite simply that “[d]omestic-partnership property should be divided 
according to the principles set forth for the division of marital property in § 4.09 and  § 4.10.”  
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.05.  Sections 4.09 and 
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 4.10 provide generally that, at dissolution of the marriage, each spouse is presumptively entitled to one 
half of the marital property owned by either spouse.  Section 4.09(1) provides that generally “marital 
property and marital debts are divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in 
value, although not necessarily identical in kind.”  Id. § 4.09. 
 
[FN230]. Id. § 6.04(1).  Paragraph 2 of Section 6.04 provides that:  
The domestic-partnership period  
(a) starts when the domestic partners began sharing a primary residence, unless either 
partner shows that the parties did not begin sharing life together as a couple until a later 
date, in which case the domestic- partnership period starts on that later date, and  
(b) ends when the parties ceased sharing a primary residence.  
For the purpose of this Paragraph, parties who are the biological parents of a common 
child began sharing life together as a couple no later than the date on which their 
common child was conceived.  
Id. § 604(2). 
 
[FN231]. See id. § 4.03 (providing that “[p]roperty acquired during marriage is marital property” except 
that “[i]nheritances, including bequests and devises, and gifts from third parties, are the separate 
property of the acquiring spouse even if acquired during marriage” and “[p]roperty acquired during 
marriage but after the parties have commenced living apart pursuant to either a written separation 
agreement or a judicial decree, is the separate property of the acquiring spouse unless the agreement or 
decree specifies otherwise”). 
 
[FN232]. Section 6.06 of the Principles provides that generally: 
(a) a domestic partner is entitled to compensatory payments on the same basis as a spouse 
under Chapter 5, and  
(b) wherever a rule implementing a Chapter 5 principle makes the duration of the 
marriage a relevant factor, the application of that principle in this Chapter should instead 
employ the duration of the domestic-partnership period, as defined in § 6.04(2).  
Id. § 6.06. 
 
[FN233]. See generally Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 
5.03 (listing the kinds of losses that are compensable with compensatory payments). 
 
[FN234]. Id. § 5.05. 
 
[FN235]. Id. § 5.04. 
 
[FN236]. For example, Section 5.04 of the Principles, entitled “Compensation for Loss of Marital Living 
Standard,” provides:  
(1) A person married to someone with significantly greater wealth or earning capacity is 
entitled at dissolution to compensation for a portion of the loss in the standard of living 
he or she would otherwise experience, when the marriage was of sufficient duration that 
equity requires that some portion of the loss be treated as the spouses’ joint 
responsibility.  
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 (2) Entitlement to an award under this section should be determined by a rule of 
statewide application under which a presumption of entitlement arises in marriages of 
specified duration and spousal income disparity.  
(3) The value of the award made under this section should be determined by a rule of 
statewide application that sets a presumptive award of periodic payments calculated by 
applying a specified percentage to the difference between the incomes the spouses are 
expected to have after dissolution.  This percentage is referred to in this Chapter as the 
durational factor, and should increase with the duration of the marriage until it reaches a 
maximum value set by the rule.  
Id. § 5.04.  
  A comment to this section illustrates an application of this principle as follows:  
A presumption arises that a spouse is entitled to an award under this section whenever 
that spouse has been married five years or more to a person whose income at dissolution 
is expected to be at least 25 percent greater than the claimant’s.  The presumptive award 
shall equal the difference in the spouses’ expected incomes at dissolution, multiplied by 
the appropriate durational factor.  The durational factor is equal to the years of marriage 
multiplied by .01, but shall in no case exceed .4.  
Id. § 5.04 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
 
[FN237]. In the case of the presumption arising with respect to a cohabiting period, the presumption is 
rebuttable.  Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(3).  In 
the case of the “presumption” arising with respect to a cohabiting parenting period, the “presumption” is 
not rebuttable.  Id. § 6.03(2). 
 
[FN238]. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d (internal citations omitted). 
 
[FN239]. See Oldham, supra note 1, at 1421-22 (noting empirical studies showing that of U.S. opposite-
sex cohabitants who do not marry, “one-sixth last three years and about 10% last five years” in support 
of acceptance of a three- year “safe-harbor” period before rights would arise from the cohabitation); 
Alta. Law Reform Inst., supra note 11, at 114-15 (noting that of the various Canadian provincial statutes 
that have extended protections to cohabitants in the areas of intestacy, support obligations, family relief, 
and wrongful death most require cohabitation for a specified minimum period (ranging from one to five 
years), with the most common such period being three years); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:39 (1992) 
(providing a spouse’s intestate share to a surviving non-marital partner of an opposite-sex non-marital 
partnership in which the partners cohabited and held themselves out as husband and wife for at least a 
three-year period immediately preceding the intestate’s death). 
 
[FN240]. Infra Appendix B § (b)(2).  I have drafted this phrase with the intent that a court must first find 
that the claimant and the decedent lived as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate 
partnership and, second, must find that their relationship also profoundly implicated at least one, but not 
necessarily more than one, of the three values--donative intent, reciprocity and reliance.  My proposal 
places the burden on one opposing the qualification of a claimant as a surviving committed partner to 
demonstrate that the decedent and the claimant did not share physical intimacy at any time during their 
relationship.  Id. § (b)(2)(v). 
 
-71- 
 [FN241]. See infra Appendix A § (d); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 6.03(7).  Section 6.03(7) of the Principles sets out factors that a court should 
consider relevant in making its determination as to whether a claimant was a domestic partner:  
Whether persons share a life together as a couple is determined by reference to all the 
circumstances, including:  
(a) the oral or written statements or promises made to one another, or representations 
jointly made to third parties, regarding their relationship;  
(b) the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances;  
(c) the extent to which their relationship fostered the parties’ economic interdependence, 
or the economic dependence of one party upon the other;  
(d) the extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and assumed specialized or 
collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together;  
(e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of either or both 
parties;  
(f) the extent to which the parties acknowledged responsibilities to each other; as by 
naming the other the beneficiary of life insurance or of a testamentary instrument, or as 
eligible to receive benefits under an employee benefit plan;  
(g) the extent to which the parties’ relationship was treated by the parties as qualitatively 
distinct from the relationship either party had with any other person;  
(h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties’ relationship;  
(i) the parties’ community reputation as a couple;  
(j) the parties’ participation in a commitment ceremony or registration as a domestic 
partnership;  
(k) the parties’ participation in a void or voidable marriage that, under applicable law, 
does not give rise to the economic incidents of marriage;  
(l) the parties’ procreation of, adoption of, or joint assumption of parental functions 
toward a child;  
(m) the parties’ maintenance of a common household, as defined by Paragraph (4).  
Id. 
 
[FN242]. Infra Appendix A §§ (b), (d).  Professor Waggoner chose to focus the multi-factor inquiry on 
whether a relationship was “marriage-like,” in part, because he believed that a judge would be likely to 
know what “marriage- like” was when she saw it.  E-mail from Lawrence Waggoner to Gary Spitko 
(Dec. 28, 2001) (on file with the author).  See also Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 
27.  
There is a substantial benefit of using marital relationships as the standard for evaluating 
the degree of commitment and the likelihood that the decedent would have intended the 
person to share in the estate; it is a standard familiar to the courts and one they likely will 
feel comfortable applying.  
Id.  Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 373, 383 (2001) 
(pointing out how both employers and courts set out criteria for qualification as a domestic partner with 
reference to the characteristics that “are thought to accompany or constitute marriage”). 
 
[FN243]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(1). 
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 [FN244]. See Stephen A. James, “As If They Were Husband and Wife:”  A Critique of De Facto 
Relationship Property Law in Victoria 15:1 Law in Context 53, 60-61 (1997) (labeling as “ironic” the 
notion that recognition of a non- marital partnership would depend upon the degree to which the partners 
“lived together as if they were husband and wife” given that a purpose of the recognition is to 
acknowledge the diversity of relationships). 
 
[FN245]. See id. at 61 (arguing that use of marriage-like as a standard  “seems to imply a monolithic 
experience which glosses over diversity even within heterosexual marriage”). 
 
[FN246]. See Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1099-102.  The author notes the political 
opposition to treating same-sex relationships as on a par with marital relationships and argues that:  
[T]o the extent that a reformed Article II [of the Uniform Probate Code] limits intestate 
inheritance rights to non-marital relationships with a requisite level of ‘marriage-like’ 
commitment and responsibility, extension of intestate inheritance rights to same-sex 
partnerships would necessarily be an acknowledgment that such commitment and 
responsibility do exist within some gay and lesbian relationships.  
Id.  See also Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 27 (noting that “a statutory 
requirement that insists on committed couples ‘mimicking’ marriage may be politically unappealing to 
LGBT communities [because t]hey might reason that it increases the potential of reinforcing 
heterosexual norms” and “also may be problematic for some opposite-sex couples who have rejected 
marriage because of its patriarchal underpinnings”). 
 
[FN247]. See Hernandez, supra note 135, at 1006-07 (“The functional approach [to defining family] 
legitimizes non-nuclear relationships that share the essential qualities of traditional relationships for a 
given context by inquiring whether a relationship shares the main characteristics of caring, commitment, 
economic cooperation and participation in domestic responsibilities.”). 
 
[FN248]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(1). 
 
[FN249]. Id. § 6.03, cmt. e (“Whether parties shared life together as a couple is determined by reference 
to all the circumstances listed in Paragraph (7), which are intended to ascertain whether the parties 
conducted themselves as spouses normally do in the course of family life.”).  See also id. § 6.02, cmt. a 
(“Domestic relationships that satisfy the criteria of § 6.03 closely resemble marriages in function, and 
their termination therefore poses the same social and legal issues as does the dissolution of a 
marriage.”). 
 
[FN250]. See Appendix B § (b)(2). 
 
[FN251]. See Principles of the Law of Faculty Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 
6.03(7)(h). 
 
[FN252]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(5); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 6.03(7)(j), (k). 
 
[FN253]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(3). 
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 [FN254]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(6); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 6.03(7)(i). 
 
[FN255]. Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 63. 
 
[FN256]. See id. at 59-61 (reporting a survey showing a positive correlation between the surveyed 
partner having exchanged with her or his partner a symbol of their relationship, such as a ring or other 
jewelry, and a preference that the surviving partner of a hypothesized non-marital couple take a larger 
share of the decedent partner’s estate). 
 
[FN257]. See id. at 55 (reporting a survey in which 6.7% of respondents with opposite-sex partners and 
5.9% of respondents with same-sex partners had arranged to be buried next to each other). 
 
[FN258]. See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(7)(f).  
See also Robbennolt & Kirkpatrick Johnson, supra note 1, at 441 (reporting that “[o]f those respondents 
[in a survey of non- marital committed partners] who had wills, ... [o]ver 90% of respondents with same-
sex partners (77 respondents) included their partner as an heir; 40% of respondents with opposite-sex 
partners (4 respondents) did so”). 
 
[FN259]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(3); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 6.03(7)(f). 
 
[FN260]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.03(7)(a). 
 
[FN261]. See id. § 6.03(7)(e). 
 
[FN262]. See id. 
 
[FN263]. See id. § 6.03(7)(a). 
 
[FN264]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(4); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 6.03(7)(l). 
 
[FN265]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(2); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 6.03(7)(b). 
 
[FN266]. See infra Appendix A § (d)(1) (listing “the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of 
exclusivity of the relationship” among the factors that a court is to consider in determining whether a 
relationship was “marriage-like”).  Professor Waggoner seems to have borrowed this exclusivity prong 
of his multi-factor approach from the court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 
1989).  See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 77-78 (quoting Braschi).  In Braschi, 
the court examined the nature of the relationship between “two adult lifetime partners” for the purpose 
of determining whether the survivor of the relationship should be entitled to remain in a rent-controlled 
apartment as a “member of the deceased tenant’s family who has been living with the tenant.”  Braschi 
v. Stahl Associates, Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50, 54 (N.Y. 1989) (emphasis removed). The Braschi court 
called for “an objective examination of the relationship of the parties,” focusing on such factors as “the 
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 exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the 
manner in which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and 
the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services.”  Id. at 55. 
 
[FN267]. Infra Appendix B § (b)(2). 
 
[FN268]. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 83 n.149  (citations omitted). 
 
[FN269]. Id. at 83. 
 
[FN270]. See Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 54  (reporting that 26.7% of survey 
respondents with an opposite-sex partner and 45.1% of survey respondents with a same-sex partner 
mentioned “[m]onogamy over an ‘extended’ period of time” as a characteristic of their relationship that 
made the respondent define the relationship as committed). 
 
[FN271]. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93 at 101.  Professor Foster explains that:  
Chinese courts give considerable weight to a wrongdoer’s reform and repentance even in 
the most severe cases of family neglect and abuse .... Under an express directive from the 
Supreme People’s Court, courts can elect not to order forfeiture of inheritance rights if 
evidence indicates that the wrongdoer subsequently “repented and mended his or her 
ways,” and the decedent “forgave” the wrongdoer during her lifetime.  
Id.  Professor Foster further notes that “[s]ome American jurisdictions take a similar approach in cases 
of spousal or parental abandonment or failure to support the decedent.”  Id. at 102 n.145 (citing N.Y. 
Est. Powers & Trusts Law §§ 4-1.4(a) (McKinney 1998), 5-1.2(6) (McKinney 1999) and N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 31A-2(1) (2001)). 
 
[FN272]. See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 83 n.149 (arguing that infidelity 
demonstrates “a weakened commitment to the relationship”). 
 
[FN273]. Kentucky and Missouri bar an adulterous spouse from taking an intestate share of the decedent 
spouse’s estate where the adultery is coupled with abandonment of the decedent spouse.  Waggoner et 
al. Family Property Law, supra note 35, at 81 (citing statutes in n.8). 
 
[FN274]. No-fault divorce, which is the rule in all fifty states, permits a court to dissolve a marriage 
without regard to whether or not either or both of the spouses has committed some act of marital fault - 
such as desertion or adultery.  See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in A Modern Divorce Law, 28 
Ariz. St. L.J. 773, 775 (1996) [hereinafter Ellman, Place of Fault]. Whether the divorce court may or 
must consider marital fault in making a property division or spousal support award is an entirely 
separate issue. Id. at 775.  See also Barbara B. Woodhouse & Katherine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and 
Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 Geo. L.J. 2525 (1994) (a “conversation” 
between Professors Bartlett and Woodhouse concerning whether courts should consider marital 
misconduct in adjudicating property issues at divorce). 
 
[FN275]. Marital fault and economic fault should be distinguished.  Economic fault is “misconduct that 
has affected directly the amount of property available for allocation.”  Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 
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 274, at 776-77. All states permit a court to consider economic fault in allocating marital property.  Id. at 
776-77. 
 
[FN276]. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act §§ 307 and 308(b) (1983). 
 
[FN277]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Chapter 1: 
Introduction 42-85 (setting out the reasoning behind the Principles’ decision to reject consideration of 
marital fault).  In an article published in 1996, Professor Ira Ellman surveyed the law of the fifty states 
and reported that at least thirty-two states forbid the consideration of marital fault in the allocation of 
property.  Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 782.  Of these thirty-two states, however, at least 
seven allow a court to consider marital fault in the awarding of spousal support.  Id. at 780.  Five 
additional states that forbid consideration of marital fault in property division “may allow some very 
limited consideration of misconduct with respect to alimony.”  Id. at 778.  Conversely, no state that 
forbids the use of marital fault in the awarding of spousal support allows its use in division of property.  
Id. at 782.  Fifteen states grant to courts the discretion to consider marital fault both in property division 
and alimony adjudication.  Id. at 780.  Finally, Ellman categorizes three states as “almost pure no-fault 
states” in that they generally preclude the consideration of marital fault in adjudicating either property 
division or spousal support, but allow for a “slight possibility” that a court might consider marital fault 
in deciding these issues in cases of very serious misconduct such as conspiracy to murder the other 
spouse or serious violent assault against the other spouse.  Id. at 779.  The law of four states--that of 
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia--provide that a spouse’s adultery is a 
complete bar to that spouse receiving a spousal support award, irrespective of any other circumstances in 
the case.  Id. at 787 n.30.  In many other states, a spouse’s infidelity is merely an “appropriate 
consideration” for the court in adjudicating a spousal support claim.  Id.  
  Professor Ellman theorizes that those states that allow consideration of marital fault in an alimony 
adjudication but not in a property division might be influenced by an acceptance of distinct rationales 
underlying alimony and property division.  Id. at 783.  He suggests that some of the common law states, 
in developing their equitable distribution schemes, have come to accept the community property notion 
that spouses jointly own property acquired by either’s labor during the course of their marriage.  Id. 
Professor Ellman further suggests that pursuant to this view, a court might think of its role as dividing 
marital property between its two legal owners, rather than as recognizing the equitable claim of an 
untitled spouse to the property of the other spouse based upon the course of events during the marriage.  
Id.  Ellman concludes that “[i]n dividing property between owners the marital misconduct of the parties 
seems largely irrelevant.” Id.  Ellman further notes that theory of alimony has not undergone widespread 
reform, and whether to award alimony and, if so, how much remains largely a matter for the court’s 
discretion.  Id. at 783-84.  “In a system with few bright lines, or even dim ones, it is not surprising that 
spousal conduct would often be included, along with everything else, among the open- ended list of 
factors that a court may consider [in adjudicating an alimony claim].”  Id. at 784. 
 
[FN278]. See Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 782-85. 
 
[FN279]. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 4.09 and 4.10 
(giving the principles for the division of marital property).  Section 4.09(1) provides that generally 
“marital property and marital debts are divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal 
in value, although not necessarily identical in kind.”  Id. § 4.09. 
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 [FN280]. See id. § 4.09, cmt. c (“It makes far more sense to ground an equal-division presumption on 
the spouses’ contribution to the entire marital relationship, not just to the accumulation of financial 
assets.”). 
 
[FN281]. Id. § 5.03 (listing kinds of compensatory awards). 
 
[FN282]. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 784.  Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: 
Analysis and Recommendations § 5.05, cmt. a (noting that the loss in earning capacity arising from 
assumption of primary caretaker duties “is ordinarily incurred in the expectation that the marriage will 
endure and the primary caretaker will continue to share in the income of the other parent”). 
 
[FN283]. See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Chapter 1: 
Introduction at 48 (stating that “[m]arital misconduct ... would typically have no logical connection to 
the factual foundation upon which Chapter 5’s presumptions of entitlement are based”); id. at 66-67 
(noting that property allocation and alimony rules were not designed to measure or satisfy compensation 
claims for physical violence or emotional abuse); Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 785 
(“Assessments of misconduct have no logical connection to the factual foundation upon which Chapter 
5’s presumptions of entitlement are based.”). 
 
[FN284]. Professor Ellman has considered whether the use of fault in an alimony adjudication might be 
appropriate to vindicate some interests other than reliance and reciprocity.  Ellman, Place of Fault, supra 
note 274, at 785- 86.  He argues that consideration of marital fault in such a proceeding can only be 
grounded in two rationales: to punish the spouse who has engaged in misconduct, or to compensate the 
spouse who has been harmed by such misconduct.  Id. at 786.  Professor Ellman, for the most part, 
rejects both of these rationales.  Id. at 788-92.  But see id. at 803 (suggesting that it might be appropriate 
to adopt in adjudications of the financial aspects of dissolution a forfeiture rule for very serious 
misconduct--such at the attempted murder of one’s spouse).  
  One line of reasoning adopted by some courts considering this issue incorporates both the punishment 
and compensation rationales.  In most cases of divorce, the dissolution of the marriage results in 
increased costs arising from the need at dissolution to maintain two households.  Some courts reason 
that these increased costs should be borne by the party whose marital fault caused the breakdown of the 
marriage.  Id. at 788.  Thus, the court punishes the wrongdoer while at the same time compensating the 
innocent spouse.  Professor Ellman criticizes this reasoning: He argues that it is too difficult to 
determine if the marital fault actually caused the marital breakdown.  Id. at 788 (asking “[w]as the 
marital breakdown ... caused by one spouse’s adultery or the other’s emotional insensitivity?”, and 
arguing that “[t]he court’s answer tells us which conduct it finds more blameworthy, not which 
functioned as the cause of the other.”).  
  Of course, this dual costs rationale, which requires an inquiry into who is to blame for the breakup of 
the marriage, has no application in the discussion of the appropriate distribution of an intestate estate.  
The intestate’s partnership has ended not because of the marital fault of either party, but rather because 
of the death of the intestate.  Therefore, the infidelity or other marital fault of the intestate or her 
surviving partner has not caused a need for the maintenance of two households.  
  Professor Ellman further rejects the argument that marital fault should be used in adjudicating the 
financial consequences of divorce to punish the guilty party who has inflicted non-financial injuries on 
her spouse or to compensate the innocent party who has incurred such non-financial injuries. Id. at 789-
92.  Such non-financial injuries might include both emotional harm and physical harm.  Id. at 790-91.  
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Professor Ellman argues that where the harm is serious, tort law (pursuant to such causes of action as 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress and battery or assault actions) is better able to 
punish the guilty party and to compensate the victim.  Id. at 791.  “In short, a fault rule would serve 
compensation functions that may already be served by the tort law.  Such duplication is inadvisable.  
There is no reason to reinvent compensation principles under the rubric of fault adjudications, nor to 
incorporate tort principles into divorce adjudications.”  Id. 
 
[FN285]. Infra, Appendix B § (b)(2)(v).  My proposal is silent with respect to whether an intestate 
decedent might be survived by more than one surviving committed partner, as the proposal defines that 
term.  Given that my proposal does not require that the intestate and a claimant have been in a 
monogamous relationship for the claimant to qualify as a surviving committed partner, it would seem 
quite possible that an intestate might be survived by two or more persons who could be qualified under 
the multi-factor approach as a surviving committed partner.  In such a case, the court should calculate 
the total amount of property awarded to the surviving committed partners based on the duration of the 
longest cohabiting partnership period.  The court might then equitably apportion among the qualified 
surviving committed partners that portion of the intestate estate so calculated taking into account such 
factors as the comparative duration of the claimants’ relationships with the decedent and the 
comparative reciprocity, reliance, and donative intent values implicated by each relationship.  The task 
would be quite similar to the equitable apportionment performed by a court faced with the competing 
claims on an estate of a legal spouse and one or more putative spouses or simply multiple putative 
spouses.  See supra note 104-07, and accompanying text (discussing the putative spouse doctrine). 
 
